SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: PEACE DIALOGUE AWAITS SIGNAL FROM NEW

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CHIANG MAI 000040 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS NSC FOR PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/11/2018 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER KDEM TH SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: PEACE DIALOGUE AWAITS SIGNAL FROM NEW GOVERNMENT REF: A. BANGKOK 300 (DAS MARCIEL HEARS VIEWS ON SOUTHERN VIOLENCE) ¶B. 07 BANGKOK 6281 (SOUTHERN DIALOGUE FACILITATOR GIVES OPTIMISTIC READOUT) ¶C. 07 BANGKOK 6161 (SURAYUD TALKS TO THE BRN-C) ¶D. BANGKOK 710 (PRISONER ABUSE ALLEGATIONS ON THE RISE) CHIANG MAI 00000040 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Mike Morrow, Consul General, CG, Chiang Mai. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (S/NF) PM Samak's month-old government has yet to signal its approach to the secret peace process launched by its predecessor to address the violence in southern Thailand, we were told by Mark Tamthai, advisor to former PM Surayud. Samak's security policy team is still taking shape, and it is unclear who will have his ear on the southern issue. Tamthai believes Samak must embrace the peace process for it to succeed, and expects in a few days to brief him and other top officials on the status of the process and seek to win their support. No meetings have taken place between the RTG and separatist groups since the last round in Bahrain in early December. With human rights abuses reportedly on the rise, Samak would need to move forward quickly and decisively if he wishes to avoid having both sides dig in deeper and gird themselves for new cycle of intensified violence in the south. End Summary. -------------- --- Peace Process Awaits New Thai Government -------------- --- ¶2. (S/NF) On March 10, Consul General called on Dr. Mark Tamthai, Director of the Institute of Religion, Culture and Peace at Payap University in Chiang Mai. Tamthai was a member of the 2005 National Reconciliation Commission, and more recently served as advisor to former interim Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont on the southern Thailand peace process. ¶3. (S/NF) Tamthai told CG it was still too soon to say how the new government in Bangkok would approach the secret peace process that has been underway (reftels). He said the government was still organizing itself, noting that this was not a normal transition given the change-over from a military-appointed interim government to an elected one. "So they're starting from scratch," he observed, making almost wholesale replacements of top-ranking officials and largely bringing back officials from the Thaksin-era governments of 2001-06. Tamthai confirmed that no meetings have taken place between the RTG and separatist groups since the last round in Bahrain in early December (refs B and C). -------------- Some Optimistic Signals -------------- ¶4. (S/NF) The RTG's Surayud-chaired committee on the southern insurgency would continue to exist, Tamthai said. But the key is whether new Prime Minster Samak Sundaravej will embrace and support it. The committee cannot move the peace process forward without prime ministerial support; for example, it needs someone who can order troop movements to set up and secure "peace zones," as well as someone who can engage foreign governments. ¶5. (S/NF) Tamthai was cautiously optimistic PM Samak would support rather than ignore the committee and the existing peace process, because: -- no better alternative has emerged, so the new government is unlikely to reject the current process if there is nothing to replace it with; and -- Samak is already on record saying his government would continue to follow the roadmap outlined in the recommendations of the 2005 National Reconciliation Commission, and Interior Minister Chalerm Yubamrung has stated a need to look beyond a purely military solution. -------------- Who Has PM Samak's Ear? -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) A bigger question mark is who will be the key players CHIANG MAI 00000040 002.2 OF 003 on the southern issue in Samak's government, Tamthai said. Samak's priorities on economic policy are fairly clear, but his security policy is less so. His cabinet team is comprised largely of politicians, and lacks officials with strong military, security, and foreign policy experience. Tamthai claimed no knowledge of who might comprise Samak's inner circle of advisors, but spoke favorably of two people whom he believed were in the "next tier" on security matters: Royal Thai Army (RTA) Supreme Commander Gen. Boonsang Niampradit, and RTA Chief of Staff Gen. Songkitti Jakkabat. He said both officers were close to the Thaksin-era governments, and both served with RTA forces deployed to East Timor as peacekeepers. (Comment: Gen. Jakkabat was a prep school classmate of former PM Thaksin). ¶7. (S/NF) Tamthai also spoke favorably of RTA Commander-in-Chief Gen. Anupong Paojinda, who is a member of the RTG's committee on the southern insurgency and has supported Surayud's efforts. Asked whether Surayud would remain a player, Tamthai expressed uncertainty. He said it was very strange that Surayud had not been appointed to the King's Privy Council since leaving office in early February. An appointment would seem to be an obvious move, given that Surayud was asked to be interim Prime Minister to "help out the country" and his PM appointment was endorsed by the King. ¶8. (S/NF) Tamthai told us he would travel to Bangkok in a few days to brief PM Samak and other top officials on the status of the secret peace process and seek to persuade them to support it. It will be important, he said, to inform them about developments that have taken place since the Thaksin government was ousted in 2006. Asked for an example of a new development, Tamthai cited the inclusion in the process of community stakeholders (both Muslim and Buddhist). He did not provide details on the nature of their participation, but said bringing community leaders inside was an important step forward. This helps get them to buy into the process - even if their views are not heeded much - and it would be a mistake to exclude them now that they are part of it. -------------- An Argument For Going Public -------------- ¶9. (S/NF) Tamthai continues to advocate that the RTG-separatist dialogue be made public (ref A). He argued that there reaches a point when the secrecy of secret talks loses its utility. At a certain point the process needs to go public so that pro-peace forces can support the process and give it sustainability. He acknowledge the risk to public security (and participants' personal security) of going public, but believes the risk occurs "only at the first moment." -------------- Tamthai on Human Rights Abuses -------------- ¶10. (S/NF) Tamthai said he was aware of allegations by NGOs and civil society groups of an uptick in human rights abuses by Thai military forces in recent months (ref D). Though he knew of no hard evidence, he drew a parallel between the current situation and that of 2004. That year, he said, several years of good government policy in the south had created a threat to those who may have wanted peace but wanted it without any compromises made to the area's Muslim majority. As a result, some rank-and-file military personnel felt threatened by the peace process and powerless to stop it through formal channels - so they resorted to "disappearances" and other human rights abuses. Now we are seeing a similar phenomenon, Tamthai observed. He cautioned, however, that not all violence in the south could be attributed to the insurgents and security forces. Some is related to narcotics trafficking, and some was linked to the December parliamentary elections. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (S/NF) Surayud has a reasonably good package to hand off to new PM Samak. Whether the handoff will be clean, fumbled, or refused will largely be determined by the same players who had - at best - a mixed record on the south as members of the 2001-06 Thaksin governments. With human rights abuses reportedly on the rise, Samak would need to move forward quickly and decisively if he wishes to avoid having both sides dig in deeper and gird CHIANG MAI 00000040 003.2 OF 003 themselves for new cycle of intensified violence in the south. ¶12. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Bangkok. MORROW