2008 U.S.-AUSTRALIA POL-MIL TALKS: PART I

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 CANBERRA 001025 SIPDIS STATE FOR PM, NEA, SCA AND EAP PACOM ALSO FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2018 TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS AS SUBJECT: 2008 U.S.-AUSTRALIA POL-MIL TALKS: PART I (SUMMARY, IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN, PARTICIPANTS) Classified By: Acting Political Counselor John W. Crowley. Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d). ¶1. (SBU) This is Part I of a three-part cable reporting on the annual U.S.-Australia Political-Military Talks held in Canberra, AUSTRALIA on October 9, 2008. Part I covers Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as providing a summary and list of participants. Part II (septel) covers Persian Gulf Security (Iran),Nonproliferation and Disarmament, Regional Architecture, China and India. Part III (septel) covers Southeast Asia, Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, Pacific Islands, Defence White Paper, Enhanced Defense Cooperation, and the U.S.-Australia Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty. SUMMARY -------------- ¶2. (S/REL AUS) PM A/S Kimmitt led a joint State-DoD delegation to the annual U.S. AUSTRALIA Political-Military Talks in Canberra October 9, 2008. The Australians registered concern at the rapidly diminishing timeline in which to meet requirements for their forces to remain in Iraq beyond 2008, and sought a green light from the United States to begin bilateral SOFA negotiations with the Iraqi government. (PM Maliki plans to visit AUSTRALIA on October 23.) On Afghanistan, the GOA reiterated its pledge to maintain current force levels for the indefinite future, despite declining public support, and reconfirmed plans to deploy an OMLT to URUZGAN before the end of the year. Foreign Minister Smith is preparing to announce additional sanctions on Iran that go beyond UNSC resolutions, including adopting EU sanctions and adding Bank Saderat to sanctioned entities, and will encourage Japan and others to do likewise. The GOA briefed on the status of the Defence White Paper, disclosing its conclusion that it would purchase the Joint Strike Fighter and acquire 6-12 additional submarines. In a discussion on regional architecture, the Australian mentioned that PM Rudd may seek to visit Washington in early 2009, perhaps in February. A full list of participants is provided at para 13 below. END SUMMARY. STRATEGIC OVERVIEW -------------- ¶3. (C/REL AUS) Assistant Secretary Kimmitt and Deputy Secretary Ritchie exchanged closely congruent global perspectives, with cautious assessments of developments and prospects in South Asia, particularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the Middle East. Ritchie said AUSTRALIA was focused on developments in its own neighborhood - it was watching nervously what effects the global financial crisis might have on China, its largest trading partner, for example Qmight have on China, its largest trading partner, for example - but broadly supported Western interests around the world, such as in Zimbabwe and the Russia-Georgia conflict, and looked to do more to further those interests, particularly vis-a-vis Pakistan and Iran. Ritchie enumerated the challenges facing AUSTRALIA in its "troubled neighborhood," including an increase in illegal immigration from Indonesia, where Yudhoyono was facing elections; continuing political instability in Thailand; the "basket case" of the Philippines; the continuing "burden" of providing security and development assistance to East Timor; problems o f bad governance in many of the Pacific Island states; and illegal fishing and whaling. ¶4. (C/REL AUS) Ritchie reaffirmed that Australia's alliance CANBERRA 00001025 002 OF 005 with the United States remained the bedrock of its foreign and security policy, ahead of the other two pillars of its foreign policy: greater engagement in the Asia-Pacific region and increased involvement in multilateral organizations. He said the Prime Minister would soon deliver Australia's first National Security Statement, in advance of an inaugural National Security Strategy, that would help inform the GOA's Defence White Paper. Ritchie added Foreign Minister Smith would issue Australia's first Foreign Policy Annual Statement later in the year also. ¶5. (C/REL AUS) A/S Kimmitt noted to the Australians that a new U.S. Administration might be preoccupied initially with problems in the Middle East, South Asia, Russia and South America, but that should not be read as a diminution of America's interest in the Asia-Pacific region. He reiterated U.S. gratitude for Australia's strong support in addressing global challenges and acting as an anchor in the region. