THE SCHIZOPHRENIA OF THE EGYPTIAN MUSLIM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000562 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR PASCUAL E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2028 TAGS: PREL KISL KDEM EG SUBJECT: THE SCHIZOPHRENIA OF THE EGYPTIAN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD (C-NE6-01656) REF: A. 2006 CAIRO 6474 ¶B. 2007 CAIRO 3118 ¶C. 2007 CAIRO 3129 ¶D. CAIRO 389 Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Economic and Political Affairs William R. Stewart, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The ongoing debate over the draft party platform of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has exposed in an unprecedented manner the cross-cutting fault lines within the 80-year old Islamist organization. The dichotomy within the MB's leadership - highlighted by contradictory statements issued by various leading figures - appears to be echoed throughout the organization's lower echelons. A divided organization operating in an uncertain political environment, struggling against a government crackdown as it struggles within itself, it does not appear that either the religiously-oriented conservative wing or the politically-oriented moderate wing of the group is securely ascendant. The political party platform, should it eventually be released in final form, will be a useful gauge to determine which dominates. End summary. -------------- DIVISION IN THE RANKS MORE APPARENT THAN EVER -------------- ¶2. (C) The MB's internal debate over its draft party platform has markedly demonstrated the diverse range of opinions within the organization, with members grouped into either the "moderate" or "conservative" faction. The debate over the platform has featured the unprecedented public airing of the variant views within the MB, with leading senior members such as Political Bureau member Essam El Erian, leading Guidance Council member Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, and influential former MB parliamentarian Gamal Heshmat criticizing specific aspects of the document (ref B). As the April 8 local council election races heat up, and the military tribunals of forty senior MB members come to a close, the MB has put the political party platform on the back-burner. According to our contacts, the MB's leadership determined not to push decisions on such a seminal document, and risk deepening divisions and internal dissension, at such a critical time for the group. No further movement is expected on the platform until after the verdict is delivered in the military tribunals (currently expected on March 25) and after the April 8 local council elections. ¶3. (C) Divisions within the group are not solely focused on the draft party platform. The decision to contest the local council elections was apparently very controversial within the MB, with the conservative faction arguing that the MB should not participate. The moderates, advocating for continued electoral engagement, won the day (ref D). Another high-profile rift was exposed with El Erian's unprecedented comments in October 2007 that "should the MB win power, it would recognize Israel and respect treaties. As for the Camp David Accords, they would have to be changed according to what is suitable for us, which does not mean that we would be declaring any war" (ref C). His comments were walked back by MB leaders, and he recanted publicly. But a confidante of El Erian told us that his comments "were not a slip of the tongue, but rather a deliberate attempt to move the ball forward, in terms of at least getting the MB cadres discussing recognition of Israel." -------------- THE MODERATES -------------- ¶4. (C) Aboul Fotouh, El Erian, imprisoned Second Deputy Supreme Guide Khayrat El Shatir (the third-most senior official in the MB, currently being tried before the military tribunal),and Mohamed Saad El Katatni (head of the MB's parliamentary bloc) are widely viewed as the most moderate or pragmatic leaders within the MB, who have long advocated for outreach to other Egyptian players and the West, supported the creation of an MB political party, and pushed for the increased political engagement of the group and embrace of democratic participation, rather than the MB's traditional "da'wa" (call to Islam) focus. Shatir has been described to us by various contacts as the key moderate figure within the MB, a "power-player" who had the ability to reach out to both sides within the organization and "bridge the gap." He was also renowned for his encouragement and support of younger MB members who were taking the group into uncharted territory - for instance, the community of active MB-affiliated bloggers, who in November 2007 posted their criticism of the draft CAIRO 00000562 002 OF 002 party platform on their websites and even started a parallel web-site to the MB's official site, on which they aired criticism of the MB's more conservative leaders. (Note: Such unusual breakdown of MB discipline was halted by leading conservative Mohamed Mursi, who reportedly called the bloggers in for a talking to. The parallel website was subsequently taken off-line, and critical comments on other web-sites halted. Our contacts speculate that had Shatir not been imprisoned, the situation might have been dealt with differently. End note). ¶5. (C) On November 23, 2005, following the MB's gains in the 2005 parliamentary elections, Shatir published an op-ed in the British newspaper "The Guardian," titled "No Need to Be Afraid of Us: The Muslim Brotherhood Believes That Democratic Reforms Could Trigger a Renaissance in Egypt." He was reportedly chastised by the security services for publishing the article, and feared since that he would be arrested. We have heard that his continued detention was a set-back for the moderate wing of the MB. While some of the public views expressed by MB Deputy Supreme Guide Mohamed Habib seem moderate, he is often described as "being on the fence." Habib is viewed as bending to the prevalent political wind within the MB. -------------- THE CONSERVATIVES -------------- ¶6. (C) Our contacts (mainly journalists, academics, and analysts) report that roughly 30-35 percent of the MB's rank and file support the group's leading moderates. The other 55-60 percent allegedly are conservatives, with the remaining 10 percent vacillating between the two camps. Our contacts caution that MB strongholds are in the country-side; "inevitably, that means that the base of the group is more conservative." Mohamed Mursi (head of the MB's Political Bureau),Mahmoud Ezzat (secretary-general of the MB),and Mahmoud Ghozlan (leading Guidance Council member) are widely recognized as the most prominent among the group's conservative faction. In recent months, Mursi in particular appears to be taking on a more assertive role, perhaps in part to fill the vacuum left by Shatir's detention. ¶7. (C) In terms of other conservative trends within the group, some contacts report a worrisome Salafi tendency among some younger MB members, who are "impatient" with the pragmatists. Certain groups within the MB's younger generation reportedly are increasingly frustrated by the organization's strategy of political participation, which they view as having borne little fruit, due to government interference and crackdowns. MB leaders are reportedly progressively more concerned about their ability to contain the MB members frustrated by the GOE's roadblocks to political participation, and who thus may look to an alternative. -------------- MB SUCCESSION -------------- ¶8. (C) To date, the position of MB Supreme Guide has been a life-time appointment; all six previous MB Supreme Guide's have died in office. The 79-year old Akef, who succeeded Mohamed Ma'moun al Hudaibi in January 2004, has made only sporadic comments about his tenure in the post, including an April 2004 TV interview in which he said that the Supreme Guide's term is limited to six years, but that he had proposed the term be only four years (ref A). Intermittently, there are rumors that the MB will limit the Supreme Guide to two terms in office, but to date, no official MB statement to that effect has been issued. In terms of possible successors to Akef, our contacts agree that the most likely replacements are Mohamed Habib, Mohamed Mursi, or Mahmoud Ezzat. Prior to his current incarceration, Shatir had been mentioned as a possible Supreme Guide, but his continuing imprisonment, widely expected to last several more years, has removed him for the time being as a contender. RICCIARDONE