MEETING THE TRANSNISTRIANS IN TIRASPOL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHISINAU 001206

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/UMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS MD
SUBJECT: MEETING THE TRANSNISTRIANS IN TIRASPOL

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Classified By: Ambassador Asif J. Chaudhry for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: During his first working visit to
Transnistria on November 24, Ambassador Chaudhry
met separately with "President" Smirnov, Speaker
Shevchuk, and Acting "Foreign Minister"
Yastrebchak, and held a press conference with
local media. The visit combined initial courtesy
calls with the need to gain an open statement on
Tiraspol's willingness to cooperate on the
Transnistrian segment of the Millennium Challenge
Corporation (MCC) roads project.


2. (C) Smirnov said he would be grateful to the
USG for undertaking the roads project, but
defiantly refused to sign a protocol of assurances
together with Chisinau officials. Yastrebchak
instead offered a unilateral letter of assurances,
which he would sign. He also suggested that
Embassy officials' problems in crossing the
boundary into Transnistria could be resolved by
providing a list of embassy personnel for whom the
boundary-crossing would be easier. Transnistrian
legislative chief Shevchuk underlined
Transnistria's desire and need for the MCC's roads
renovation project and said that the Supreme
Soviet (Parliament) could pass special legislation
to ensure success of the MCC project. End
Summary.

Smirnov Performs Classic Monologue without
Listening
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--


3. (C) After Ambassador's polite opening statement
about his interest in getting to know
Transnistria, his desire to discuss embassy
officials' problems entering Transnistria, and
MCC's roads project, Smirnov took off into a
monologue, barely allowing the Ambassador to
intersperse a few comments. Smirnov dismissed the
issue of travel problems summarily by saying that
he was banned from visiting the United States and
the European Union, "so, why should I let you into
my country?" Smirnov then attempted to lead the
meeting into long digressions about history ("we
fought together against the fascists...,"
"...historically we were never part of Moldova,"
etc.,) while the Ambassador kept trying to steer
him back to the subject at hand.


4. (C) Turning to the MCC roads project, Smirnov
noted that Transnistria had problems repairing its
roads, and would be grateful to the U.S. for
taking on this project. He then introduced
unacceptable conditions. He wanted the MCC to
work directly with the Transnistrian side not
through the Moldovan central government, noting
"we have different budgets." (Comment: That
comment reflected Smirnov's lack of understanding
of how the MCC project would function, as an MCC
compact program would not put any money directly
into any state budget. End Comment.) The
Ambassador reiterated the need for dealing with
one entity. Smirnov said that Acting Foreign
Minister was fully empowered to work on MCC, but
then announced his refusal to allow signing a
protocol with Chisinau. Smirnov summed up his
attitude by saying "we did not ask you to build
these roads, but if you want to, then go ahead."

Yastrebchak Proposes a Letter instead of a
Protocol
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-


5. (C) In a separate meeting with Acting "Foreign
Minister" Yastrebchak, the Ambassador continued
discussion of the MCC roads project, asking
Yastrebchak to interpret what Smirnov really
wanted and explain the Transnistrian bottom line
on the roads. Yastrebchak hedged, saying that it
was difficult to say, as he would have to fall in
line with the position expressed by his
leadership. However, eager to find a solution
that would allow the project to go forward,
Yastrebchak proposed giving a statement of

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assurances directly to the American side.


6. (C) The Ambassador expressed his frustration
with these developments, noting that if Tiraspol
could not agree on signing this piece of paper,
then Washington ran a risk of spending money on a
project where the sides could not agree to work
together. The Ambassador said that the USG did
not want to politicize this project or link it to
the 5-plus-2 process. It should be kept separate
as a development project. In order to avoid
politicization, Yastrebchak proposed that he would
sign a letter of assurances, and then have
Alexander Rosenberg and Pavel Untura, the Tiraspol
and Chisinau co-chairs of the transportation
working group sign a document together. The
Ambassador reminded Yastrebchak that Tiraspol was
facing a deadline for providing the assurances.


