AUSTRALIAN DEFENSE TEAM TO VISIT U.S. RE IRAQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CANBERRA 000103 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR T, L/PM, PM, NEA/I AND EAP SECDEF ALSO FOR OGC AND OSD E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2018 TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL KTIA AS SUBJECT: AUSTRALIAN DEFENSE TEAM TO VISIT U.S. RE IRAQ DEPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENT REF: CANBERRA 52 Classified By: Political Counselor James F. Cole for reasons 1.4 (b),(d ). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) David Hallett, Director for Iraq, International Policy Division, Australian Department of Defense, outlined GOA thinking about the nature of arrangements Australia will need to govern deployment of Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel and civilian contractors in Iraq when the current resolution lapses. Hallett plans to lead a small team to Washington, D.C., February 12-13 to consult on this issue with DOD, State, NSC and other agencies. He also commented on some assistance options currently under consideration by the Australian Cabinet and clarified status of some training elements in Iraq. End summary. GOA DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS -------------- ¶2. (C) According to Hallett, Australia needs a treaty-level agreement for its forces in Iraq, i.e., one requiring consideration by the the GOA Parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Treaties and approval by the National Security Committee of Cabinet. The arrangement must be legally enforceable, not only on Australia but also on Iraq. For that reason, he said, Australia wants to see protections enshrined in Iraqi law. He added Australia is concerned about the length of time it takes for the Iraqi Parliament to pass legislation. Hallett suggested that more limited arrangements that Australia has used in the past, including MOUs, MOAs and exchanges of letters, might not suffice for Iraq, noting that historically Australia has negotiated bilateral SOFAs. ADF forces must have immunity from criminal and civil jurisdiction, with Australia retaining exclusive right to waive immunity. ¶3. (C) Hallet said he hoped the current UNSC resolution would be maintained through the end of 2008, following the mid-year review. To cover ongoing military operations in Iraq, Australia requires a Chapter 7 UNSC mandate; Chapter 6 will not suffice. Any arrangement with Iraq will require privity, permitting Australia to enforce provisions directly with Iraq, rather than go through the United States or other third party. Any arrangement must be flexible enough to accommodate changes in mission of Australian forces. ¶4. (C) Hallett said he wished to explore in depth with his U.S. counterparts what kind of arrangement the U.S. is contemplating in Iraq for its forces and other Coalition forces. Part of the discussion would focus on the reaction of Iraq and other coalition partners, and on the timelines for the various options under consideration, as well as U.S. Congressional considerations. NEW DETAINEE MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT -------------- ¶5. (C) The Australian team also wanted to discuss a new detainee management agreement with U.S. officials, noting the UK, which had pulled out the U.S.-UK-Australia MOU on this subject, was close to finalizing a new agreement with the U.S. The GOA was "not comfortable" with assurances under the current MOU, he said, acknowledging that Australia had not handed over any detainees in the past 18 months. ASSISTANCE OPTIONS -------------- ¶6. (C) Elaborating on Australia's future direction in Iraq, Q6. (C) Elaborating on Australia's future direction in Iraq, Hallett said the Cabinet was reviewing a range of options, including additional humanitarian assistance and training of security forces. Options included training in countries adjacent to Iraq or bringing Iraqi security personnel to Australia for training. One option under consideration, for example, involves training in Australia by Australian Federal Police in areas such as rule of law. Australia had been advised earlier by the United States that security training of Iraqis outside Iraq "did not work well," Hallett commented, adding that training in Australia would have other problems, including poor English language skills of trainees (coupled with a lack of adequate interpreters) and the CANBERRA 00000103 002 OF 002 reluctance of the GOI to release military officers, because of operational needs and concern they might not return to Iraq. STATUS OF TRAINERS IN IRAQ -------------- ¶7. (C) On the status of ADF trainers in Iraq, Hallett clarified that one group of Army trainers at Camp Taji in Baghdad had redeployed to Australia when their six-month rotation ended in December 2007. Other trainers attached to the Overwatch Battle Group in the southern province of Dhi Qar, which was scheduled to be redeployed in mid-2008, will return to Australia at that time. Neither group would be replaced, Hallett noted, suggesting that no new in-country security-related training is currently contemplated. ¶8. (C) In addition to Hallett, the team will include Commander Scott Ritchie, legal adviser; Mark Pierce, Political Minister-Counsellor, Australian Embassy, Washington; and Peter Roggero, Political Counsellor, Australian Embassy, Washington. MCCALLUM