VORONIN: LOTS OF TALK, NO TRACTION ON TRANSNISTRIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHISINAU 000132 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS EAID MARR MD RO UP SUBJECT: VORONIN: LOTS OF TALK, NO TRACTION ON TRANSNISTRIA Classified By: Ambassador Michael D. Kirby for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: On February 12, the Ambassador met with President Voronin and, separately, with Foreign Minister Andrei Stratan to discuss Transnistria (TN),Article 98, relations with Romania and Ukraine, and the upcoming Gagauzia parliamentary elections. Voronin discussed Moldovan neutrality and agreed that the next 5+2 meeting could take place in Helsinki. He did not seem energized about concrete steps to resolving the TN conflict. The Moldovan government (GOM) seems ready to sign an Article 98 agreement with the USG; the timing of such a signing still needs to be resolved. Relations with Ukraine seem to be improving, while those with Romania remain sour. Voronin is very supportive of USG efforts to provide assistance to average Moldovans. He highlighted the importance of health and other social aid given directly to underprivileged Moldovans. End summary. Transnistria: Neutrality, Next 5+2 Steps -------------- ¶2. (C) When asked about his recent Moscow discussions with President Putin, President Voronin said the two had talked for a long time about Moldova's neutrality. Later, during the Sova-Tkaciuk discussions with their Russian interlocutors in Moscow, Russia had pushed for international guarantees of Moldova's neutrality. Voronin explained that the Moldovans had convinced the Russians to accept words like "respect" and "acknowledge" in describing Moldovan neutrality and the international community's acceptance of Moldova's neutrality. Voronin agreed that no other country could guarantee Moldova's neutrality. ¶3. (C) Voronin said that he and Assistant Secretary Dan Fried had discussed the issue of neutrality during their February 9 meeting in Munich. Voronin understood that Fried had agreed that State Department experts would review the differences and consequences of using words like guarantee vs. respect or acknowledge. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador asked Voronin whether the Russians would discuss important TN-related issues after resolving questions about Moldova's neutrality. Voronin lamented that the Russians had not responded to the Moldovan package of issues; nor had they raised objections, Voronin added. Voronin thought that, after agreeing to some language on neutrality, 5+2 negotiations would be able to move forward in earnest. The Ambassador noted that EU Special Representative Kalman Miszei had suggested extended (two- to three-week) 5+2 discussions to address seriously and continuously the issues on the table. The U.S. was ready to engage in such extended discussions on the basis of the Moldovan package and the Yushenko plan, the Ambassador told the President. Ideally, such talks would take place in Helsinki, the Ambassador added. (Comment: It is not clear that everyone is ready for a real push on a TN settlement, but we should not be an impediment to one. End comment.) ¶5. (C) The Ambassador suggested that, when the 5+2 discussions become more concrete and seem to be leading to a solution, the Moldovan government include opposition political leaders in discussions on TN's future. The Ambassador observed that opposition politicians seemed to view TN in narrow, political-opportunistic terms and should be encouraged to see a solution to the TN conflict as in the best interests of Moldova. Voronin responded somewhat surprisingly that Iurie Rosca (the Christian Democratic Party leader about whom the President has had sharp words) had changed since the 2005 elections; Rosca better understood and had a more constructive approach to political issues now, the President believed. Moldovan-Romanian Relations -------------- ¶6. (C) Voronin said that he felt the greatest resistance from the Romanians, rather than from the Moldovan political opposition, when the GOM has been close to a TN settlement. The Ambassador urged the President to conclude a border agreement with Romania, noting that an agreement which defined the border on the Prut River instead of the Nistru River would underscore Moldovan sovereignty. The lack of such an agreement provided fodder for Transnistrian accusations that Moldova wanted to join with Romania. Voronin agreed that a border agreement was important for political reasons and added that the Russians, too, needed to understand that Moldova and Romania were separate countries. Voronin concluded by saying that Moldova was ready "any day" for a constructive dialogue with Romania. ¶7. (C) In the meeting with the Foreign Minister, the Ambassador asked about progress on a border agreement. Stratan responded that no progress was visible. He noted he likely would meet with Romanian Foreign Minister Cioroianu in Kyiv on February 14. Article 98 -------------- ¶8. (C) The Ambassador noted the importance of signing an Article 98 agreement between the U.S. and Moldova before Moldova ratified the Rome Treaty. The President responded that the GOM had prepared the legal foundation for signing an Article 98 agreement. He asked whether the Article 98 