COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT FOR THE TRANSFER OF 120MM

C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 000742 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE NEA/ELA FOR IRWIN ODS FOR AGUIRRE E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2018 TAGS: PREL MASS MARR EG SUBJECT: COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT FOR THE TRANSFER OF 120MM HIGH EXPLOSIVE CARTRIDGE WITH RACER (HE-T) TO EGYPT REF: EGYPTIAN ARMAMENT AUTHORITY LETTER OF REQUEST (LOR) 05/OV/152 PROCUREMENT OF NEW 120MM HIGH EXPLOSIVE WITH TRACER (HE-T) CARTRIDGES Classified By: DCM Stuart Jones for reason 1.4 (b). ¶1. (C) Description: The Government of Egypt has requested procurement of 15,500 120mm HE-T main-gun rounds, 200 dummy rounds, and 100 cutaway rounds. The dummy and cutaway rounds are for training purposes only. ¶2. (C) Reason the purchaser desires the articles or services: The Egyptian Army desires to expand its inventory of 120mm tank ammunition in light of its expansion of its M1A1 tank fleet. Egypt is adding 250 tanks to its M1A1 fleet through Increments 9 and 10. These tanks are currently in production. ¶3. (S) How the articles or services would contribute to both the U.S. and the recipient's defense/security goals: a. (U) Egyptian Security Goals: The requested 120mm ammunition enables Egypt's M1A1 tank crews to engage and destroy unarmored and light-armored vehicles on the battlefield. Without main-gun ammunition, the M1A1 has limited combat capabilities. b. (S) U.S. Security Goals: (S) (1) This procurement will strengthen the US-Egyptian mil-to-mil relationship at a time when we rely heavily on Egyptian cooperation for Suez Canal transits and over-flight rights that are critical to Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. It will also demonstrate USG commitment to remain as Egypt,s primary military partner and discourage it from pursuing stronger military ties with Russia or China. (S) (2) This procurement is consistent with DOD's Security Cooperation Guidance as it enhances the territorial security of one of our regional allies. It also supports three of CENTCOM's Security Cooperation objectives for Egypt: (a) strengthening regional stability, (b) enabling allies and partners, and (c) protecting US and partner interests. It also supports two of CENTCOM's Security Cooperation Desired Effects (SCDE) for Egypt: -- SCDE 3.2. "Support the defense modernization and transformation of allies or partners to reduce their vulnerability to external aggression and coercion." -- SCDE 4.2 "Help reform the defense establishment of selected countries...improve their capacity to operate independently or in coalition with US forces...improve a country,s ability to manage its defense resources." ¶4. (C) Justification for the type and quantity of articles or services requested: The Egyptian Army has possessed 120 mm HE-T cartridges for over twenty years. Therefore, this transfer does not introduce a new weapons capability to Egypt or to the region. ¶5. (C) Combatant Commander,s concurrence to the introduction of a new war fighting capability to the nation or region: Combatant Commander's assessment to follow separately, if required. ¶6. (C) Anticipated reactions of neighboring nations: Release and sale of 120 mm HE-T cartridges will not affect the regional balance of power; nor will it cause negative reactions from any of Egypt,s neighbors. We do not assess this transfer to have any negative impact on Israel,s qualitative military edge. ¶7. (C) Assessment of the nation's ability to account for, safeguard, operate, maintain, and support the articles: The GOE has demonstrated the intent and ability to protect sensitive, classified military technology over an extended period, including over 20 years of experience with the M1A1 tank program. Egypt signed a general security of information agreement with the U.S. and, as a customer, has protected the sensitive technology of other U.S. weapons systems. ¶8. (C) Training required either in country or in the United States and anticipated reactions resulting from the presence of U.S. trainers in country: No training requirement expected. ¶9. (C) Possible impact of any in-country U.S. presence that might be required as a result of providing the article: No in-country presence is required. ¶10. (C) Source of financing and the economic impact of the proposed acquisition: This transfer will be financed through Egypt's Foreign Military Financing-Grant (FMF-G) and will not have a significant impact on Egypt,s economy. ¶11. (C) Human rights considerations relevant to the proposed acquisition: The Egyptian military has no history of human rights abuses and is under civilian control. There are no human rights considerations that would preclude the release of ammunition to the Egyptian military. ¶12. (C) Plan for end-use monitoring and plan for compliance verification: OMC Egypt has a robust Golden Sentry Program. The Golden Sentry point of contact, working in close cooperation with the security assistance program officer, will review and maintain a copy of the purchaser's physical security and accountability control plan, and stands ready to assist with or conduct inventories and inspections as required. ¶13. (C) The operational plan for use and specific end-users to include: Egyptian Army requests 15,500 HE-T (High Explosive-Tracer) rounds, 200 dummy rounds, and 100 cutaway rounds to maintain credible ammunition inventories for their M1A1 fleet. ¶14. (C) Description of the primary mission for the units to receive the munitions: The Egyptian Army defends Egyptian territory from foreign aggression and conducts security operations to include counter-terrorism operations, protection of the Suez Canal, peace-keeping and force protection. ¶15. (C) Extent of anti-terrorist missions for the units to receive the munitions: The Egyptian Army has a homeland and border security mission. ¶16. (C) Assessment of the purchaser's capacity to afford substantially the same degree of security and accountability protection as given by the United States and willingness to accept physical security and accountability of the munitions: Numerous security audits by the U.S. Government have repeatedly verified Egypt's capability to safeguard sensitive technology and materiel as well as classified military information. ¶17. (C) Additional information in support of the transfer request: The 200 dummy rounds, and 100 cutaway rounds do not have an offensive capability but will be used for training only. The number is reasonable given the purpose. --In November 2006 a Country Team Assessment was filed that supported the third party transfer of 100(each) 120 mm TPCSDS-T M865 tank rounds from the Government of Egypt(GOE) to the Government of Jordan. --In October 2003 and July 2004, OMC Egypt hosted EUM Tiger Teams led by DSCA/P3. The teams inspected multiple locations and weapons systems within Egypt. These visits were very successful and no EUM violations were found. --In December 2004, Egypt received its first shipment of Stinger missiles in conjunction with its purchase of the Avenger system. Multiple inspections of the Stinger storage facility have been conducted with positive results and there have been no discrepancies in the two missile inventories accomplished by U.S. personnel to date. --An unknown number of the 15,500 rounds will be used in an Egyptian test fire exercise to ensure the quality of the rounds. Previous lot testing was not conducted by the Government of Egypt. Instead, the Government of Egypt relied upon US Government testing results. The Government of Egypt desires to learn how to do this testing, so that it can conduct similar tests on previously acquired lots of 120mm ammunition. ¶18. (C) Country Team Recommendation: That the US Government approve the procurement the 15,800 assorted 120 mm (HE-T) cartridges to Egypt. This is a coordinated mission position. RICCIARDONE