CHAVEZ'S PERPETUAL CAMPAIGN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 001777

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HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2028
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ'S PERPETUAL CAMPAIGN

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Classified By: A/POLITICAL COUNSELOR DANIEL LAWTON,
FOR REASON 1.4 (D)


1. (C) Summary: Since taking office in 1999, President
Chavez has engaged in frequent, polarizing electoral
campaigns to both burnish his democratic credentials and
accumulate personal power. The Venezuelan president's
electoral focus has hindered his government's ability to
address pressing social and economic issues. In the run-up
to the proposed amendment referendum to remove presidential
term limits, Chavez has intensified his aggressive rhetoric,
suggesting that Venezuela is on the cusp of yet another major
electoral decision that will determine the survival of both
Chavez and his "revolution" or the "return of the oligarchs."
The planned February or March 2009 amendment referendum will
be the fifth since Chavez took power in 1999 and the
thirteenth national election. Chavez's perpetual campaign
strategy conveniently distracts public attention from
Venezuela's accumulating problems and galvanizes his base.
Nevertheless, Chavez's electoral setbacks in the last two
elections suggest that Venezuelans increasingly distinguish
between support for Chavez personally and for his policies.
End Summary.

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THE UPCOMING REFERENDUM
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2. (C) Chavez has charged the National Assembly with
authorizing a referendum on a proposed amendment to remove
presidential term limits and allow his reelection in 2012 to
a third, six-year term. The election, which Chavez has asked
to be held on February 15, comes just three months after the
conclusion of the November 2008 state and local elections and
will be the thirteenth national election since he first came
to power a decade ago. The November election had unusually
high voter turn-out, including among middle-class voters.
Nevertheless, political observers remarked that the campaign
was the "coldest" in recent memory, despite Chavez's attempts
to incite furor over allegations of an opposition- and
US-backed coup plot and pledges to jail opposition leaders on
corruption charges. Local polling indicated that the
majority of Venezuelans did not believe Chavez's claims of a
coup attempt.

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ALL CHAVEZ, ALL THE TIME
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3. (C) Chavez has increasingly sought to dominate public
spaces with his image. The President intensified his abuse
of obligatory "cadena" broadcasts in the weeks preceding the
November election to saturate the television and radio air
waves for hours on a near daily basis. He used this tactic
in previous campaigns, but to a lesser extent. Without even
a firm election date for the prospective 2009 referendum,
Chavez has continued using nightly "cadenas," bombarding his
working-class supporters with justification for his amendment
and threats that the survival of the "revolution" and its
accompanying social programs rest with his winning the
referendum.


4. (C) Chavez has historically framed elections as a
plebiscite on him personally -- a tactic he is likely to
continue given his relative popularity and the weakened state
of other figures within Chavismo. Several of his key allies
lost closely contested races, including Jesse Chacon for the
mayorship of the Sucre Borough of Caracas and Diosdado
Cabello in Miranda State. Although both subsequently
received Cabinet positions, their electoral failures suggest
they are unlikely to be effective -- or trusted -- on the
campaign trail as substitutes for Chavez. In fact, the
President named Jorge Rodriguez to run his amendment
referendum campaign, despite his considerable
responsibilities as the incoming mayor of the Liberator
Borough of Caracas municipality. Rodriguez appears to have
been chosen for his unconditional loyalty to the President
given that he spearheaded the unsuccessful effort to win
public approval of Chavez's constitutional reform package in
December 2007.

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BURNING PARTISAN BRIDGES
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5. (C) Chavez has rejected entreaties from opposition
politicians to engage and mend political divides following

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the November elections. Instead, the President has overseen
the continued legal harassment of the opposition's leading
figure, Maracaibo mayor Manuel Rosales. Rosales was summoned
to give testimony to a prosecutor on December 11, and could
face arrest on corruption charges. He has also allowed
outgoing PSUV governors and mayors whose seats were won by
opposition politicians to sack the offices they are vacating,
leaving their successors ill-equipped to conduct public
services as basic as trash collection -- problems that often
disproportionately affect his poor supporters. Chavez has
offered few concrete solutions to the skyrocketing crime
rate, unemployment, and the looming economic crisis, instead
twisting statistics and using public relations ploys to dodge
responsibility.

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EXERCISING THE MACHINE
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6. (C) Chavez's perpetual campaigning also provides him
with a method of testing and stoking his United Socialist
Party of Venezuela (PSUV) electoral "machine" and maintaining
an energized and faithful cadre of supporters. Rather than
genuine grass-roots political parties, Chavez's series of
political bodies, including the Fifth Republic Movement
(MVR),and more recently, the PSUV, really function as
top-down mass electoral organizations. The Venezuelan
president has made it clear to Chavista officials that their
political survival rests squarely on their ability to deliver
votes for his amendment proposal. Just as he did in the 2006
presidential election, Chavez is setting the outsized goal of
10 million votes. He won 7.3 million votes in 2006, but
polled only 4 million and his PSUV candidates only 5.4
million votes, respectively, in the 2007 constitutional
referendum and the 2008 state and local election. The
opposition generally polls a little over 4 million votes.


7. (C) In addition, referenda in Venezuela have assisted
Chavez and his supporters in determining -- as well as
extorting -- political loyalties. The Venezuelan government
continues to use the signatures used to launch the 2004
recall referendum against Chavez to discriminate in the
apportionment of government jobs, loans, contracts and other
benefits. In an economy dominated by the public sector, the
"Tascon list" has served as a powerful tool of political
intimidation. Chavez personally launched a signature drive
that coincides with the National Assembly's efforts to
sponsor the referendum on eliminating presidential term
limits. Local pundits believe this effort, which the PSUV
claims has gathered close to five million signatures, may
serve in the future as a "reverse Tascon list." EMBASSY has
heard numerous, credible reports of Venezuelan government
entities pressuring government job-holders and
service-seekers to sign.

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COMMENT
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8. (C) Local pundits often note that President Chavez is a
far more effective campaigner than administrator. Continual
and polarizing elections have allowed Chavez to avoid
appearing responsible for Venezuela's accumulating problems.
They have also allowed Chavez to lay claim to democratic
legitimacy, despite the lack of separation of powers and his
authoritarian style of governing. Nevertheless, Chavez's
perpetual campaign formula for political success may be
wearing thin on all but the President's most ardent
supporters. He suffered his firstelectoral loss after a
string of eleven wins, in the December 2007 reform
referendum, in which the elimination of presidential term
limits was a key component. Chavez's PSUV party dominated
the November 23 state and local elections, but ceded ground
to the opposition in five key governorships (up from two in
2004).


9. (C) Chavez is taking a big political risk in pressing for
the referendum on presidential term limits and gambling that
he and his supporters can mobilize more voters than they did
in the December 2007 referendum. Judging from the extent to
which Chavez is already personally engaged in this referendum
campaign and putting state resources, including mandatory
"cadena" broadcasts, behind the "Yes" campaign, the
Venezuelan president is well aware that the outcome of this
referendum is not a foregone conclusion (at least not in a
generally free and fair election). Whatever the outcome of
the February or March 2009 referendum, Chavez is likely to

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continue with his permanent campaign strategy in the coming
years. Nation-wide municipal council elections are slated
for the second half of 2009 and parliamentary elections by
the end of 2010.

CAULFIELD