MINISTER OF REINTEGRATION ON 3 PLUS 2 MEETING, OSTROVSKY

C O N F I D E N T I A L CHISINAU 000602 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2018 TAGS: PBTS PGOV PREL RS MD SUBJECT: MINISTER OF REINTEGRATION ON 3 PLUS 2 MEETING, OSTROVSKY VISIT REF: KEIDERLING E-MAIL 06/04/08 Classified by: Ambassador Michael D. Kirby for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Ambassador Kirby met with Minister of Reintegration Vasile Sova on May 29 to review progress on confidence-building measures. Sova shared details about his meeting with Russian Duma deputy Aleksei Ostrovsky. Sova stressed that the 5 plus 2 format was the only way to resolve the Transnistrian conflict in a lasting manner. End Summary. 3 plus 2 in Helsinki -------------- ¶2. (C) Sova supported the upcoming 3 plus 2 (Russia, Ukraine, OSCE plus the EU and U.S.) meeting in Helsinki and hoped the 3 plus 2 would energize the confidence-building measures (CBM) working groups (WGs). Sova said the WGs were barely functioning, notwithstanding various letters and calls from Chisinau to Tiraspol. He thought Tiraspol authorities were dragging their feet because of a lack of pressure or lack of focus from Moscow. Sova also opined that Tiraspol was trying to establish bilateral discussions about projects with the 5 plus 2 partners, at the expense of making progress on the working groups. Sova asked the U.S. to support discussing confidence-building projects in the working groups. CBMs would be needed for the long run, he noted, implying that the long run could extend beyond next year's elections. In the meantime, he pointed out, the population needed practical solutions from the working groups. Sova added that Transnistrian working-level officials consistently showed an interest in the health, agricultural and humanitarian WGs. ¶3. (C) Sova concluded that he did not have the feeling that Moscow was actively trying to convince Tiraspol officials to participate in the CBM WGs, at least not as actively as Russia was before the Voronin-Smirnov meeting in April. Without pressure from Moscow, Sova believed, Transnistrian efforts would slow. Sova thought that the Transnistrians would block WG efforts until at least mid-June. Sova was less optimistic during the meeting about the likely success of the WGs and of finding a road to settlement this year. Ostrovsky in Moldova -------------- ¶4. (C) Sova gave us a very complete read-out of his conversation last week in Chisinau with Russian State Duma deputy Ostrovsky. Ostrovsky heads the Duma's Committee for CIS Affairs. Ostrovsky met with President Voronin, other Chisinau officials and Tiraspol authorities. In Sova's opinion, Ostrovsky seemed to be assessing whether progress was really being made in Moldova before the June informal CIS meeting. ¶5. (C) Ostrovsky told Sova that Transnistria was important to Russia for national security reasons and for its connection to the other frozen conflicts. Ostrovsky said that he felt Georgia wanted to resolve the conflicts by force, while Moldova sought a peaceful, political resolution. Ostrovsky said Russia supported a single state in Moldova, with Transnistria as part of that state. However, he asked Sova to think carefully about how strongly Chisinau wanted a unitary state. (Note: The difference between "single" and "unitary" seems to be that, in the Russian understanding, "single" would allow for a federation of two parts. End note.) Sova explained to Ostrovsky that the Moldovan constitution required both a neutral and unitary state and that Chisinau was ready to offer Transnistria broad authority to run its own affairs. ¶6. (C) According to Sova, Ostrovsky asked about Moldova's recently approved dual-nationality law that does not allow high-ranking officials to hold two citizenships. Sova explained to Ostrovsky that for now the law would not be changed, but that, after the Transnnistria conflict was resolved, the law could be modified. Ostrovsky also asked about the 2005 Moldovan law which binds the government to certain policies and approaches to the Transnistria settlement. Sova replied that the law couldn't be changed; it contained basic principles and served to guide the government's approach to resolving the Transnistria conflict. He added, however, that as a guide the law provided some flexibility on the shape of Transnistria's final status within Moldova. ¶7. (C) When asked about guarantees, Sova explained to Ostrovsky that the GOM was looking at the issue of providing Transnistria the option of choosing independence if Moldova lost its sovereignty (i.e., if Moldova became a part of Romania). Ostrovsky told Sova that he didn't see Smirnov as a person who wanted to resolve the conflict. ¶8. (C) Sova assessed his meeting with Ostrovsky as positive and constructive. Sova thought that Ostrovsky understood the Moldovan position on neutrality, a unitary state, guarantees, and the importance to Chisinau of the 5 plus 2 format for resolving the Transnistria conflict. A Russian Side Deal on Transnistria -------------- ¶9. (C) When the Ambassador asked about possible Russian efforts to resolve the Transnistria conflict on its own, Sova was emphatic that the 5 plus 2 format was the only road to a final resolution. He allowed that Russia might be able to help frame a final settlement, but said any proposed settlement must be approved by the 5 plus 2. Sova said he knew President Voronin's firm position: no separate signatures; no separate guarantees; 5 plus 2 as the only instrument for a final settlement to the Transnistria conflict. ¶10. (C) Ambassador Kirby repeated the U.S. position: we want a democratic Moldova that can function as a state and that respects human rights and that has no foreign troops on its territory. The U.S., he added, can play a valuable role in supporting a final Transnistria agreement. KIRBY