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IRAQ -------------- ¶6. (S/REL AUS) A/S Kimmitt briefed on efforts to assist Iraq in modernizing its security forces, on progress in negotiating a status of forces agreement (SOFA),including options in the event a SOFA was not agreed by the end of the year, and U.S. thinking on overall numbers of U.S. troops required for Iraq. ¶7. (S/REL AUS) Deputy Secretary Ritchie said the GOA was in the process of preparing points on Australia's role in Iraq to present to Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki, who planned to visit AUSTRALIA on October 23. Ritchie expressed hope that the U.S. could reach an agreement on a SOFA as quickly as possible, cautioning that AUSTRALIA was running out of time to put in place requirements to continue its presence in Iraq after 2008. At a minimum, AUSTRALIA needed to have a legal basis to stay on, he said, stressing that the U.S. negotiated outcome needed to be embedded in Iraqi law. AUSTRALIA hoped to piggy-back on the U.S. agreement, once it had reviewed the text. Without proper legal protection, however, Australian forces in Iraq, including the security detachment guarding the Australian Embassy, would simply stop all activities after December 31. This may force the closure of the Australian Embassy, he added, although the GOA was exploring the possibility of according diplomatic accreditation to the security detach ment personnel to avoid this outcome. ¶8. (S/REL AUS) Deputy Secretary of Defence Stephen Merchant interjected that AUSTRALIA had refrained so far from Qinterjected that AUSTRALIA had refrained so far from initiating separate bilateral negotiations on a SOFA with Iraq, partly to avoid introducing complications into the U.S. negotiations but also because AUSTRALIA believed it would be unable to negotiate more comprehensive protections than could the U.S. He urged that the United States give AUSTRALIA the green light to begin initiating its own agreement with Iraq, if the U.S. believed the time was right. A/S Kimmitt took the request on board. AFGHANISTAN -------------- ¶9. (C/REL AUS) Ritchie said the Australian Cabinet had taken up the issue of Australia's role in Afghanistan following CANBERRA 00001025 003 OF 005 withdrawal of the DUTCH in 2010. AUSTRALIA remained strongly committed to Afghanistan, he said, and the GOA expected to maintain its current level of forces there, concentrated on Uruzgan Province, for the indefinite future. Prime Minister Rudd was focused on successful outcomes, however, specifically, how to measure progress in Afghanistan, and, equally important, how to convince the Australian public, whose support for Australia's military involvement in Afghanistan had recently fallen below 50 percent for the first time, to continue to support the effort. Regardless, he reiterated, AUSTRALIA was committed to Afghanistan post-2010 for "a very long time." The Cabinet was considering options, including requirements for maintaining its aid program that may depend on availability of U.S. enablers. Ritchie thanked the United States for providing accommodations for Australia's diplomatic personnel i n Kabul following the bombing of the Serena Hotel. Construction of a temporary embassy co-located with the DUTCH had encountered delays, he said, but the Australian government was looking for a new site on which to establish a permanent mission, evidence of its long-term commitment to Afghanistan. Ritchie drew attention to a recent Australian press item that erroneously suggested Defence Minister Fitzgibbon had said the conflict in Afghanistan was not winnable, clarifying that the Minister had actually echoed the UK Defence Minister's comment that the conflict could not be won by military means alone. ¶10. (C/REL AUS) Merchant reaffirmed Australia's plan to deploy an Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) in Afghanistan later in the year. With the emphasis shifting to more training and mentoring, more enablers would be needed, he said. He solicited U.S. views on the future of Regional Command-South. Deborah Stokes, First Assistant Secretary for South and West Asia, the Middle East and Africa, observed the Dutch had irritated AUSTRALIA by insisting on a European successor to