7. (C) Yastrebchak asked for permission to make
several small changes to the text that he would
include in his letter to the American side. He
asked that the text use the official name
"Transnistria (Pridniestrovia)" instead of
"Transnsitria region." Additionally, he asked to
leave out the sentence about opening the Gura
Bicului Bridge. He said Tiraspol was ready to
speak of free movement of goods and people, but
not ready to speak of the bridge by name. The
Ambassador agreed that these changes should not
present a problem.

Yastrebchak Proposes Embassy List to Solve Travel
Problems
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--------------


8. (C) Turning to the issue of embassy personnel
problems entering Transnistria, Yastrebchak
proposed a solution. The embassy could follow
the model already in practice by the OSCE and the
Ukrainian Embassy. These organizations had
provided a list of personnel for whom entry into
Transnistria should be expedited. The list was
given as a non-paper, not on official stationery,
and with no formal request, just a list of names.
Yastrebchak then provided those names to the
authorities at the boundary point, and the listed
individuals were able to cross into Transnistria
freely for both personal and official travel. The
Ambassador responded that he would consider this
approach.

Shevchuk Suggests Legislation to Ensure MCC
Success
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-


9. (C) In contrast to Smirnov's political
posturing, parliamentary speaker Evgeniy Shevchuk
openly and directly spoke of the Supreme Soviet's
steadfast support for the MCC road rehabilitation
project. He noted that Transnistria lacked its
own resources for such work. Shevchuk claimed
that it had been the position of the Supreme
Soviet which had forced the Transnistrian
executive branch to start to think of implementing
this project. (Comment: In meetings with us,
Shevchuk has never referred to Smirnov by name,
preferring instead to speak only of "the executive
branch." End Comment.) Shevchuk proposed that if
necessary the Supreme Soviet could pass a special
legislative act for the MCC project, to push the
executive branch to have to implement it.


10. (C) Additionally, Shevchuk noted that he was
planning a project to create a transit corridor to
Ukraine using the Gura Bicului Bridge. He said
that this project would create a free customs
corridor which would yield positive economic
results.


11. (C) As to the free movement of diplomats,
Shevchuk noted that he had introduced legislation
addressing this problem. This bill would apply
to all persons with diplomatic immunities, and
would require the authorities to provide freedom
of movement for these individuals. The draft
legislation had already passed in the first

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reading in the Parliament, and in the second
reading in the special commission which dealt with
this issue. He predicted that the bill would be
included on the agenda in the coming days for a
final reading. Shevchuk noted that because of
tensions between Transnistrian authorities, he
wanted these issues on freedom of movement to be
clear according to law. He noted that the law
must be signed by the president and could possibly
face a presidential veto. However, should this
take place, the parliament had enough votes to
overcome a veto. After a signing, a new law would
take about one month before it became effective.


12. (C) The Ambassador outlined USG concerns on
the MCC project. He reiterated the need for
assurances that Transnistrians understood that a
single entity would implement the compact project,
that Transnistria would cooperate with Chisinau,
and that there would be freedom of movement for
the contractors carrying out feasibility studies,
as well as free movement of people and goods after
the roads were rehabilitated. The Ambassador
reiterated the November 28 deadline for receiving
the necessary assurances. Shevchuk promised to
speak with the "President" about the Ambassador's
concerns, and to find the necessary solutions.
Unfortunately, he noted, there were still strong
controls at the "border" between Moldova and
Transnistria, but he believed such controls should
be simplified.

Comment
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13. (C) Decision-making in Transnistria has been
hampered by differences of opinion within the
inner circle. While pragmatists understand the
need for working with the U.S. on road
rehabilitation, a small circle of hardliners have
been opposed to allowing the Americans greater
presence and engagement in Transnistria. The
differences in approach between Smirnov and
Shevchuk could hardly have been painted more
clearly than in these meetings. While Smirnov
approached the Ambassador with off-putting
rhetoric, the pragmatic, business-oriented
Shevchuk eagerly expressed Transnistria's need for
the MCC project and offered to undertake special
action to keep it on track. While Smirnov is a
"carpet-bagger" who will one day pack his bags and
return to Russia, Shevchuk and Yastrebchak
represent a younger generation of indigenous
leadership who care more about economic
development and Transnistria's future. Between
Yastrebchak's proposal for providing a list of
names, and Shevchuk's proposed legislation, our
problems in entering Transnistria may be solved.

CHAUDHRY