Anti-Russian Christian Democrat Leader Also Critical of

C O N F I D E N T I A L CHISINAU 000105 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/UMB, DRL/AE E.O. 12958: Decl 02/03/18 TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS KDEM MD SUBJECT: Anti-Russian Christian Democrat Leader Also Critical of Romania REFS: Chisinau 0071 Classified by CDA Kelly Keiderling under 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In a February 1 meeting with Ambassador Kirby, Christian Democrat (PPCD) leader Iurie Rosca sought assurances that the USG would not "guarantee" Moldovan neutrality. The Ambassador explained that the U.S. was not in a position to guarantee the neutrality of another sovereign nation. In discussing Transnistria, Rosca reflexively rejected the possibility of any fair solution as long as Voronin was President and the Russians were involved. While culturally and linguistically pro-Romanian, he strongly criticized Romania's failure to sign the border treaty, and presented himself as a true patriot supporting Moldovan independence. End summary. ¶2. (C) Rosca showed visible relief when the Ambassador stated that the USG would not "guarantee" Moldova's neutrality as part of a Transnistria settlement. Dismissing the analogy to post-WWII Austria, the Ambassador pointed out that the U.S. had no military or legal claim over Moldova's sovereignty. Moldova could, he said, bind itself to limited-term neutrality, but that was Moldova's choice to make. Russian statements about western "guarantees" of Moldova's neutrality, the Ambassador concluded, were best seen as a distraction from more important issues. The Ambassador further noted, to Rosca's rather chagrined acceptance, that Moldova was completely unready for NATO membership. ¶3. (C) Rosca was adamant that Russia had to withdraw its troops before a final agreement, and that Moldova should not conclude an agreement on Transnistria while the pro-Russian Voronin was in power. Regarding ownership guarantees for Transnistrian/Russian businesses, Rosca replied that Moldova could offer solid reassurances only after the 2009 elections. When asked about 5 + 2 talks, Rosca replied that they could be effective after the "1 + 1" (Voronin and Putin) talks came to an end. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador noted that a sustainable solution to the Transnistria conflict would require the support of other concerned parties (i.e., parliamentarians and political party leaders). Rosca expressed strong support for the U.S. approach to treaty negotiations (which included senators from both parties),and noted that Voronin would need a three-quarters (76 of 101 members) parliamentary vote to confirm a settlement. He also accepted that an inclusive approach was necessary to spread political credit (and risk of blame) across the Moldovan political spectrum. ¶5. (C) However, when asked whether he would support a Voronin effort to include other political leaders in the settlement process, he replied: "Probably. But not now. Only after 2009. When we have a President with a normal patriotic attitude." Further, Rosca acknowledged that the Communist Party would have to be included in such a broad-front approach even if it lost its parliamentary majority after the 2009 elections. Even with Voronin out of the picture, Rosca noted that Russian intransigence could derail any hope of non-Communist parties accepting a deal. ¶6. (C) For all his antipathy to Voronin and the Russians, Rosca showed no compensatory pro-Romanian reflexes. In fact, he strongly criticized Romania's failure to sign the basic border treaty, noting that the Russians were exploiting the failure in order to prevent a Transnistrian solution. (Note: Transnistrian leaders interpret any Romanian "weakness" on Moldovan sovereignty as part of Romanian hegemonic designs on Moldova and Transnistria. End note.) Rosca stated that he would try to persuade Romanian Prime Minister Basescu to do the right thing and sign the border treaty immediately. Rosca said that Basescu's reluctance to sign arose from political pressures in Romania, ignorance in the Prime Minister's Democratic Party (PD), and from the failure of the Romanian Ambassador to Moldova to keep his government informed. The worst effect of Romania's failure to sign, Rosca concluded, was that it allowed Voronin to portray Romania as the enemy. ¶7. (C) Comment: At every turn of the conversation, Rosca showed his visceral opposition to Voronin and Russia. Even Rosca's criticism of Romania was ultimately based on the fact that it assisted Voronin. As one who could play a key role in formulating Moldova's approach to a Transnistrian settlement after the 2009 elections, Rosca displayed the antipathy to compromise and all-parties inclusion that retards the development of consensual democracy in the country. Keiderling