preserve its legacy in Afghanistan after 2010. Australia needed to have a say over what country it would partner with after the DUTCH departed, she asserted. The Dutch government had publicly couched its military presence in Afghanistan as a "reconstruction" mission and consequently faced a domestic political backlash when its forces started to take casualties, she commented. ¶11. (C/REL AUS) A/S Kimmitt briefed on the status of the U.S. strategic review of Afghanistan, and on gains made in Qstrategic review of Afghanistan, and on gains made in increasing the size and capacity of the Afghan National Army. He expressed U.S. gratitude for Australia's contribution in Afghanistan, not only for the quality of its fighting force but also for its reconstruction efforts. PAKISTAN -------------- ¶12. (C/REL AUS) Assistant Secretary Kimmitt provided an overview of financial and political threats to Pakistan's stability, and the situation in the Federally-administered tribal areas (FATA),voicing pessimism that the GOP had grasped the seriousness of the threat from militant elements within the country, despite the recent Marriott Hotel bombing. The Pakistani military did not lack the capability, but may lack the will to effectively confront the insurgents, he observed. ¶13. (S/REL AUS) Deputy Secretary Ritchie echoed A/S Kimmitt's assessment, predicting there could be a major crisis in CANBERRA 00001025 004 OF 005 Pakistan in one month or less. AUSTRALIA wanted to step up its aid to Pakistan, including providing counterinsurgency training. Peter West, Assistant Secretary of Defence for the Americas and North and South Asia, elaborated that the Australian government had approached Pakistan's Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) on counterinsurgency cooperation. ISI had drawn a sharp distinction between al Qaeda, on the one hand, and the Taliban and its supporters, on the other, insisting COIN could not be used against the latter, as it would hurt development efforts in the FATA. Responding to the current debate in the West about whether to negotiate with moderate elements of the Taliban, Ritchie expressed GOA skepticism that such a course would be effective. The GOA believed in the utility of seeking to induce Taliban defections but thought direct negotiations were dangerous. PARTICIPANTS -------------- ¶14. (U) Participants in the 2008 U.S.-Australia Pol-Mil Talks included: UNITED STATES --A/S Mark T. Kimmitt, PM Bureau (Head of delegation) --DASD David Sedney (East Asia) --LTC Desmond Walton, Asian & Pacific Security Affairs, OSD --Col. J.K. Arruda, Chief, PACOM/J53 --LTC Rocky Carter, Joint Staff, J5, SE Asia --Abraham Denmark, OSD --David Michaels, AUSTRALIA Country Director, OSD --Tim Liston, Political-Military Officer, PM/RSAT --Col. A.J. Britschgi, DATT, Embassy Canberra --Aleisha Woodward, Country Desk Officer, EAP/ANP --John Crowley, Acting POLCOUNS, Embassy Canberra (notetaker) AUSTRALIA --David J. Ritchie, Deputy Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) --Steve Merchant, Deputy Secretary for Intelligence, Security and International Policy, Australian Department of Defence (ADOD) --Jennifer Rawson, First Assistant Secretary, International Security Division, DFAT --Deborah Stokes, First Assistant Secretary, South and West Asia, Middle East and Africa Division, DFAT --Graham Fletcher, First Assistant Secretary, North Asia Division, DFAT --Chris de Cure, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Americas Division, DFAT --Richard Rowe, First Assistant Secretary, Pacific Division, DFAT --Peter Woolcott, First Assistant Secretary, South-East Asia Division, DFAT --Hugh Borrowman, First Assistant Secretary, International Division, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) --Miles Armitage, Assistant Secretary, Asia, Americas and Trade Branch, International Division, PM&C --John Quinn, Assistant Secretary, Strategic Affairs and Q--John Quinn, Assistant Secretary, Strategic Affairs and Intelligence Branch, DFAT --Peter West, Assistant Secretary, Americas and North & South Asia Branch, International Policy Division, ADOD --Rodger Hodgkins, Strategic Analysis, Office of National Assessments --Beverly Mercer, U.S. Political and Strategic Section, DFAT --Cameron Archer, Director Defense Policy and Liaison CANBERRA 00001025 005 OF 005 Section, DFAT (notetaker) --Jonathan Gilbert, Executive Officer, Defense Policy and Liaison Section, DFAT (Notetaker) ¶15. (U) Assistant Secretary Kimmitt has cleared this message. MCCALLUM