VORONIN-SMIRNOV: THE MEETING THAT DIDN'T

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHISINAU 000958 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/UMB E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2018 TAGS: PBTS PREL PINR RU MD SUBJECT: VORONIN-SMIRNOV: THE MEETING THAT DIDN'T HAPPEN Classified By: Ambassador Asif J. Chaudhry for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Although a Voronin-Smirnov meeting was scheduled for September 25, on September 24 SmirnovQs press office announced that the meeting would be postponed because the sides could not agree upon a venue. The Transnistrian side attempted to blame the GOM for Chisinau's inflexibility, but President Voronin demonstrated his openness to compromise by expressing his willingness to come to Tiraspol to meet. Surprised by the cancellation of the Voronin-Smirnov meeting, Russian chief negotiator Nesterushkin arrived in Chisinau on September 25 and plans to meet with Smirnov and the GOM to clarify the situation. End Summary. No Venue, No Meeting -------------- ¶2. (C) At a September 24 reception, Transnistrian Acting "Foreign Minister" Yastrebchak explained to Ambassador, DCM and Pol/Econ Chief that the meeting had been postponed because of an inability to find a mutually acceptable venue. Yastrebchak said that the Transnistrian side had proposed that the meeting be held in Bendery, but Chisinau had proposed Aneni Noi, a small town on the right bank about halfway between Chisinau and Tiraspol. Smirnov expressed concerns that he might be arrested if he ventured that far onto right-bank territory. Then discussions on venue fell apart. ¶3. (C) Yastrebchak explained that Smirnov had promised the Russians that he would arrange a bilateral meeting with President Voronin. The Transnistrian side had called several times and proposed various dates that had been rejected. After finally reaching agreement on a date, no compromise could be found on location. Partially in jest, Yastrebchak suggested that perhaps the 5-plus-2 negotiators and observers could help arrange other locations, such as Odessa, Vienna, or even New York. In a calm and reasonable manner, Yastrebchak explained that the Transnistrian side was willing to meet, but put the blame on Chisinau for inflexibility in compromising on a location. Litskai Opines that Smirnov has Lost -------------- ¶4. (C) Meanwhile, in a separate conversation at the reception, former "Foreign Minister" Valery Litskai opined that "Smirnov had lost the game." The Russians had a vested interest in this process, he said, and Smirnov would cause Russia's discontent with his foot-dragging. Smirnov did not fool anybody by using ridiculous pretexts on location and security concerns to hide his unwillingness to meet, opined Litskai. ¶5. (C) Litskai said that Yastrebchak had been invited to Russia the previous week to encourage him and the Transnistrian administration to participate constructively in the talks. As Smirnov had failed to justify Russia's trust, in Litskai's opinion, Shevchuk was invited to Moscow to meet with Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin. Litskai suggested that this was a clear signal of the Kremlin's discontent with Smirnov. Litskai was concerned that as a result the Ukrainians could seize the Russian initiative. The new Ukrainian negotiator Kryzhanovski had already proposed to host a possible meeting of the left- and right-bank leaders in Odessa. GOM Rejects Smirnov's Concerns, Proposes Tiraspol -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Following the official statement of the Transnistrian authorities, the Ministry of Reintegration issued its own release on the issue on September 24. The Ministry labeled as absurd Smirnov's security concerns about possible arrest, and reiterated its readiness to continue direct contacts with Tiraspol representatives. In a September 25 meeting Minister of CHISINAU 00000958 002 OF 002 Reintegration Sova told Poloff that President Voronin had told Sova to release an official statement that, because Smirnov's "security concerns" and unwillingness to come to the right bank, President Voronin was willing to meet with Smirnov in Tiraspol. Following a meeting with OSCE Ambassador Remler, Sova put out a press release on September 25, expressing Voronin's willingness to meet Smirnov in Tiraspol. Nesterushkin Flies to Chisinau to Clarify -------------- ¶7. (C) Surprised by the turn of events that led to cancellation of the Russian-inspired Smirnov- Voronin meeting, Russian negotiator Nesterushkin flew to Chisinau on September 25 with the intention of clarifying the situation. Nesterushkin plans to meet on September 25 and 26 first with Smirnov and later with Sova. Comment: Two Sides to the Story -------------- ¶8. (C) Each side would like to appear like the flexible and reasonable one, and blame the other side for foot-dragging. The issue now is not one of blame, but of moving forward constructively. Though there are debates about Russian intentions in pushing for 1-plus-1 and 2-plus-1 meetings, the Moldova remains committed to formal negotiations only in the 5-plus-2 format. It seems that Russian pressure has increased upon Transnistria to give up the dream of independence. Smirnov's efforts to stall may be the result of his concerns that Russia is tightening the noose, and that a process has been unleashed that will force him to publicly abandon his long-term dream of Transnistrian independence. Indeed, Yastrebchak's comments to Ambassador seemed to reflect a new realism about the impossibility of independence. CHAUDHRY