SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FORD'S CAIRO MEETINGS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000690 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/08 TAGS: IAEA KNPP AORC PARM PREL IS EG SUBJECT: SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FORD'S CAIRO MEETINGS ON THE 2008 NPT PREPCOM Classified By: ECPO Mincouns William R. Stewart for reason 1.4 (b). ¶1. (C) Summary: On March 13, Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation Christopher Ford discussed the upcoming April-May Nonproliferation Treaty PrepCom with MFA Assistant Minister for Cabinet Affairs Ambassador Wafaa Bassim and Arab League Director for Multilateral Affairs Wael Al-Assad. Bassim pushed for compliance with the 1995 NPT Review Conference resolution on the Middle East, and urged progress on the provision of nuclear fuel. MFA Counselor Ali Sirry suggested that the upcoming NPT PrepCom should try to achieve a negotiated consensus document. Arab League Director for Multilateral Affairs Wael Al-Assad told Ford that in the run-up to the 2010 Review Conference it would not be feasible to have an all-encompassing Final Document. He criticized the U.S. for ignoring the nuclear programs of non-parties to the NPT, and called for an improved atmosphere at the September-October 2008 IAEA General Conference in Vienna. Ford told his interlocutors that the U.S. wants to move beyond procedural debate at the PrepCom into a substantive airing of views. End summary. ¶2. (C) Ambassador Bassim began by saying she valued consultations with the United States before the PrepCom. She said that all states need to keep the universality of the Nonproliferation Treaty in mind, but that Egypt was open to being "creative on implementing measures." She declared that nonproliferation should not exclusively be the focus of discussions, but in fact that "disarmament is the main goal," and must not be overlooked. Bassim added that it was important for the nuclear weapons states to comply with previously-agreed commitments, specifically identifying the package of agreements reached at the 1995 NPT Review Conference, including the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. ¶3. (C) She faulted the states party to the 1995 RevCon agreements, especially the nuclear weapons states, for a "lack of will" to fulfill the agreements, and stressed the need to "keep the regime alive." Bassim opined that we should not let the Iranian issue lead to preventing other countries from developing nuclear energy. She said Egypt was concerned not only about Iran, but also about how an Iranian nuclear weapon could trigger an arms race in the region and elsewhere. ¶4. (C) MFA Multilateral Affairs Counselor Ali Sirry suggested that at the upcoming 2008 NPT PrepCom it would be desirable to "aim high" and try for an agreed consensus document, rather than just a Chairman's Summary. If this proved impossible, he continued, a summary would be acceptable, but we should not preclude a consensus document. He said that Egypt liked the idea of having a negotiated document at this PrepCom, "if we can." Sirry said it was important that the PrepCom not concentrate solely upon procedure, as occurred last year, but instead focus on steps to implement the 1995 Middle East Resolution. Sirry added that Egypt wanted to keep the Additional Protocol "voluntary," at least until NPT universality had been achieved. He worried that fuel-cycle restriction efforts would hurt the emerging nuclear programs of developing countries. ¶5. (C) Ford said that the U.S. goal at the upcoming NPT PrepCom would be to try to move beyond procedural debate into a substantive airing of views. The U.S. is concerned that Iran may try to dispute the Chairman's Summary, although the summary's purpose is to avoid requiring consensus. Ford said that the U.S. supports the peaceful use of nuclear energy and wants to promote international cooperation on this issue within the context of safeguards and other nonproliferation commitments. He noted that Iranian pursuit of a nuclear weapon imperils NPT universality. Ford pointed out that the international community had offered Iran a generous assistance package if it gives up uranium enrichment and re-processing. ¶6. (C) In a separate meeting, Arab League Director for Multilateral Affairs Wael Al-Assad said that in the run-up to the 2010 RevCon it would not be feasible to have an all-encompassing Final Document, and that it would be wise to cultivate areas that are appropriately "ripe" for agreement. The Arab states needed to see serious discussion and movement on implementing the 1995 Middle East Resolution, especially from the NPT depository states. He believed that it was important to "set measures in place" by 2010, such as creating a mechanism to assess progress on Middle East issues between sessions of the NPT. ¶7. (C) Al-Assad criticized U.S. policy for ignoring the CAIRO 00000690 002 OF 002 nuclear programs of non-parties to the NPT. He said that the Arab League heartily supported international cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and believed that some kind of fuel-supply plan was important. Al-Assad stressed that without very solid assurances of supply, enrichment would remain an attractive option. Al-Assad said that at recent Middle East Track II discussions at the Hague, Iranian representatives argued that Iran had been prevented in the past from acquiring fuel supplies from abroad, and is therefore reluctant to give up its program without fuel supply guarantees. ¶8. (C) Al-Assad said that the Arab League worried about the "worsening atmosphere" at the IAEA, and "threats" apparently made by the EU and others to break longstanding consensus on IAEA General Conference resolutions, such as the general Middle East safeguards resolution. Al-Assad said that the Arab League was open to ideas on how to improve the political atmosphere at the IAEA, which affects NPT PrepCom issues. Al-Assad said that contrary to press reports, during the March 4-5 Cairo Foreign Ministers' Arab League Summit Preparatory Conference, the Arab League had not adopted a resolution calling upon Arab states to withdraw from the NPT if Israel admitted to possessing nuclear weapons. One idea that he said does have support in the Arab League is a refusal to sign any new nonproliferation treaties until at least 2010, unless "progress" (NFI) is made regarding Israel. ¶9. (C) With regard to the upcoming 2008 PrepCom, Al-Assad said that the USG's paper on the Middle East last year had not been in keeping with the USG's otherwise commendably fresh approach, and he urged the U.S. to take "practical steps" to move things forward. Al-Assad said he was hearing that Iran was agreeable about the 2008 PrepCom agenda, and uninterested in reopening it. Al-Asad said the Arab League is currently enthusiastic about a 2004 IAEA proposal for a seminar on lessons from other nuclear weapon free zones worldwide, provided that such a meeting included "a look at the Middle East." Finally, Al-Assad said that he had heard that Japanese Ambassador to the International Organizations in Vienna, Yukiya Amano, was in the running for IAEA Director General. Al-Assad mentioned that he had been slightly concerned at Amano's angry reaction when Iran attacked him personally at the 2007 PrepCom. ¶10. (C) Ford told Al-Assad that the NPT review cycle process itself obviated any need for additional mechanisms, such as those Al-Assad mentioned. Ford said it would be important to reach agreement on fuel-supply issues to undercut Iran's arguments, and to provide benefits to countries genuinely interested in civilian nuclear power. Ford said he regretted that in 2006 the Arabs had broken the consensus approach on the Middle East that had prevailed at IAEA General Committees for many years. Today's unpleasant atmosphere was a result of this, he said. Ford said he hoped for better cooperation at the 2008 IAEA General Committee this fall in Vienna. ¶11. (U) ISN/MNSA cleared this message. RICCIARDONE