SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: SEARCHING FOR WAYS AHEAD

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CHIANG MAI 000141 NOFORN SIPDIS NSC FOR PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/15/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KDEM PTER PHUM TH SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: SEARCHING FOR WAYS AHEAD REF: CHIANG MAI 120 (IMPLEMENTATION STALLED) CHIANG MAI 00000141 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Mike Morrow, CG, ConGen, Chiang Mai. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) -------------- Summary and Comment -------------- ¶1. (S/NF) Mark Tamthai, the RTG's point-man for secret talks with southern insurgents, told CG September 15 of his efforts to move ahead with a pilot peace zone plan in Yala despite the distraction of ongoing political crisis in Bangkok. He aims to implement this as a "local" operation via the RTA regional military commander, though this approach would negate for now the possibility of a prisoner release that is a central element of the plan. Insurgent representatives at the talks are still willing to go forward despite this, he said. Tamthai reported that while consensus holds in the RTG for a non-military solution to the southern violence, a viewpoint has emerged in some circles that the government can achieve this unilaterally, without involving insurgent leaders. ¶2. (S/NF) Comment: Tamthai's hopes for RTG implementation of its part of the Yala cease-fire plan originally hinged on Cabinet approval, then devolved to the RTA Commander in Chief, and now hang on buy-in by the RTA's southern regional commander. Furthermore, the suspension of the plan's prisoner release diminishes its potential as a confidence-building measure for both the government and the insurgents. Nonetheless, Tamthai is determined to forge ahead and maintain a pulse for the peace process. The decision to wait nearly two months between the previous and next round of peace talks reflects the reality that there is little to be achieved until the national political situation settles. End Summary and Comment. -------------- --- Seeking Detour Around Domestic Political Crisis -------------- --- ¶3. (S/NF) CG met September 15 in Chiang Mai with Mark Tamthai, Director of Payap University's Institute of Religion, Culture and Peace and point-man for the RTG's secret dialogue with southern insurgents. Tamthai expressed frustration that political crisis in Bangkok was deflecting the RTG's attention from the southern peace process. The ideal approach to the peace process would be a "top-down" approach with the Prime Minister and/or Cabinet calling the shots, or at least approving them, with appropriate RTG bodies then carrying out instructions. But "there is no top" at the moment, Tamthai lamented. 4 (S/NF) In an effort to keep the peace process moving forward despite the absence of clear direction from the RTG, Tamthai said he was pursuing a more complicated, two-track approach: -- moving forward now at the local level with implementation of a 45-day pilot "peace zone" in Yala city, in a way that would not require Cabinet-level action; and -- holding back for now at the national level by standing down on efforts to bring political party leaders and other national institutions more fully into the process. Tamthai said he had recently briefed opposition Democrat Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva on the peace process. But Tamthai is advocating a hold on further outreach to national political groups, in part because he fears the hyper-politicized atmosphere in Bangkok could suck the peace process into it, and also because he wants to insulate the nascent Yala peace zone plan from the pressures of national attention. The time will come when the peace process will require national political-level engagement, Tamthai said, but this is not it. -------------- Amending the Yala Cease-Fire Plan -------------- ¶5. (S/NF) Regarding the pilot peace zone plan for Yala that he has described to us previously (reftel),Tamthai said he has given up hope for now on obtaining formal backing from either the Cabinet or Royal Thai Army (RTA) Commander Anupong Paochinda, given their preoccupation with domestic political dynamics in the capital. He instead is pinning his hopes on persuading RTA Region Four (south) Commander Pichet Wisaichorn CHIANG MAI 00000141 002.2 OF 003 to implement the government's part of the Yala cease-fire as a "local" RTA operation. He claimed Pichet was favorably disposed toward the plan and has long been an advocate and practitioner of civil outreach over use of force in the south. But Pichet is concerned that any involvement in or endorsement of the Yala plan by the RTG or national politicians would place the operation at a political level outside his purview. ¶6. (S/NF) To keep the Yala plan "local" and assuage Pichet's concern, Tamthai admitted that a central element of the plan - the release of certain prisoners as a sign of RTG good faith -- has to be dropped. CG questioned whether insurgent leaders would still go along; Tamthai said he believed they would. He asserted that the insurgent leaders he meets with are eager to move forward with the Yala cease fire. He said the insurgent leadership contains two schools of thought: one inclined to seek a political solution within the Thai constitution, the other inclined to keep fighting. The former group wants the Yala pilot project to succeed in order to validate their commitment to the peace process. ¶7. (S/NF) Tamthai described two additional elements of the Yala peace zone plan. The first is the formation of a local "rapid response" committee, comprised of RTG and insurgent leaders, that would be prepared to respond publicly to any cease-fire violations, especially those committed by outside "spoilers." The second would be - short of an outright prisoner release - the possible parole of one or more detained local leaders who would remain under guard but be allowed to circulate among the local populace and advocate support for the cease-fire. Tamthai believes the RTA Fourth Army has the authority to do this without requiring Cabinet approval. -------------- Internal RTG Debate -------------- ¶8. (S/NF) Tamthai reiterated his belief of consensus within the RTG that a non-military solution is needed to end the southern violence. However, he described the emergence of a viewpoint in some RTG circles that a political solution can be achieved by the government unilaterally, without recourse to interaction or cooperation with insurgent leaders. Tamthai does not share that view. He said that after two years of dialogue with insurgent leaders, he believes most are ready to take violence out of the equation and instead settle the dispute within Thailand's existing constitutional system. He said the government and insurgents share several common goals for the south, such as justice, education, economic and social development. The obvious challenge is for the insurgents to renounce independent claims that have been handed down by their elders for decades. -------------- Broadening Participation in Peace Talks -------------- ¶9. (S/NF) CG asked whether participation in the peace talks was broadening or remaining static. Tamthai replied that of the two insurgent groups in the talks, participation by the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) has always been fairly broad, while that of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C) had started narrow but was slowly growing. Whereas the PULO representatives are mainly long-time exiles based in Sweden and Syria (though in close contact with PULO leaders based near the Thailand-Malaysia border),the BRN-C representatives are "closer to the action" (not specified) and thus it is riskier for them to participate. The BRN-C is cautiously broadening its participation, however, via mini-steps such as having new members come to the meeting venues but sit outside the actual meeting room, or join the other participants for meals only. -------------- -------------- Tamthai on Violence, NSC "Irrelevance," Next Round of Talks -------------- -------------- ¶10. (S/NF) Tamthai said the downward trend in violence and human rights abuses in the south continues to hold, though the degree of those acts that are committed remains brutal (he specifically cited beheadings by insurgents). The problem is that the general populace still does not feel safe. Tamthai does not think the decrease in violence reduces the sense of urgency in the RTA to address the issue, because the military knows the violence could quickly ratchet back up. ¶11. (S/NF) CG asked about rumors of the possible removal of NSC CHIANG MAI 00000141 003.2 OF 003 Secretary General Surapol Puanaiyaka, whom Tamthai has previously characterized as ineffectual and unsupportive of the peace process. Tamthai doubted that Surapol's departure was imminent, if only because his inaction has rendered the NSC so irrelevant that there is little urgency to make a change. ¶12. (S/NF) Tamthai said the next round of talks was tentatively set for late October, which would be nearly two months since the previous round in Jakarta in late August. The main reason for the gap, he said, was to give the national domestic political situation time to settle. ¶13. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Bangkok. MORROW