EUROPEN COMMISSION HEAD DOWNBEAT ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHISINAU 001078 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/UMB E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS MD SUBJECT: EUROPEN COMMISSION HEAD DOWNBEAT ON MOLDOVA Classifed By: Ambassador Asif J. Chaudhry for reasons 14 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: 1. In an October 9 meeting with Ambassador Chaudhry, the head of he European Commission delegation to Moldova, Ceare de Montis, gave a disapproving assessment of political and economic developments in Moldova. He painted a generally negative picture of MoldoaQs prospects for reaching EU standards, as he qestioned the commitment of Moldovan leaders to avance needed political and economic reforms. EndSummary. Moldova's Poor EU Prospects -------------- ¶2. (C) De Montis offered litte hope that Moldova would receive a clear EU sigal regarding prospects for Moldovan accession tothe EU in the foreseeable future. First, Moldov had made no progress on reforming its politicaland economic systems since before the local electons in June 2007, claimed de Montis. Second, evn if Moldova could re-start reforms, the questio of EU enlargement was now "taboo" within the EU In addition, he openly questioned the GOM's acual commitment to joining the EU. Unlike Ukraine where the opposition parties pushed for movemen toward EU accession, he believed that the GOM's strategy to join the EU was merely a political maneuver by the Party of Communists (PCRM) to weken the appeal of MoldovaQs opposition groups. Itoxicated Political Elite Unable to Reform -------------- ¶3. (C) Abassador de Montis had nothing positive to say aout Moldova's recent political developments, whih he claimed were dominated by an "intoxicated" ladership unable to think or act in a way that wold support political reforms. He even questione whether average Moldovans were more likely to support movement toward the EU rather than Moscow. De Montis said that the ruling party was caught off guard by the strong showing of the opposition during the June 2007 local elections. The PCRM's poor showing caused the GOM to make changes to the power structures of the country (such as the Ministry of Interior),electoral laws, and the media. He noted that the GOM had ignored the EC's clear expressions of concern regarding these negative developments and said that more strong criticism was on its way in the form of the just-released Venice Commission report. How to Spend EC's Large Assistance to Moldova -------------- ¶4. (C) Ambassador de Montis said that the EC's annual assistance to Moldova was one of the largest in the world on a per capita basis (30 Euro per Moldovan he said),but that prospects were very limited for the EC's projects making much difference. He didn't see the point in investing in roads, because he questioned whether the GOM would maintain them. He saw no possibilities in the agricultural sector for EC programs, other than assistance with phyto- sanitary norms. De Montis believed little could be done to alleviate the major economic problems of trade, credit, the financial system, or an improved business regulatory environment. The only EC program that he spoke positively about was support for EUBAM, which he believed was directly responsible for increasing transparency in trade involving the Transnistria region and reduced trafficking in persons. No Positive Scenarios for Elections -------------- ¶5. (C) De Montis expressed strong skepticism that the results of the 2009 elections would have a positive impact on Moldova's reform prospects. He argued that each of the following three election scenarios were still possible: a continued majority for the PCRM, a majority coalition of opposition parties, or a coalition of the PCRM and one or more opposition parties. His opinion was not based on the most recent poll numbers, but rather on his conviction that today's polls did not represent the true views of voters. Soviet Instincts Remain -------------- ¶6. (C) Throughout the meeting, De Montis made frequent references to the ongoing presence of the Soviet Union's legacy in Moldova, particularly in the area of governance. He made frequent references to the role of Moldova's security services and the Ministry of Interior in managing the flow of information within the government and monitoring the opposition, and noted his belief that the newly re-appointed Minister of Interior "was given a specific task to deliver." He also stated that the PCRM's new election campaign head, Mark Tkaciuk, would "use all of the tricks of the game." Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) While Post generally agrees with the concerns expressed by Ambassador de Montis, we do not share his cynicism. Quite the opposite. We believe that the Moldovan leadership and population genuinely want European integration and are making progress in thaQdirection. In our view, by ignoring positive developments in society, constantly focusing on rumors of political intrigue and overemphasizing the Soviet legacy in Moldova, De Montis's thesis serves to rationalize the relatively poor results of the EC's flawed model of development assistance, with its strong emphasis on poorly monitored budgetary support to the GOM. His is not an accurate depiction of the desires of the majority of Moldova's citizens, nor of broad Moldovan progress in structural reforms. If De Montis's reports to Brussels reflect the negative assessment he shared with us, the prospects for Moldova's membership in the EU are probably distant indeed. CHAUDHRY