MIC RESPONDS TO U/S FORE LETTER; COMMENTS FURTHER

S E C R E T CAIRO 000528 SIPDIS SIPDIS PASS USAID FOR GEORGE LAUDATO AND DAVID MCCLOUD STATE FOR NEA/DAS DANIN E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2018 TAGS: EAID ECON EFIN PGOV PREL KDEM EG SUBJECT: MIC RESPONDS TO U/S FORE LETTER; COMMENTS FURTHER ON D&G PROGRAMS REF: CAIRO 399 Classified by Ambassador Francis Ricciardone for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION: On March 13, the Ambassador, accompanied by the Administrator's Special Advisor for the Middle East George Laudato, USAID's David McCloud, USAID Mission director and econ counselor (notetaker) met with Minister for International Cooperation Fayza Aboulnaga. Discussion focused on her reaction to Under Secretary Fore's letter, delivered on March 11, and details SIPDIS surrounding Aboulnaga's February 17 letter complaining about direct grants to American and Egyptian organizations not registered either with the MFA, or with the Ministry of Social Security, in accordance with the 2004 agreement (ref). Aboulnaga reiterated her disappointment in the response as well as the decision-making process, which she described as "unilateral." She specifically complained that $200m in FY 2009 ESF was "unacceptable" because it was less than the $350m in annual Egyptian debt repayments to the U.S. Aboulnaga also said that funding for civil companies by USAID or any other USG entity violated the 2004 agreement and described grants to civil companies as "illegal." Aboulnaga claims to have Mubarak's backing. She may also be staking out a maximalist line as a negotiator, as she also tries to force a review of FY 2009 ESF levels. She evidently also is acting as part of a concerted GOE plan to close the civil company loophole. The Ambassador plans to talk with Prime Minister Nazif and Gamal Mubarak in the coming two weeks, and raised this issue with Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit and EGIS Chief Omar Soliman on March 16 (septels). END SUMMARY. ¶2. (S) Aboulnaga opened with a frank reaction to the letter from F explaining FY 2009 funding levels, our decision not to provide debt treatment, and our offer to work together on a legacy program. She reiterated her disappointment in the response as well as the decision-making process, which she described as "unilateral." She said for thirty years the program has been a joint government-to-government process, and said that "we reject the letter as a way of dealing with our bilateral relationship." The Ambassador responded that the USG did take Egyptian views into account, and our delay in responding was due to the full interagency discussion on every possible option for addressing Egypt's proposals on debt and a legacy program. He noted that the Secretary had discussed this with Prime Minister Nazif in January 2007 and on her last visit. Finally, he reminded her that in the end, funding levels are a U.S. decision, Egypt had greatly benefited from U.S. assistance over the years, the Egyptian economy is growing rapidly and that there are lot of other demands on U.S. resources. Aboulnaga charged that the letter reflects "a change in attitude, a change in how things are being done between the U.S. and Egypt." She said that the $200m amount of annual ESF for 2009 was "unacceptable" because it was less than the $350m in annual Egyptian debt repayments to the U.S. Therefore, she said, Egypt may reject the $200m for FY 2009; "this is under consideration." Options for a Legacy Program -------------- ¶3. (S) The minister inquired about the U.S. vision of an endowment, including the funding and the mechanism. She was particularly concerned about the prospect of conditionality. We offered to provide background about various mechanisms, and described how similar organizations had been set up elsewhere. Aboulnaga asked where the money for the endowment would come from. We mentioned the reprogramming option and said that it might also come from out-year ESF. We also noted that it might be possible to structure it as a public-private partnership, allowing for participation by foundations or other private sources of money. Aboulnaga was cool to re-programming and again urged that the U.S. should convert 2009 and out-year funding to "pay down" Egypt's debt to the U.S. Ambassador explained this would require new U.S. legislation which, as U/S Fore's letter made clear, we were not prepared to request at this time. USAID's Direct Grants Program -------------- ¶4. (S) Re the February 17 MIC letter (ref),the Ambassador noted our mandate to fund civil society organizations directly as required by the Brownback