MFA OFFICIALS ON AL LEBANON DELEGATION, AL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000983 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2018 TAGS: PARM PREL PTER LEB EG SUBJECT: MFA OFFICIALS ON AL LEBANON DELEGATION, AL MINISTERIAL DYNAMICS REF: STATE 49259 Classified By: ECPO Mincouns William R. Stewart for reason 1.4 (b). ¶1. (C) Summary: In separate meetings May 13, MFA Senior Advisor and Spokesman Hossam Zaki and MFA Cabinet Director for Lebanon Nazih El-Negary briefed us on current plans for the Qatari-led Arab League (AL) Delegation to Beirut, and the dynamics at the May 11 AL Ministerial. Zaki said that the AL delegation needs to defuse the current tension in Lebanon in order to allow for dialogue on the underlying political problems. He described Lebanese Sunni suffering at the hands of Hizballah as "deeply distressing" to the GOE and the Saudis. Zaki said that the GOE and Saudi Arabia, with help from Jordan, had to confront the rest of the AL at the May 11 Ministerial, but expressed satisfaction that the AL adopted "about ninety percent" of the GOE's original draft resolution. El-Negary said that the Arab League Initiative would still be in play during the AL Delegation's mission to Beirut, and that SYG Moussa could raise the idea of an Arab Force for Lebanon. He cautioned that Egypt would need to avoid openly favoring the GOL against Hizballah because of fears that Hizballah could target the Egyptian Embassy in Beirut. End summary. ¶2. (C) In line with reftel demarche, Mincouns opened the May 13 meeting with Zaki by expressing USG concern over the situation in Lebanon, and asking what Egypt and the Arab League planned to do. Zaki said that the AL Delegation to Beirut, led by Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassem, planned to fly to Qatar the evening of May 13. From Qatar, the delegation would plan to fly the Qatari PM's private plane to Beirut, if Hizballah would allow them to land. Zaki was not able to say when he expected the delegation to reach Beirut. He described the current Lebanese crisis as consisting of two layers: 1) the immediate violence on the streets and in the north, and 2) the underlying political crisis. Zaki said that the Arab League delegation needs to be able to first defuse the tension and violence in order to allow for dialogue to address the underlying political problems. ¶3. (C) Zaki offered us his personal analysis that Hizballah would not attack Christian interests in Lebanon because of its alliance with Michel Aoun, and therefore Hizballah would not be able to occupy the entire country. Zaki said that �A;because of this political dynamic, the Sunnis are paying the highest price among Lebanese for Hizballah's aggression. In emotional terms, he said that the suffering of Lebanese Sunnis is "deeply distressing" and "deeply offensive" to the Egyptians and Saudis, especially after "what the Sunnis went through in Iraq." He said that the Lebanese Sunnis' suffering could lead to a "different calculation" by the Egyptians and Saudis regarding what could be done to help them. (Note: Zaki interrupted the meeting to watch Saad Hariri's press conference on Al-Arabiya, and stood at rapt attention for about fifteen minutes in front of the television. He made a point of elaborating sympathetically on items from Hariri's statement, such as Hariri's reference to Hizballah's breaking into the offices of the Rafiq Hariri Foundation and replacing photos of Hariri with those of Bashar Al-Assad. End note.) ¶4. (C) Zaki recounted for us the May 11 Arab League Ministerial debate, saying that the GOE was pleased that the AL had adopted "about ninety percent" of the original Egyptian draft resolution. The GOE was disappointed that its draft criticism of Hizballah for targeting media institutions was cut from the final resolution due to opposition from Qatar and Algeria. He described the May 11 AL Ministerial as pitting Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan against all the other countries. He characterized Qatar as "the biggest supporter of Syria," and charged that Qatar also maintains channels to Iran, Hizballah and Hamas. He described Omani Foreign Minister Youssef Bin-Alawi as a "spoiler," and said that Libya played an unhelpful role with its anti-Saudi emphasis. He said the Kuwaiti, Bahraini and Emirati Foreign Ministers were not dependable and too "low key" to be of assistance. Zaki said the North African ministers were not "sufficiently engaged." ¶5. (C) In a separate meeting May 13, MFA Cabinet Director for Lebanon Nazih El-Negary told us that the Arab League Delegation would plan to conduct negotiations in Beirut with all the parties, including Hizballah, to determine what compromises would be acceptable in order to work toward a political solution to the crisis. He said that although Egypt does not have a representative on the delegation, the GOE intends to try to exert influence on the expected CAIRO 00000983 002 OF 002 negotiations through its embassy in Beirut. According to El-Negary, the GOE will continue to oppose PM Siniora's resignation. He cautioned that Egypt cannot afford to openly favor the GOL against Hizballah because of GOE fears that Hizballah could target the Egyptian Embassy in Beirut. He said the Arab League Initiative would still be in play during the negotiations, and that SYG Moussa could raise the idea of an Arab Force for Lebanon, depending on the atmosphere in Beirut and Hizballah's political standing. 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