EXILES SEE OPPORTUNITY FOR POLITICAL CHANGE IN NARGIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHIANG MAI 000075 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS, IO, AND DRL NSC FOR PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/13/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SOCI BM TH SUBJECT: EXILES SEE OPPORTUNITY FOR POLITICAL CHANGE IN NARGIS CHIANG MAI 00000075 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Alex Barrasso, Chief, Pol/Econ, CG Chiang Mai. REASON: 1.4 (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The Burmese regime's mishandling of the relief effort in the wake of Cyclone Nargis has the potential to boil over into mass uprising, according to Thailand-based Burmese exiles. Given the correct confluence of factors, demonstrations could even possibly lead to the downfall of the regime, in which some small cracks have already become apparent, they asserted. In their view, the role played by the monks, the National League for Democracy, student groups, and younger Burmese inside Burma will be key factors determining the success of any future uprising. The subtext of this point, however, is that the exiles alone cannot significantly influence the regime's grip ON power. Moreover, some contacts told us Aung San Suu Kyi has directed that the relief effort not be linked to national politics. End Summary. ¶2. (C) ON a May 9-11 trip to the Thai-Burma border town of Mae Sot, Tak Province, Consulate staff sought the views of several Burmese exiles ON whether the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis presented an opportunity that could be capitalized ON to promote political change inside the country. Though they conveyed differing degrees of confidence, and divergent thoughts, they agreed that a window of opportunity existed, and some were able to outline nascent efforts to spur such a process. -------------- The Role of Monks -------------- ¶3. (C) According to U Pinya Zawta, a monk who played a leading role behind the scenes before and during the Saffron Revolution last summer, mobilizing monks and youth to provide assistance in affected areas is one way to capitalize ON the regime's botched relief operations in the wake of Cyclone Nargis. U Pinya Zawta said he had sent letters outlining this approach to monasteries in the Irrawaddy delta ON May 6 via Burmese students based in Bangkok who have since reentered Burma. The students, he said, are prepared to participate in this effort, and are carrying cash they raised in Bangkok, which they will use to purchase and distribute relief supplies. Younger monks engaged mainly in teaching are his main target group, he said, because they are more "in touch" with the people than other monks. ¶4. (C) Any mass uprising would emerge from popular anger over three issues, U Pinya Zawta opined: -- the fact that the regime had 48 hours notice before the cyclone hit, yet failed to warn residents or take precautionary measures; -- the regime's focus ON the constitutional referendum rather than humanitarian relief; and -- the regime's failure to allow international assistance to enter the country or issue visas to aid workers. Opposition groups inside Burma understood these issues, he asserted, and were spreading these bits of news via the exile radio stations and word of mouth. According to other contacts, the re-labeling of relief supplies by Burmese authorities to hide their origin and make it appear as though they came from one or another General, was another issue worth emphasizing as a part of such efforts. The fact that re-labeling has occurred was confirmed to us by a World Food Program worker inside Rangoon. ¶5. (C) If students, monks, and the general public work together to provide assistance, they will inevitably clash with authorities attempting to stop them from doing so, U Pinya Zawta claimed, thereby causing some low-level clashes with security forces. Such encounters ON a larger scale could, he opined, lead to successful political upheaval. For this to occur, however, activists in Rangoon and the National League for Democracy (NLD) must take the lead. If demonstrations START in Rangoon, he underscored, the rest of the country will follow, particularly if they are backed by the NLD, and the NLD is prepared to form a transition government. ¶6. (C) Yet U Pinya Zawta pointed out several weaknesses in this strategy, making it clear that the regime has the upper hand. One complicating factor is that there are very few monks in monasteries right now, he noted, with many having returned home CHIANG MAI 00000075 002.2 OF 003 for a break after the recent state-sponsored exams. He also highlighted several restrictions placed ON monks in the wake of the Saffron Revolution that would hamper any such effort, namely that the regime had placed strict limits ON the number of monks entering the monkhood and planted informers among those granted entry. Monks, he said, can also no longer travel as freely as they did, preach impromptu in villages, or run schools for disadvantaged children. ¶7. (C) According to U Pinya Zawta, older monks are afraid of returning to monasteries and organizing politically because they fear being identified as supporters of the Saffron Revolution by informants. Similarly, younger ones are reluctant to return and play politically-active roles out of fear they will be fingered as participants in the Revolution. Consequently, he opined that not many monks would participate in any uprising occurring in the next two weeks. Nonetheless, he remained optimistic, citing an incident in which monks seeking to travel to Rangoon from Mandalay to distribute relief supplies ON May 9 were forcibly turned back by authorities. -------------- It's Not Just Monks -------------- ¶8. (C) We also met separately with Mo Thee, a key leader of the 1988 uprising who, despite having been outside the exile movement in Thailand for several years, still commands the respect of many former political prisoners and activists, as well as Aung Myo Tint and Mo Kyaw, former members of the Generation 88 group who fled to Thailand after the Saffron Revolution. They are working together with U Pinya Zawta, and seconded his comments about the need to cause skirmishes with authorities by attempting to deliver relief supplies. ¶9. (C) Aung Myo Tint asserted that about 10% of Burma's population lives in areas affected by the cyclone, and that the group is highlighting the U.S. offers of humanitarian assistance to affected residents there, along with the regime's refusal to accept all of them. (Embassy Rangoon notes that the correct figure is 28%.) Mo Thee said that approximately 50 Burmese-Americans are prepared to enter the affected areas and assist in the group's effort, while bemoaning the fact that none had yet received the necessary entry permits. He added that the group has the support of Burmese actor-turned-activist Kyaw Thu, and that he believes the effort could succeed in heightening political tensions and making it clear to the people that the regime has failed them, if the group could raise money quickly. Aung Myo Tint seconded this sentiment, noting that when the Saffron Revolution broke out, no one was prepared. He expressed hope that this would not be the case if an uprising occurred in the near future. -------------- Hairline Fractures at the Top? -------------- ¶10. (C) Separately, contacts at the Karen National Union -- a group that has waged low-level armed conflict against the regime for over 40 years -- told us that Senior General Than Shwe and Thura Shwe Man, the regime's third-highest ranking general, openly disagreed about whether to accept international aid. They said that Thura Shwe Man favors accepting it without conditions, while Than Shwe is taking a much harder line. They also alleged that many soldiers were unhappy because their commanders were not allowing them to take leave in order to assist their families in this time of need. Interlocutors at the National League for Democracy Liberated Areas -- an exile group that claims to still have links with the NLD -- echoed this assessment. However, neither the KNU nor the NLDLA was able to articulate a plan to capitalize politically ON the Nargis tragedy. In fact, NLDLA contacts told us they had received a message from Aung San Suu Kyi via the NLD's Central Executive Committee explicitly instructing the party to delink humanitarian relief from politics. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Some exiles are determined to push ahead with efforts to instigate clashes with the authorities by forcibly distributing relief supplies even when instructed not to do so by the authorities. Embassy Rangoon adds that the exiles' comments do not take into account the current situation, particularly in the devastated Delta region, where the monks are focused completely ON humanitarian relief, although these monks may not be carrying out the particular strategy exiles outlined CHIANG MAI 00000075 003.2 OF 003 to us. The exiles have wrongly predicted "cracks at the top" before. Burma's senior generals continue to FOLLOW Than Shwe's orders. No one dares to defy him, even if it means the unnecessary deaths of thousands of people. ¶12. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassies Rangoon and Bangkok. MORROW