TRANSNISTRIAN BORDER GUARDS REFUSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHISINAU 001084 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/UMB E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS MD SUBJECT: TRANSNISTRIAN BORDER GUARDS REFUSE PRESIDENT VORONIN Classified By: Ambassador Asif J. Chaudhry for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: On November 3, Minister for Reintegration Vasile Sova convened the Ambassador to inform him about an incident that had taken place earlier that morning. Transnistrian "border" guards had denied President Voronin access to his home village of Corjova, a central-government-controlled town located in Transnistria. As a result, it was not clear whether or not the Voronin-Smirnov meeting planned for November 6 would take place. Though informal talks in Odessa were scheduled for November 7-8, a new shadow now hung over the prospects for a formal 5-plus-2 round by the end of November. It was not clear whether Transnistrian "President" Igor Smirnov had prevented the President's travel on his own initiative or under instructions from Moscow. Sova asked that the U.S. Delegation to OSCE in Vienna support a statement at the Permanent Council meeting next week noting the difficulties that this incident would pose for the 5-plus-2 process. End summary. President Voronin Refused Access to Home Village -------------- --- ¶2. (C) In a November 3 meeting, Minister for Reintegration Sova said that President Voronin had personally asked him to inform the American Ambassador about the events which had taken place earlier in the day. The President had planned to take part in a ceremony in his native village of Corjova, in honor of rebuilding the church (which had been demolished by the Communist Government in the 1960s). The village of Corjova is situated on the left bank of the Dniester but is controlled by Chisinau. Transnistrian border guards refused access to President Voronin, who was accompanied by his wife and the Orthodox Church Metropolitan Vladimir. ¶3. (C) In light of the meeting between Presidents Voronin and Smirnov proposed for November 6 and the upcoming 5-plus-2 session in Odessa November 7-8, Sova speculated that the goal of this incident had been to complicate the settlement process, and raise a cloud over the resumption of 5-plus-2 talks in late November. GOM Notified Transnistrian Authorities in Advance -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Sova reviewed the steps the GOM had taken to inform the Transnistrian authorities of the President's travel and assure unimpeded passage. On October 29 the GOM had sent a letter to Tiraspol requesting assistance in organizing the November 3 church dedication event, and the November 6 meeting of Voronin and Smirnov. This letter had included detailed information about the names of those traveling for the November 3 ceremony, including the time of arrival and departure, and information about the cars. ¶5. (C) On October 30-31 Smirnov was in Moscow, accompanied by Transnistrian "Foreign Minister" Vladimir Yastrebchak. Sova had spoken with Russian Special Ambassador Nesterushkin on November 1 and confirmed that these planned events had been discussed with Deputy Foreign Minister Karasin. Reportedly, Karasin had suggested that both events should take place as scheduled, and on November 1 Smirnov returned to Tiraspol. ¶6. (C) On the evening of November 1 Chisinau received confirmation from Tiraspol for the November 6 meeting. However, Chisinau officials received no response with respect to the November 3 church ceremony. Sova made a second call to Russian Security Council Deputy Zubakov. On November 2 Sova received a response from Transnistrian "Minister for State Security" Antiufeev that one of the names on the list, Chairman of the Dubasari District Chair Polichinski, was under criminal investigation in Transnistria and suggested that he be excluded from the group traveling with the President. In order to avoid any problems, Sova reported, the GOM removed Polichinski from the list. CHISINAU 00001084 002 OF 003 ¶7. (C) Despite these preparations, on the morning of November 3, when the President's car arrived at the Dubasari checkpoint, the guards told the President they had no permission to let him in. Sova called Antiufeev, whose deputy confirmed that there was no permission from Smirnov to allow Voronin to cross. Voronin, his wife and the Metropolitan returned to Chisinau. Will November 6 Meeting Take Place? -------------- ¶8. (C) Back in Chisinau, Voronin called a cabinet meeting. The President and his advisors formally decided to avoid any steps which could aggravate the situation. President Voronin understood that this incident was designed to humiliate him. According to Sova, the President was calm and believed that this was not a local initiative. However, this incident cast a shadow on the possibilities for Voronin and Smirnov to meet on November 6. It was not certain whether that meeting would take place. Sova promised to inform us by the afternoon of November 5 whether Chisinau officials planned to go forward. ¶9. (C) Sova noted that the Transnistrian letter confirming the November 6 meeting had contained an odd element. The Transnistrian side had proposed that the meeting take place in the presence of the media. Sova said he was not opposed in principle, but that no serious discussions could take place in the presence of the mass media. Was Smirnov Exercising Free Will? Or Russia's Will? -------------- -------------- - ¶10. (C) However, pondered Sova, it was not yet clear, what this incident meant, and who was behind it. Was Smirnov acting on his own, asked Sova, or, was he fulfilling Russian instructions? Sova noted that Antiufeev had assured him several times that Moscow had said that travel to the ceremony would be acceptable. Antiufeev had told Sova that he expected no problems and was only waiting for Smirnov's permission. Such permission never came. ¶11. (C) The Ambassador noted that he had posed the question of Smirnov's free will to President Voronin. Voronin had responded that Smirnov did what Moscow told him to do. Now, we had a situation where Moscow had reassured various players that all should transpire without problem, and yet the Transnistrians had done the opposite. Transnistrian officials also failed to participate in the October 7-8 meeting of 5-plus-2 in Vienna, which also raised the question of whether Smirnov acted on his own or under Russian orders. Sova responded that he was 100 percent sure that the decision not to attend in Vienna was not taken in Tiraspol. Would Smirnov Jeopardize 150 Million USD? -------------- ¶12. (C) Sova noted that the goal of Smirnov's trip to Moscow had been to request 150 million USD assistance for Transnistria. Sova thus believed that had Russian officials recommended to Smirnov that nothing go wrong for President Voronin's travel, then Smirnov would have followed instructions. Sova believed that when Smirnov received clear instructions from Moscow he followed them to the letter, but that whenever the instructions were not so clear, he took his own initiative. It was possible, speculated Sova that Smirnov might have taken this initiative if he had been refused the financial assistance he requested. Request USG Support for OSCE Statement in Vienna -------------- --- ¶13. (C) Sova had one final request. He noted that Presidential Advisor Sergiu Stati would meet with OSCE Ambassador Philip Remler to brief him on the Corjova events. Stati planned to ask Remler to inform the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna of these developments at its meeting next Thursday, and to CHISINAU 00001084 003 OF 003 let delegates know that this incident did not provide a positive atmosphere for moving forward on a Transnistria settlement. Sova asked that the U.S. delegation support this message. Comment -------------- ¶14. (C) Recently, a pattern has emerged: whenever progress is accelerating, an incident takes place to create a stumbling block. Following the Corjova incident, it is not clear whether the Voronin- Smirnov meeting scheduled for November 6 will take place. At any rate, it is clear that a shadow hangs over the process which may succeed in derailing both the informal 5-plus-2 discussions in Odessa November 7-8 and the formal round of talks planned for late November. Those who seek to derail the process can always find an easy pretext. CHAUDHRY