Amendment and to be transparent in our funding with Egypt. On transparency, USAID is willing to provide information to MIC about direct grants more frequently. The bilateral consultative group could also be revived. On the NGO side, the U.S. has found it necessary to provide funds to U.S. organizations without an MFA agreement because the MFA doesn't grant agreements. Also, Egypt had not met U.S. expectations in terms of timely registrations of new Egyptian NGOs, and approvals for those NGOs to receive foreign funds. Without the option of funding legally-registered civil companies, it is not possible to run an effective program. We need either to sustain the legal and policy understanding that has enabled us heretofore to fund worthwhile, legal activities in a transparent manner, or to negotiate a new understanding of how this program will work but "We need to be able to provide direct funding" to civil society organizations. ¶5. (S) Aboulnaga replied emphatically that funding for civil companies by USAID or any other USG entity violated the 2004 agreement. She described grants to civil companies as "illegal." She specifically cited a grant made in 2004 to the Ibn Khaldoun Center, a civil company, to which MIC decided not to respond. She also complained about planned funding for Transparency International, which she said was a German organization and not eligible for funding under the terms of the 2004 agreement, which stipulated only Egyptian and U.S. NGOs could receive funding. Although her February 17 letter did not refer to NDI and IRI, Aboulnaga argued that they did have offices in Egypt, did not have an MFA agreement, and should not be receiving ESF. The decision to allow direct funding to NGOs was "a major concession" by the GOE, and that "we have come a long way." Now, however, she said, we need to "take a pause" and look at it again. COMMENT -------------- ¶6. (S) Aboulnaga claimed that she had the full backing of the Presidency in laying out her position. We think we still have room to test the theory that she is staking out a maximalist line as a negotiator, as she tries to force a review of FY 2009 ESF levels. She evidently also is acting as part of a concerted GOE plan to close the civil company loophole. The Ambassador plans to talk with Prime Minister Nazif and Gamal Mubarak in the coming two weeks, and raised this issue with Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit and EGIS Chief Omar Soliman on March 16 (septel). Both focused on debt relief rather than on the civil companies. Aboul Gheit had no comment on civil companies. Soliman promised "flexbility," provided the U.S. would fund appropriate organizations. We will also pursue this issue with MOD assistant ministers, in an effort to determine whether or not they are aware of this latest round of discussions and its implications for the full U.S.-Egyptian ESF and FMF package. ¶7. (S) On March 13, some hours before meeting Aboulnaga, we had signed a new grant agreement with the Ibn Khaldoun Center for a three year multi-activity program. We will brief IKC's leadership about the Aboulnaga conversation. Of the Egyptian companies listed in MIC's February 17 letter, two have completed their grants. Two others are still working; we will continue to reimburse them for outstanding obligations and any financial commitments we have made. ECDDS, which was to have provided support to NDI for local elections monitoring, has agreed to apply for funding under their registered NGO. We hope that the remaining Egyptian group, MAAT, will be able to take advantage of $100,000 in MEPI funding. We will brief MAAT about possible repercussions of U.S. funding as well. Funding for U.S.-based organizations will go forward as planned for as long as they can sustain their activities in the face of possible GOE counteraction. ¶8. (S) Negotiating with the GOE re: direct funding could be protracted, and this process could be our best hope of sustaining the funding meanwhile. We will continue to fund Egyptian civil companies as necessary on a case by case basis with a bias towards funding. Considerations in those cases will include their other options for funding, timeliness and effectiveness of the activities, and whether or not they are will to take the risk of accepting funding given the strenuous GOE opposition. But our partners need to be aware that there may be legal or political consequences of accepting USG funds. We do not believe that Aboulnaga will escalate by pushing security authorities to arrest our partners or close their organizations without additional warning, but we cannot foreclose that possibility. RICCIARDONE