Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
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08CANBERRA906 | 2008-09-12 07:54:00 | SECRET | Embassy Canberra |
1. (S/REL AUS) Australia welcomes the GOI's decision to limit the coalition presence in Iraq after 2008 as evidence of improving conditions and Iraqi willingness to take on greater responsibility, and believes the decision will help free up resources that can be devoted to Afghanistan. Two key issues for the GOA regarding protections and authorities for its defense force personnel post 2008 are: a) who would be covered by a SOFA or other arrangement, and b) whether the GOA would adopt the arrangement negotiated by the United States or negotiate a separate bilateral agreement. In any event, the GOA needs a formal invitation from the GOI and wants the U.S. to urge Iraq to engage quickly with the five countries it would like to remain post 2008 and to expedite legal arrangments for their forces to reamin. End summary. 2. (SBU) DCM, accompanied by poloff, delivered reftel demarche points to David Ritchie, Deputy Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) on September 12. Ritchie was joined by Paul Robilliard, DFAT Assistant Secretary for Afghanistan and Iraq. Ritchie indicated he had been briefed on Secretary Gates' September 9 call to Defence Minister Fitzgibbon, and Ambassador Crocker and Lt.Gen. Lute's September 9 presentation in Washington to coalition country ambassadors and defense attaches. REDUCED COALITION PRESENCE IS WELCOME NEWS -------------------------- 3. (S/REL AUS) Deputy Secretary Ritchie said the Government of Iraq decision on a reduced coalition presence beyond 2008 was welcome news. It demonstrated the improved situation in Iraq and showed the GOI wanted to stand on its own feet, he commented. It was also a positive development in that a reduced presence of coalition partners in Iraq freed up resources for Afghanistan, he added. Ritchie said the demarche was particularly timely as the National Security Committee of Cabinet planned to meet on Monday, September 15, to discuss Australia's presence in Iraq. The Cabinet had previously examined legal requirements for its forces in Iraq but was not yet aware of the GOI's latest decision on which countries it wanted to remain in Iraq in 2009. ISSUES FOR AUSTRALIA -------------------------- 4. (S/REL AUS) Regarding protection and authorities for its defense personnel post-2008, Ritchie identified two key issues: -- Who would be covered? While the GOI may want an arrangment that covered the entire Australian presence as a single package, the GOA needed clarity on the separate elements of its presence. Would the protections cover only Australian embedded personnel? Ritchie noted the briefing by Ambassador Crocker and Lt.Gen. Lute suggested that the U.S.-negotiated SOFA appeared to cover only troops on the ground and embedded personnel. (Note: It was not clear whether Ritchie intended to reflect the distinction made in Qwhether Ritchie intended to reflect the distinction made in the Australian military between third country deployments (TCD), i.e., Australian forces attached to third country units that are currently authorized by the GOA to engage in combat operations with those units, and embedded personnel, i.e., those Australian-based civilian and military personnel seconded temporarily to work in headquarters or in other support roles. Australian combat forces were completely withdrawn by the end of June 2008.) There was also the question of what protections were available for Australian forces based in neighboring countries who operated in and around Iraq, including GOA air and naval assets. Finally, it was not clear if the security detachment at the Australian Embassy in Baghdad would be covered by the arrangement, or whether the detachment could be covered under regular diplomatic arrangements, for example being accredited as diplomatic staff. -- Should Australia seek to extend the U.S. agreement to cover its forces or negotiate a separate bilateral agreement? Ritchie said DFAT's preference was for the GOA to adopt the SOFA negotiated by the U.S. rather than enter into separate negotiations. He expected that Foreign Minister Smith would endorse that view. By contrast, he said, the Australian Department of Defence, particularly Chief of the Defence Force Angus Houston, may be inclined to insist on stronger protections than what the U.S. has managed to secure, and to have such protections further guaranteed by corresponding Iraqi legislation. Ritchie suggested that, given Australia's lack of leverage compared to the U.S. and the lengthy and slow process needed to have protections and authorities for GOA forces enshrined in Iraqi law, it was unlikely the GOA would be able to negotiate a better bilateral arrangement than the U.S. SOFA. GOA WANTS SOFA COPY, U.S. INTERVENTION WITH GOI -------------------------- -- 5. (S/REL AUS) Beyond the form and scope of a SOFA or other arrangement, Ritchie said the GOA needed to hear from the GOI, including, at a minimum, a formal invitation regarding its post-2008 presence. In response to the DCM's offer for U.S. assistance, Ritchie made two requests: a) a copy of the U.S.-GOI SOFA as soon as possible; and b) early U.S. encouragement for the GOI to engage the five countries and expedite post-2008 arrangements with them. MCCALLUM |