agreement could be signed after April 9. CHISINAU 00000132 002 OF 003 Voronin preferred to avoid an EU fuss and a negative EU assessment by waiting to sign an Article 98 agreement until after the April 9 EU assessment of Moldova's progress on the EU-Moldova Action Plan. The Ambassador responded that the agreement between our two countries could be signed later, as long as the Article 98 agreement was signed before the Rome Treaty was ratified. The President recalled that he had heard such a requirement existed. ¶9. (C) During the conversation with Stratan, the Ambassador stressed the importance of signing Article 98 first and then ratifying the Rome Treaty. Ambassador Kirby noted that the embassy recently had shared six variants of an Article 98 agreement with MFA specialists. Gagauzia Parliamentary Elections -------------- ¶10. (C) The Ambassador raised the concern about the possibility of the Gagauzia People's Assembly (parliament) elections not taking place as scheduled this March. Gagauzia governor Mihail Formuzal had announced that his autonomous region had not received funds to carry out the elections. Formuzal had threatened not to hold the elections if his region did not receive funds from the central government. ¶11. (C) Voronin explained that the Gagauzia People's Assembly had made a mistake when approving the Gagauzia budget. It should have budgeted for the elections and did not when Formuzal assured the parliamentarians that he would find money elsewhere. The central government had given the autonomous region funds that could be used for various purposes, Voronin said. Voronin believed Gagauz leaders should have used those funds for elections. Voronin said the People's Assembly still had time to fix the mistake by voting for funds to be allocated to the elections. The President worried that, if the central government allotted separate funds for the Gagauzia elections, it would be accused of interfering in the autonomous region's elections. Voronin stressed that the Gagauzia elections should be conducted properly, according to norms and laws. Since the central government's budget had been adopted by the national parliament, Voronin noted, it wasn't that easy to change the budget to send more funds to Gagauzia. Still, Voronin concluded, "we'll give them funds if necessary." Moldovan-Ukrainian Relations -------------- ¶12. (C) The Ambassador noted a positive trend in Moldova's relations with Ukraine. Voronin responded that only two major issues remained unresolved. He added that Moldova wanted good relations with its eastern neighbor and resolution of issues on the basis of friendship and understanding. Voronin said Ukrainian President Yushenko had agreed to come to Moldova to sign the package of agreements if agreement on the remaining issues could be worked out between the two countries. Special Thanks to USG for Health, Social Assistance -------------- -------------- ¶13. (C) President Voronin concluded the conversation by thanking the Ambassador and U.S. Government for concrete, practical assistance in the health and social sectors. The Moldovan leader noted that average Moldovans judged the U.S. by such visible assistance. Comment -------------- ¶14. (C) President Voronin was in a relaxed mood. In discussing Moldovan neutrality and 5+2 talks, Voronin seemed unsure about Russian intentions or next steps on Transnistria. He asked rhetorically whether the Russians agreed with the Moldovan package proposals or whether they would present their objections later. Voronin shrugged in response to his own questions with an "I don't know." He seemed rather philosophical, or maybe just tired of trying to divine the Russian position on TN. Voronin did not share his longer-term vision for settling the TN conflict. During the meeting, at least, he did not exude a sense of urgency, of determination, or of the need to press forward on specific next steps. ¶15. (C) Voronin did not engage on the Ambassador's point about the importance of bringing in the opposition into TN settlement discussions at the right moment to ensure buy-in from across the political spectrum. He had measured, even kind, words for Christian Democrat leader Rosca. Perhaps Voronin does not see domestic political opposition to a GOM agreement on TN as much of an obstacle. ¶16. (C) Voronin's distrust of Romania was undiminished. He implied that Romania undertook actions against a TN settlement ("greatest resistance") whenever prospects improved for such a settlement. He did agree, however grudgingly, that signing a border agreement with Romania was important for political reasons. "We are ready any day for a constructive dialogue with Romania," Voronin concluded. ¶17. (C) Stratan, on the other hand, was less optimistic about progress with Romania. There were no "active actions" on the table, he stated during the conversation. Stratan may be wary about getting CHISINAU 00000132 003 OF 003 out ahead of his President on relations with Romania. We think President Voronin and his ruling party are more likely to use the Romanian boogey-man as a target in this pre-electoral season. Such political divisiveness-the Communist Party representing Russian- and other-language speakers, while opposition parties represent Romanian-speakers-would bode ill for Moldova. KIRBY