RUSSIAN PRESIDENT MEDVEDEV TAKES INITIATIVE BUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L CHISINAU 000933 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/UMB C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (DECL AND CLASSIFIED BY ADDED) E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2018 TAGS: PBTS PREL RU MD SUBJECT: RUSSIAN PRESIDENT MEDVEDEV TAKES INITIATIVE BUT TRANSNISTRIAN SETTLEMENT ONLY IN 5-PLUS-2 CLASSIFIED BY P/E CHIEF DARIA FANE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (SBU) Summary: While a formal 5-plus-2 meeting is now planned for early October, Russian President Medvedev has been pursuing his own initiatives with both Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin and Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov. Medvedev has secured an agreement that left- and right-bank leaders will meet together with Russia to discuss a resolution of the Transnistrian conflict. It appears that, additionally, Voronin and Smirnov will meet bilaterally before that. Seemingly as a result of Russian pressure, Transnistrian leader Smirnov announced the lifting of Tiraspol's moratorium on contacts with Chisinau. The result of this movement has been some cooling of tensions, positive signals from both Moscow and Tiraspol, and hopes for upcoming talks, though observers are concerned about Russian terms for a settlement. The GOM continues to reiterate its commitment to sign an agreement only in the 5-plus-2 context, and not separately with Russia. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) Russian President Medvedev met in Sochi with Moldovan President Voronin on August 25, and with Transnistrian leader Smirnov on September 3. Following these two meetings, Russian press releases reported that both Voronin and Smirnov had separately agreed to hold a trilateral meeting with Medvedev. Several positive outcomes followed: Smirnov announced a lifting of his ban on contacts with Chisinau, and Medvedev, noting twice in the last week his optimism regarding a solution, confirmed Russian support for Voronin's efforts to settle the conflict. In a September 9 interview in the Russian press (Nezavisamaya Gazeta),Transnistrian Acting "Foreign Minister" Yastrebchak confirmed that prior to a possible trilateral meeting Smirnov and Voronin would likely meet in late September or early October. ¶3. (SBU) According to the Russian newspaper Kommersant (which has often been used by the Kremlin to float trial balloons),Voronin and Smirnov now plan to meet to agree upon basic principles of a possible settlement. This newspaper article suggested that a joint declaration containing these principles could be signed by the two leaders in the presence of Medvedev and then submitted to the five-plus-two for approval. However, in order to allay concerns that Russia could try to replace the 5-plus-2 talks with a separate trilateral format, the Government of Moldova has underlined its intention not to sign any bilateral agreements with Russia. During a visit to Brussels on September 10 Foreign Minister Stratan declared that Moldova would negotiate only within the 5-plus-2 context. GOM officials have assured us that President Voronin would not sign a separate agreement. Similarly, Transnistrian negotiator Yastrebchak opined in the press that the international 5-plus-2 format would remain the forum for discussions in order to avoid the 2003 "Kozak situation." ¶4. (C) Comment: With its new-found political strength, Russia will press its long-standing claim to a leading role in the Transnistrian settlement process. We agree with EU Special Representative Kalman Miszei and other European diplomatic colleagues in Chisinau that Russia may try to push for a Kozak agreement that includes the stationing of Russian forces in Moldova, an element which President Voronin has categorically rejected. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov's August 26 comments on using Kozak principles for a TN resolution show continued Russian interest in a settlement based on Russian desires. While Lavrov talked about Kozak, however, Medvedev raised no objections to Moldova's "package" of documents for a TN settlement for a TN settlement, a package which did not provide for the continued presence of Russian troops. Minister for Reintegration Vasile Sova speculated that Russia may want to project a more positive and constructive image as peacemaker after Russian intervention in Georgia. Russia may try to convince Moldova that a Transnistrian settlement is possible if Moldova pledges it's neutrality, renouncing NATO membership and not behaving like Georgia. ¶5. (C) Comment continued: It is significant, in this context, that Medvedev's praise for Voronin has not been matched by praise for Smirnov, the one person to whom Russia can dictate terms. Smirnov's prompt retraction of his moratorium on contacts with Chisinau officials and announcement of readiness to continue confidence-building measures following his meeting with Medvedev illustrates the power of Russian pressure on the Transnistrian leader. Of all the players in the negotiations process, Smirnov has the least to gain from a settlement which would permanently dash the notion of Transnistrian independence. CHAUDHRY