2008 U.S.-AUSTRALIA POL-MIL TALKS: PART II

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CANBERRA 001026 SIPDIS STATE FOR PM, NEA, SCA AND EAP PACOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2018 TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS AS SUBJECT: 2008 U.S.-AUSTRALIA POL-MIL TALKS: PART II (PERSIAN GULF (IRAN),NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT, REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE, CHINA AND INDIA) REF: CANBERRA 1025 (PART I) Classified By: Acting Political Counselor John W. Crowley. Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d) ¶1. (SBU) This is Part II of a three-part cable reporting on the annual U.S.-Australia Political Military Talks held in Canberra, Australia on October 9, 2008. This section covers Persian Gulf security (Iran),Nonproliferation and Disarmament, Regional Architecture, China and India. Part I (reftel) covers Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as providing a summary and list of participants. Part III (septel) covers Southeast Asia, Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, Pacific Islands, Defence White Paper, Enhanced Defense Cooperation, and the U.S.-Australia Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty. PERSIAN GULF SECURITY -------------- ¶2. (S/REL AUS) A/S Kimmitt introduced a discussion of Iran's role and intentions in the region, including the threat posed by Iran's continuing nuclear activities, U.S. efforts to promote stability and prevent proliferation in the region, and the prospect and consequences of possible pre-emptive action by Israel against Iran's nuclear facilities. ¶3. (S/REL AUS) Deputy Secretary Ritchie agreed with the U.S. assessment that Iran sought to assert hegemony over the region, and reiterated the GOA belief that Iran had made a strategic decision to acquire a breakout nuclear capability. Referring to estimates that Iran could have a nuclear capability by 2010, he pointed out that that was only 18 months away. Iran had calculated that the international community would react only weakly to its nuclear activities, and had decided it could weather imposition of sanctions, which were having only minimal effect in any case. Ritchie said Australia planned to receive two Iranian officials soon: Iran's ambassador in Vienna planned to visit Australia to try to convince the GOA that Iran's nuclear activities posed no threat, and the mayor of Tehran, a presidential candidate, also planned to visit. Australia acknowledged the arguments against meeting with Iranians, but believed that Iran would not get much from such meetings, which would be at junior levels in the GOA, and it kept international resolve on Iran firm by demonstrating the West's willingness to talk. ADDITIONAL AUSTRALIAN SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN -------------- ¶4. (S/REL AUS) Deborah Stokes told A/S Kimmitt Australia planned to implement additional sanctions against Iran that Qplanned to implement additional sanctions against Iran that went beyond current UN Security Council resolutions. The new sanctions, which would be announced by Foreign Minister Smith in Parliament during the week of October 13, included adopting EU sanctions against 20 entities, as well as adding Bank Saderat to the list of sanctioned entities. Australia planned to encourage Japan and others to take similar steps, she said. The announcement may dissuade Tehran's mayor from proceeding with his trip, she added. NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT -------------- ¶5. (C/REL AUS David Ritchie briefed on Prime Minister Rudd's initiative in establishing the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND),which CANBERRA 00001026 002 OF 003 plans to hold its first meeting in Sydney October 19-21. The Commission, also known as the Evans Commission after co-chair Gareth Evans, originally had been established to influence the outcome of the 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference (RevCon),but Evans now wanted to extend the mandate past the NPT RevCon to address proliferation more broadly, including threats posed by states that had or were seeking to acquire nuclear capabilities, including India, Pakistan, Israel, Syria, Burma, Iran and DPRK. The Commission also wanted to engage more countries in subscribing to arms and export control regimes, and to address new civil/nuclear arrangements. At its initial meeting, Evans hoped to achieve consensus on an extended mandate and on a program of work. Ritchie stressed the Commission was independent from the GOA so Evans was conducting his own consultations in capitals. Evans understood the strategic realities involved regarding disarmament, he added. Turning to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),Ritchie praised the U.S. initiative and reaffirmed Australia's continued strong support for PSI, expressing hope Indonesia could be brought on board. ¶6. (C/REL AUS) A/S Kimmitt thanked the GOA for having hosted productive nonproliferation discussions with INS Acting Assistant Secretary McNerney in June. He registered U.S. support for ICNND's objectives, underscoring the importance for the Commission to strike the right balance between nonproliferation and disarmament. ASIA PACIFIC REGIONAL SECURITY REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE -------------- ¶7. (C/REL AUS) Hugh Borrowman, First Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, outlined the background to PM Rudd's vision for an Asian-Pacific Community (APC) by 2020. There was as yet no concrete plan or proposal, he said, rather the concept was intended to promote discussion about where the region wanted to be, and how to fashion a framework that included all major players and could address the range of economic, political and security issues. The GOA had so far engaged Wellington, Jakarta, Singapore, Seoul and Tokyo on APC. Borrowman characterized the reactions as generally "curious but cautious," with the exception of Singapore, which had reacted negatively. Key to PM Rudd's long-term thinking on the APC was how to engage China across all fronts. Rudd was Qwas how to engage China across all fronts. Rudd was contemplating how to promote his APC vision at the 2009 APEC, and planned to raise the issue in visits to both Beijing and Washington, possibly in February 2009. CHINA -------------- ¶8. (C/REL AUS) Graham Fletcher, First Assistant Secretary for North Asia, provided a political outlook for China. The elite, led by Hu Jintao, likely would retain control until 2012, when Hu would turn over the reins to one of his hand-picked successors. While China might look impressive externally, its internal politics were characterized by nervousness, paranoia and uncertainty. Nonetheless there were no major challenges to the ruling elite in the near term. Fletcher said the chances of China either falling apart or improving/reforming dramatically were very small, forecasting little change in the political settings over the CANBERRA 00001026 003 OF 003 next two decades. ¶9. (C/REL AUS) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia David Sedney responded that the U.S. analysis tracked closely with Australia's. He noted that the Chinese leadership was absorbed with domestic stability, and, while China had achieved success in achieving economic and political stability, there were cracks in the facade. China appeared to be relatively insulated from the current global financial crisis, he noted. DASD Sedney offered a personal view that, after following China closely for ten years, he leaned more toward the evolutionary model. In response to Ritchie's question about how to harness Chinese support in the international community, Sedney said part of the key to China's influence was that they did not try to exercise it, citing China's investment in Pakistan as an example. Fletcher interjected that China did not agree with the premise that it should be helping us. On China-Taiwan rivalry in the South Pacific, DASD Sedney said there had been a diplomatic truce following the election of Ma Ying-jeou. Ritchie responded Australia had observed a change in rhetoric but not in behavior. The GOA had delivered robust demarches to Taiwan about bribing Pacific Island state leaders, with some success; China was not as involved in corruption in the Pacific. INDIA -------------- ¶10. (C/REL AUS) A/S Kimmitt described U.S. military engagement with India, including the fighter aircraft competition. He told the Australians that difficulties with end-use monitoring of U.S. defense equipment and technology sold to India could hamper progress in interoperability. Col. Jeffrey Arruda, Chief, South Asia/Oceania Policy Division, PACOM, noted that, despite India's participation in the Malabar 2007 exercise, India preferred bilateral engagement and resisted efforts to engage in multilateral exercises. DASD Sedney remarked that China loomed large in India's world view, but India was largely absent in China's. Deputy Secretary Merchant noted that Australia currently had a modest military program with India, including exercises and training, but sought to expand the scope of the relationship. ¶11. (U) Assistant Secretary Kimmitt has cleared this message. MCCALLUM