A/S WELCH'S FEB 7 MEETING WITH FM ABOUL GHEIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000272 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER IS LE EG SUBJECT: A/S WELCH'S FEB 7 MEETING WITH FM ABOUL GHEIT Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Stuart Jones Reasons: 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) Summary. A/S Welch met with Egyptian Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit February 7. The two agreed that a breakthrough in Lebanon was unlikely, and that the Lebanese government and institutions needed to be supported by the international community. Aboul Gheit reported that the GOE was sealing the Egpyt-Gaza border, and that the main GOE concern was to ensure there would be no breach in the future. He agreed that a return to the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access would be ideal, but ventured that the Israeli monitoring role might be cancelled as a way to mollify Hamas. He was concerned that instability in Gaza, including the continuing rocket fire into Gaza, was dimming Israeli-Palestinian peace prospects. A/S Welch urged Aboul Gheit to stay focused Israeli-Palestinian peace prospects, notwithstanding the recent Gaza crisis, and to use the crisis as a basis to rehabilitate Egytpian-Israeli relations. End summary. ¶2. (C) FM Aboul Gheit told A/S Welch that he was pessimistic on a Lebanon breakthrough. While he said it was "premature" to determine whether President Mubarak would attend the March 29 Arab League Ministerial Summit in Damascus, he also believed it would be hard for the Arab League to cancel or postpone the summit absent Syrian acquiescence. Only if half, or more, of Arab League heads of state agree to boycott would this become a real possibility, in his view. A possible scenario might be full attendance at the summit, but with many states sending lower level delegations. ¶3. (C) Aboul Gheit reported that he has told Syrian Foreign Minister Moallam that there must be a president elected in Lebanon first, to be followed by government (i.e. cabinet) formation. He was not optimistic that Syria would "change course," and said it would be a major development if the SARG agreed to election of a Lebanese president prior to cabinet formation. He said that Moallam had signaled a possible Syrian change of position at the January 6 Arab League meeting, but has since backtracked. The larger picture, according to Aboul Gheit, is that the SARG wants the Lebanese government "fully at their disposal." Aside from traditional Syrian interests in Lebanon, the looming Hariri tribunal is driving SARG policy. In addition, he assessed that Saudi-Syrian bilateral dynamics were at play, with both dug in. ¶4. (C) A/S Welch agreed that if the Syrians had wanted the president to be elected, it would have happened already. The Lebanese majority is growing restless, and it reassessing options, and increasing its focus on 2009 parliamentary elections. The two agreed that is important not give in to Syria, but Aboul Gheit said that options to pressure the SARG were limited. "You can pinch them here or there," he said, but it is going to be very hard to alter Syria's strategic outlook on Lebanon. ¶5. (C) Aboul Gheit complained that Arab pressure had been deflected by Syria and the Lebanese opposition. "We thought we cornered them with the Arab League Initiative but they escaped," he said. He reported that at Arab League meetings "nobody wants to challenge them (the Syrians). The Omanis had received Iranian FM Mottaki following the January 6 Arab League meeting, and at the subsequent January 27 Arab League meeting, the Omani position had become decidedly pro-Syrian. ¶6. (C) A/S Welch said that there needs to be a plan to stabilize Lebanon. Aboul Gheit said that "we see eye to eye" on the need for the international community to support the Siniora government. The USG supports the Arab League Initiative, A/S Welch said, but we have been careful about publicizing our support lest it create more problems. Aboul Gheit took the point. A/S Welch said that the key now is to support the current government, and its institutions such as the central bank and security services, as well as the majority. While not a long-term solution, these steps would provide the maximum level of stability as the Lebanese continued to work toward a political settlement. Aboul Gheit agreed, and lamented the reality that sporadic violence, including assassinations, was likely to continue. ¶7. (C) Aboul Gheit said that the GOE is sealing the border but that it would be hard to prevent the repetition of the recent influx of tens of thousands of Gazans. It is critical to organize an orderly, legal operation of Rafah. The USG and Europeans have to help, he said, and the PA must return to the Rafah crossing. He said that the GOE "will not accept a role for Hamas," but said that part of a compromise might be "disconnecting Israel's computer," (i.e. Israel's monitoring role). (Note: In a subsequent Feb 8 telcon, an MFA Cabinet Advisor told us that the notion of cutting out the GOI was not a formal GOE position. End Note.) He reiterated that the GOE goal is "not to face this situation CAIRO 00000272 002 OF 002 again." We do not want to be compelled to take difficult measures against Palestinians coming into Egypt he said. "You wouldn,t do it with the Mexicans, and we cannot do it either." A/S Welch said that the GOE should work with the relevant parties (Israel, PA, and EU) to consider options at the crossings, within the framework of the 2005 AMA. How, for example, are other crossings into Gaza run? ¶8. (C) Aboul Gheit said that a "period of quiet" is critical. The GOE needs to get the Rafah border in order, in order to return the focus to supporting Israeli-Palestinian peace discussions. The rockets into Israel, suicide bombings such as the recent Dimona bombing, and what Aboul Gheit termed "collective punishment" of Gazans by the GOI are all destabilizing the situation. Hamas is eager to get into the political discussions, and the GOE had rebuked the Hamas delegation led by Khaled Mishal to Cairo earlier this month. But fundamentally, Hamas' momentum must be countered by progress on the PA-GOI discussions, Aboul Gheit said, and time is of the essence. "Their missiles will reach farther and father and the IDF will continue to retaliate," Aboul Gheit said. A/S Welch made clear that the President and Secretary continue to fully support Israeli-Palestinian SIPDIS negotiations on a two state solution as outlined at Annapolis, and that nothing will change this commitment. ¶9. (U) A/S Welch did not have the opportunity to clear this message. RICCIARDONE