AMBASSADOR ENCOURAGES OPPOSITION LEADERS TO COOPERATE ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L CHISINAU 000305 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/UMB E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2018 TAGS: PGOV PBTS MD SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR ENCOURAGES OPPOSITION LEADERS TO COOPERATE ON TRANSNISTRIA SETTLEMENT Classified By: Ambassador Michael D. Kirby, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Ambassador Kirby met leaders of the three largest opposition parties to discuss recent 3+2 talks in Vienna and to discuss a future, acceptable settlement on Transnistria. The Ambassador shared his view that any durable solution would require broad political support, including that of the key opposition parties. By including the three opposition leaders, he encouraged them to move away from knee-jerk opposition to any settlement approved by President Voronin and towards the notion of a widely supported settlement in the interests of the entire country. End summary. The Ambassador Seeks Opposition Buy-In on TN Peace -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) On March 17 Ambassador Kirby invited Serafim Urechean, head of the Our Moldova Alliance (AMN),Dumitru Diacov, head of the Democratic Party (PD),and Iurie Rosca, head of the Christian Democrats (PPCD) and Deputy Speaker of Parliament, to review the recent 3+2 meeting in Vienna. The Ambassador described the essentials of a settlement acceptable to the USG: a unified Moldova that is separate from Romania, with Russian troops out of Moldovan territory. The agreement should be worked out through the 5+2 process, be acceptable to the majority on both sides of the Dniester River, and ideally gain 80 to 90 votes in the 101-seat Moldovan Parliament (in which the PCRM currently holds 55 seats). ¶3. (C) Discussing the general background, the Ambassador described the positive and energetic work of the Finnish OSCE chair. The Ambassador went on to note that the talks in Vienna were being held in the context of Transnistrian disappointment that the Russian Duma had not "invited" Transnistria to be independent following Kosovo UDI. In order to move towards a better environment for the creation of a lasting settlement, the Ambassador said there was a need to encourage confidence-building measures, such as the ecology of the Dniester River, railroads and road transportation. He stressed that Moldova's stability and openness to investment from risk-averse investors depended on a solution which "both sides of the Dniester believe can be trusted." Opposition Leaders Glad to Be Included -------------- ¶4. (C) Urechean, leader of the largest vote-getter among opposition parties, thanked the Ambassador for this briefing and complained that Voronin and his government never briefed the opposition about their talks with Russian and Transnistrian leaders. Urechean accepted the Ambassador's argument that an earlier solution (i.e., before March 2009 Parliamentary elections) would be better than a later one, even if the GOM got credit. ¶5. (C) Rosca noted the need for patience, while also questioning whether Transnistria could participate in Moldova's 2009 elections. The Ambassador stressed the need for an inclusive settlement first. Rosca replied with a precondition ("the Russian Army goes first"), and the Ambassador responded that the 5+2 talks were the place to discuss such matters. Diacov gave an optimistic assessment that all parties wanted a solution to the Transnistria conflict, and suggested that 100 percent of the MPs would vote for a good solution. ¶6. (C) In discussing Voronin's recent statement about preparing a document for 5+2 partners to sign recognizing Moldovan neutrality, the Ambassador that Russia was no longer talking about foreign states guaranteeing Moldova's neutrality, but had retreated to the more neutral "recognizing." The Ambassador stated that the USG respected the neutrality declared in Moldova's constitution, and noted that Moldova was not yet ready for NATO, nor NATO ready for Moldova. However, he warned his guests that Moldova should not bind itself forever on the issue, and, in the present, should not give up a possible future with NATO in return for nothing in the negotiating process for a settlement. ¶7. (C) Comment: We speculated that in their opposition to President Voronin, the three politicians would be inclined not to cooperate with any Transnistrian settlement the GOM might negotiate before the 2009 elections (and Voronin's retirement). However, the Politician's appreciated being briefed on the talks in Vienna. They left the meeting with an understanding that, even though Voronin was not including them in his conversations, their support for a negotiated TN solution was important for Moldova. Implementing a durable TN resolution will need more than just a narrow majority in parliament; it will require broad-based political support. We are preparing the way for that support to be possible. Kirby