EGYPT AND ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

S E C R E T CAIRO 000856 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/IPA (KMEDLAND) AND NEA/ELA E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2018 TAGS: PREL KWBG KPAL IS EG SUBJECT: EGYPT AND ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS REF: STATE 34850 Classified By: DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: Per reftel inquiry, Egypt's overriding security equity in a Palestinian state is a secure and stable border with Gaza. Egypt is interested in opening the Gaza border to humanitarian shipments and trade through a mechanism similar to the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access in order to alleviate the economic pressure on Gaza. Egypt also believes that improved humanitarian conditions in Gaza would decrease the potential for another border breach and thereby strengthen Egypt's security. End summary. -------------- Egyptian Security Considerations and Strategy -------------- ¶2. (C) The GOE is interested in the resumption of regular humanitarian shipments through Rafah. The Egyptians have argued for a return to the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access between Israel, Egypt, the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the EU, or an alternative workable arrangement that would enable the orderly transfer of goods and people in and out of Gaza through the Rafah crossing. In the GOE's view, re-establishing this agreement would help alleviate humanitarian suffering in Gaza, and could contribute to building political stability by undermining Hamas' political strength. The Egyptians fear HAMAS will exploit the current humanitarian situation in Gaza as a pretext to breach the Egyptian border. ¶3. (C) The January 2008 border breach that resulted in hundreds of thousands of Palestinians streaming into the Sinai humiliated the GOE and quickly became a national security threat. The breach and the resulting chaos allowed Hamas to re-arm through Sinai smuggling networks, unimpeded by a border wall or GOE security forces. Despite these considerable setbacks, the GOE exercised restraint in not using lethal force against civilians, and succeeded in restoring order before the situation became a crisis. The Egyptians face a dilemma in regard to the use of force against Gazans entering Egypt in any future encroachment. They use the threat of force as a deterrent, but recognize that the use of force will benefit HAMAS and Muslim Brotherhood political interests. We believe that, ultimately, Egyptian threats of force are hollow. ¶4. (S) Since January, the Egyptians have been building a fortified stone and concrete wall that currently covers most of the border with Gaza. The Egyptians have made efforts to interdict tunnel smuggling into and from Gaza, but the results have been uneven. We are supplying the GOE with counter-tunneling equipment, which will improve the GOE's capability to map the tunnel networks and prevent increased tunneling. The tunnels will however continue to present a challenge. In addition to supplying equipment, we are also pressing the GOE to address the problem of Sinai smuggling routes, which originate in Yemen and Sudan. Egyptian sensitivities to perceived U.S. interference present an obstacle to counter-tunneling cooperation. ¶5. (C) Consistent with the 2005 Egyptian-Israeli Border Arrangements Agreement and the Camp David Accords, Egypt can deploy a maximum of 750 Border Guard Forces on the border. Under the 2005 agreement, the Egyptians also are able to deploy three naval vessels off the Sinai coast to interdict maritime smuggling attempts. These agreements also stipulate intelligence liaison at various levels between Egypt and Israel, which has been ongoing. The GOE also deploys Central Security Forces in the Sinai. Egypt has security equities in a competent PA security force. The GOE trained PA security forces in Gaza before Hamas' June 2007 takeover. We have consulted with the GOE on the feasibility of training West Bank PA security services in Egypt, but the GOE has not been able to respond within our timeframe. -------------- Final Status -------------- ¶6. (C) In the context of final status, the GOE would want security assurances for the integrity of the Gaza border. The Egyptians have repeatedly said they cannot secure the border without a trustworthy "partner" on the other side. The GOE would also want commitments from a Palestinian government in Gaza to interdict smuggling and dismantle tunnels on the Gaza side of the border. The Egyptians would also seek guarantees from Israel to ensure the steady supply of humanitarian goods, especially fuel, into a future Palestinian state in Gaza, and ultimately would seek to normalize trade through Rafah. SCOBEY