SOVA ON THE WORLD OF SMIRNOV

C O N F I D E N T I A L CHISINAU 000497 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/UMB E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/02/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS PINR MD SUBJECT: SOVA ON THE WORLD OF SMIRNOV Ref: Chisinau 466 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Kelly Keiderling for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Charge d'Affaires Keiderling and P/E Chief Daria Fane met with Minister for Reintegration Vasile Sova and Reintegration Vice Minister Ion Stavila on May 1 to brief them on Ambassador Kirby's April 30 meeting with Transnistrian (TN) "President" Igor Smirnov (reftel). Sova said that the GOM had decided that it would need Smirnov to sign an agreement with Chisinau. TN parliamentary speaker Shevchuk lacked Smirnov's natural charisma and clout with the TN security forces. Sova said he would push to set a date for long-format 5 plus 2 talks to start by the end of May. End Summary. Shevchuk Lacks Smirnov's Charisma -------------- ¶2. (C) Sova described Smirnov as a natural leader and charismatic politician who was popular with Transnistrians. Speaker of the Transnistrian Supreme Soviet (parliament) Shevchuk was a technocrat who did not have the support of TN security forces and would not be able to ensure the adherence of the security forces to an agreement signed with Chisinau. Sova recounted a couple instances when Shevchuk had tried to challenge Smirnov, but had been unable. One example was when the Supreme Soviet proposed legal changes to give itself more power. When Smirnov refused to accede to the changes, Shevchuk backed down. On another occasion, Shevchuk publicized scandalous information about Gazprom and the Smirnov family's connections to and financing with Gazprom. Shevchuk threatened that the Supreme Soviet would take action, but then backed down. ¶3. (C) Ministry of Reintegration officials had debated whether they should try to work through Shevchuk and urge Russia to remove Smirnov, but, said Sova, they had decided that TN security structures would respond only to Smirnov's orders. Sova concluded that the best path was to work with Smirnov to get him to sign an accord to resolve the TN conflict. ¶4. (C) Sova added that Smirnov would not have to worry about his retirement. Smirnov had a yacht and fabulous villa (some 30-60 kms outside of Moscow near Raminsky) in Russia, in addition to real estate in the Crimea. Sova Pushing for 5 plus 2 Round -------------- ¶5. (C) Sova said that he would push for 5 plus 2 talks to start by the end of May (some time after May 20). He envisioned a long-format meeting of 2-3 weeks to take place in St. Petersburg, with perhaps a few days in Helsinki. Sova defended a long-format approach as the best way to work through to a resolution once and for all. ¶6. (C) Asked whether Chisinau would share its "package" proposal with Tiraspol, Sova responded that the package represented Chisinau's final position, presented to Russia. Showing the Transnistrians what Chisinau would be willing to give up would not allow the GOM any room for negotiations. The Transnistrians would just table their own proposal and again the two sides would be deadlocked, Sova added. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Sova has been working the reintegration portfolio for years and has keen insight into the personalities of the players. While we have noted that Shevchuk's star has been rising, we agree with Sova's observations on the difference in personality between him and Smirnov. The GOM's recognition of the need to work with Smirnov, instead of hoping Russia would just remove him, was reflected in Voronin's decision to meet with the Transnistrian leader. Shevchuk would have his role to play, if any agreement on status were to be reached. At that point, the TN and Moldovan parliaments would be involved in approving the agreement. ¶8. (C) Post believes that holding a short meeting first to agree on an agenda for a longer session would be more productive than diving directly into an all-out long-format negotiation. KEIDERLING