AUSTRALIAN REQUIRES IMMEDIATE HELP WITH IRAQ SOFA

S E C R E T CANBERRA 001271 NOFORN DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/PDAS FELTMAN, S/I SATTERFIELD, AND EAP/PDAS DAVIES NSC FOR DNSA JEFFREY AND DWILDER E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS IZ AS SUBJECT: AUSTRALIAN REQUIRES IMMEDIATE HELP WITH IRAQ SOFA REF: A) STATE 128040 B) CANBERRA 1258 Classified By: Ambassador Robert D. McCallum for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Foreign Minister Smith has told Ambassador McCallum that Australia needs immediate help from the United States in order to keep its remaining troops in Iraq. The FM noted that GOA was requested by the US to defer its negotiation with the GOI so as not to complicate US negotiations on a US/GOI SOFA. The GOA had done so and kept its forces there all year while the U.S. negotiated its own SOFA, Smith said, because it understood their importance. Now GOA forces will have no basis to remain in Iraq and no legal protection even if they are invited to stay by the GOI. The GOA needs immediate help from the U.S. to obtain an invitation from Iraq to remain after December 31 and adequate legal protection for its forces. Smith added that the GOA needed some action by December 20-21 at the latest. Without an invitation, the GOA would likely have no alternative but to withdraw its forces by December 31. END SUMMARY ¶2. (S/NF) Foreign Minister Stephen Smith called in the Ambassador on December 12. He said he had just come from a meeting of the National Security Committee and he needed to discuss Australia's lack of a status of forces agreement (SOFA) with Iraq. He said he and the Prime Minister did not appreciate being demarched by its closest ally, particularly on a subject matter where the GOA had been asked by the US to defer interaction with the GOI. He and PM Rudd also objected to a deadline by the U.S to respond to the demarche. The GOA needed help, Smith declared. They had kept their forces and imbeds in Iraq all year because they understood their importance to the US and now they were facing a situation where they would have no invitation from the host country to remain and no legal protection if they remained. If there was no invitation from the Government of Iraq to remain, Australia would likely have to remove its troops by January 1, the Foreign Minister stated. Australia needed two things, he continued, an invitation from the Iraq Government to stay, and adequate legal protection. In addition, Smith said, the GOA needed help in the next few days not the next few weeks. ¶3. (S/NF) Smith said the GOA currently had a team in Iraq discussing with the Iraqis a small piece of legislation backed up by a letter from the Iraq Government. He stated that he was very skeptical, however, that anything could be accomplished by the end of the year. The Ambassador then asked what the GOA would do if either an invitation to remain or some legal protection is not obtained from the GOI, to which Smith replied that the GOA would "cross that bridge when we came to it." ¶4. (S/NF) The Foreign Minister said the GOA did not want to withdraw its forces from Iraq but it needed an invitation to stay from the Government of Iraq and adequate legal protection, and it needed immediate U.S. assistance to obtain both. He said the GOA's deadline for some action by the GOI was December 20-21 and Australian forces would likely have to withdraw from Iraq if no formal invitation was received from the Government by December 31, ¶5. (S/NF) COMMENT: The Foreign Minister's tone during this brief meeting was cordial but sharp. The unmistakable Qbrief meeting was cordial but sharp. The unmistakable message from him, and the Prime Minister, was that Australia had done what the U.S. had asked it to do and now it was stuck. Since the U.S. had put Australia there, Australia expected the U.S. to help it find a solution. The demarche to which the Foreign Minister referred is ref A, dated December 4, which asked Post to encourage the GOA to accept an exchange of notes or letters as a SOFA in lieu of the agreement the GOA was currently insisting on, since an agreement would need ratification by the Iraqi Council of Representatives. Ref B, sent December 11, is the current thinking from the Australian Department of Defence about how their forces could remain in the region in the absence of a SOFA. MCCALLUM