NOVEMBER STATE AND LOCAL ELECTIONS: WHAT'S AT STAKE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 001381 SIPDIS HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER) E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2028 TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM SNAR VE SUBJECT: NOVEMBER STATE AND LOCAL ELECTIONS: WHAT'S AT STAKE CARACAS 00001381 001.3 OF 003 Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR FRANCISCO FERNANDEZ REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Summary. Venezuelan voters are slated to elect 22 governors, state legislative assemblies, and 328 mayors on November 23. These state and local elections will be a key indicator of the future of Venezuela's fragile democracy, and the Embassy is actively promoting free and fair elections through our USAID/OTI and other programs. The opposition hopes to secure more political power, while President Chavez seeks to demonstrate renewed electoral strength before a possible 2009 referendum to eliminate presidential term limits. If Chavista dissidents win some key offices, they could breathe new life into "Chavismo without Chavez." The November results may also produce more state and local governments willing to cooperate with the USG. Alternatively, politicians widely perceived to be allied with narcotraffickers are vying for some key offices. Chavez is likely to try to circumvent opposition winners and even some strong local leaders in his own party, setting up possible center-state conflicts in 2009. Both the government and opposition parties are plagued by infighting and voter apathy, but Chavez's candidates will have far more resources for their campaigns than their opponents. End Summary. -------------- Carving Out Democratic Space -------------- ¶2. (C) After securing only two of 23 governorships in the 2004 state and local elections, the opposition seeks to gain local control over additional states. The Podemos party elected two governors in 2004, but broke with Chavez in the run-up to the 2007 constitutional referendum. Opposition leaders tell us that they believe they can win five or six governorship, but still hope to win as many as ten, including Podemos gubernatorial candidates. They also hope to win between 100 and 150 of the 328 mayoral races. They note that the municipalities and states they are in the best position to win tend to be the most populated and most important economically. By winning more governorships and mayorships than they did in 2004, the opposition seeks to demonstrate an efficient and democratic alternative to Chavismo. They also can be expected to tap state and local resources to try to strengthen their debilitated political parties. -------------- Referendum Trial Run -------------- ¶3. (C) Perhaps as important as the state and local races themselves is the overall turnout for both government and opposition. During the first half of 2008, President Chavez suggested he would put the elimination of presidential term limits up for another referendum in 2009. This proposal was included in the constitutional reform package that voters narrowly defeated in the 2007 referendum. In 2006, over seven million Venezuelans voted for Chavez, but only 4.5 million voted for his failed constitutional package in 2007. The sum total of votes for -- and against -- President Chavez's state and local candidates will serve as an electoral measuring stick for the relative political risk Chavez would face in going for a referendum to eliminate presidential term limits in 2009. In the wake of his first electoral defeat since 1998, Chavez needs to demonstrate that his electoral machine can mobilize a large majority of voters. -------------- A Third Way? -------------- ¶4. (C) A number of President Chavez's United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) candidates, including his brother Adan Chavez, are confronted by dissident Chavistas or strong candidates from small pro-Chavez parties. Most local pundits do not believe these candidates are likely to defeat Chavez's candidates, although they note that some of them represent legitimate electoral threats to PSUV candidates. In races in which the opposition candidates are faring poorly, opposition leaders tell us they may quietly urge their voters to support dissident Chavistas in an effort to swing those races. So far, former Chavistas have failed to attract many votes from Chavez's base or the confidence of the opposition. Should they win some key races in November they could pose a new political threat to the Venezuelan president. CARACAS 00001381 002.3 OF 003 -------------- U.S. Partners -------------- ¶5. (C) The BRV promotes a vehemently anti-American foreign policy. The BRV expelled the Ambassador September 11, discourages most official contact with Embassy personnel, and vilifies, and sometimes penalizes beneficiaries of U.S. pro-democracy and counternarcotics assistance as well as cultural exchanges. Nevertheless, the BRV has not succeeded in undermining the traditionally strong ties between the American and Venezuela people. Despite BRV efforts to depict them as American lapdogs ("pitiyanquis"),opposition and Podemos governors and mayors have welcomed contact with Embassy officials, readily accepted U.S. counternarcotics assistance and cultural programming, and promoted ties between Venezuela and the United States. Interestingly, a recent USAID-funded focus group study found that most Venezuelans, including many Chavistas, strongly rejected the BRV expulsion of the U.S. ambassador. Should the opposition win more governorships and mayorships, the Embassy will have more potential partners with which to work. -------------- Center-State Conflict -------------- ¶6. (C) Should the opposition succeed in electing several governors, President Chavez is likely to try to undermine their authority through recently created entities. He may also try to do the same for some of his own PSUV officials, should they prove to be too independent. Chavez issued a July 31 public administration decree giving the Venezuelan president authority to designate regional authorities for planning and implementing development policies. These authorities will have their own budgetary resources. At the same time, the BRV announced the formation of five strategic military zones, each led by a three-star general. These new entities can be directly funded by the Venezuelan president and could be to circumvent elected state and local authorities. Opposition leaders tell us center-state conflicts are likely to break out in 2009 if Chavez tries to take greater control at the expense of governors and mayors. -------------- NarcoPolitics -------------- ¶7. (C) Venezuela is a major drug transit country that generally refuses to engage in counternarcotics cooperation with the United States. Narcotraffickers in Venezuela are increasingly gaining a stronger foothold in Venezuela and corrupting government officials and institutions. They could have a big impact on a few key races in November. Carabobo Governor Luis Acosta Carlez is widely believed to have allied with the narcotrafficking Makled family at Venezuela's most important port, Puerto Cabello. Acosta Carlez is running for re-election as an independent after President Chavez declined to endorse his candidacy. At the same time, Abdala Makled is running as an independent for mayor of Valencia, the capital of Carabobo State. Opposition gubernatorial candidate and former two-time Carabobo governor Henrique Salas Feo told us in late August that he is concerned that narcotraffickers could try to force him out of the race. Maracaibo mayor and Zulia State gubernatorial candidate Gian Carlo Di Martino is also widely perceived as having ties to the FARC and narcotraffickers. -------------- USG Promoting Democracy -------------- ¶8. (C) Embassy Caracas continues to actively promote the democratic process, despite ongoing BRV efforts to impede Embassy operations (Septel). USAID/OTI partners in Venezuela are supporting non-partisan voter education campaigns. President Chavez continues to try to frame these elections as a referendum on his administration, but educated voters are increasingly focusing on candidates' plans to address local issues, particularly crime. USAID/OTI is also assisting with poll watcher training efforts for interested political parties. Poll watchers are vital to preventing election day fraud, particularly in local races in which the margins of victory can be quite small. The results of a USAID/OTI-funded focus group study will be shared with interested parties. The program will also sponsor a CARACAS 00001381 003.3 OF 003 non-partisan get-out-the-vote media campaign in support of state and local elections. At the same time, Emboffs are asking hard questions of candidates who put personal ambitions before fostering greater democracy. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) President Chavez has used yearly elections to help legitimize his increasingly authoritarian administration. The stunning defeat of his constitutional package in the December 2007 referendum, however, has put additional pressure on Chavez's PSUV party to demonstrate that it can mobilize a large majority of voters. It has also provided the opposition with a real opportunity to make further, even if marginal, electoral gains from their dismal showing in the 2004 state and local elections. To date, neither the pro-government and opposition political parties have mounted impressive campaigns. Both sides have been plagued by in-fighting and are as much combating abstentionism among their ranks as they are competing against the other side. That said, Chavez remains the most popular Venezuelan politician by far, and his candidates have considerably more (state) resources than their opponents. CAULFIELD