SCENESETTER FOR US-EGYPT MCC

S E C R E T CAIRO 002485 E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2018 TAGS: PREL MASS MOPS MARR PHUM KDEM EG SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR US-EGYPT MCC Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey per 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: This year's U.S. - Egypt Military Cooperation Committee (MCC),being held in Washington December 16 - 17, will be an opportunity to confirm the mutual benefits of our bilateral security relationship and engage the GOE on transforming our relationship to counter current threats. Since our Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program began almost 30 years ago, our strong military relationship has supported peace between Egypt and Israel and ensured critical Suez Canal and overflight access for U.S. military operations. The relationship, however, should now change to reflect new regional and transnational security threats. Given the current global economic crisis and continued Congressional support for conditioning Egyptian assistance, the MCC will provide a valuable opportunity to convince GOE leadership that, while Egypt remains a key regional ally, our military assistance program is not set in stone, but must reflect changing realities. We and the GOE will be able to make the best case for continuing a robust FMF program by targeting funding for shared priorities like peacekeeping and border security, and must take more action on emerging regional security threats such as piracy. Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Sami Enan will lead the Ministry of Defense's (MOD) delegation. End Summary. -------------- -------------- Mil-Mil Cooperation: Strong Foundation, Ready for Next Level -------------- -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) President Mubarak and military leaders view our military assistance program as the cornerstone of our mil-mil relationship and consider the USD 1.3 billion in annual FMF as "untouchable compensation" for making and maintaining peace with Israel. The tangible benefits of our relationship are clear: Egypt remains at peace with Israel, and the U.S. military enjoys priority access to the Suez Canal and Egyptian airspace. We believe, however, that our relationship can accomplish much more. Over the last year, we have engaged MOD leaders on developing shared objectives to address current and emerging threats, including border security, counter terrorism, civil defense, and peacekeeping. Our efforts thus far have met with limited success. After initial strong resistance, MOD supported the first phase of a USD 23 million FMF-funded counter-smuggling system soon to be installed on the Gaza-Egyptian border (ref A). During MCC discussions, USG officials should encourage MOD counterparts to approve the follow-on stages and stress the importance of using the knowledge gained from the seismic-acoustic equipment to destroy tunnels and break up smuggling rings. ¶3. (S/NF) Decision-making within MOD rests almost solely with Minister of Defense Field Marshal Tantawi. In office since 1991, he consistently resists change to the level and direction of FMF funding and is therefore one of the chief impediments to transforming our security relationship. During his tenure, the tactical and operational readiness of the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) has degraded. But he retains President Mubarak's support, and so he and the top brass will most likely stay in position until Mubarak leaves the scene. Enan will express his government's opposition to Congressional conditioning of military assistance and will seek support in convincing Congress of Egypt's strategic importance. Enan should be reassured that Egypt remains a key U.S. ally, but stress that given the current economic downturn and the likelihood of continued Congressional support for conditioning, Egypt and we should do more to justify continuing value by demonstrating through action its support for our shared regional security goals and moving forward on political reform. Enan will likely push back strongly, arguing that the USG should divorce military issues from political ones. ¶4. (S/NF) One way to demonstrate Egypt's continued strategic importance is through shifting more FMF funding to address asymmetric threats like terrorism and improving border security along its long and porous borders. We should also stress that our mil-mil relationship is much greater than the yearly flow of military assistance. Egypt could play a much more active and influential role in regional security issues, including supporting and training the Iraqi military, deploying more peacekeeping troops to Sudan, joining neighbors in combating piracy, and stemming the flow of illegal migration. Another such concrete display of a more forward-looking security strategy would be to support CENTCOM's efforts to re-invent Bright Star. Enan may lament the loss of large-scale Bright Stars. We should stress that Bright Star continues to be an important strategic statement for the U.S. and its regional allies, and solicit his input for ways to make Bright Star more relevant. ¶5. (S/NF) The Egyptian delegation will also raise the issue of releasability and express frustration with Egypt's inability to procure restricted weapons systems. Some systems are not releasable because of Egyptian refusal to sign the necessary agreement (CISMOA) providing end-use assurances and ensuring proper protection of certain U.S. origin technology. Other systems are either not releasable to any country or denied for political reasons, mainly due to concerns regarding Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME). We should stress that decisions to release advanced weapons system are made on a country-by-country basis, but signing a CISMOA and expanding cooperation on current regional threats would be welcomed steps to our dialogue on releasability. Egypt recently raised the Javelin, not subject to CISMOA concerns and already released to several countries in the Middle East. -------------- Regional Efforts -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) While the military remains inwardly focused, President Mubarak and key Egyptian officials remain engaged on a number of regional issues. On Iraq, Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit completed a successful trip to Baghdad in October 2008 (ref B). GOE officials have expressed increasing confidence in Iraqi PM Maliki, and plans are moving forward to reopen the Embassy in Baghdad. We have encouraged the Egyptian MOD to send a high-ranking military representative to Baghdad once the embassy reopens. On the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, GOE efforts to facilitate intra-Palestinian reconciliation continue under the auspices of EGIS Chief General Soliman with the goal of pressuring Hamas to relinquish control of Gaza to the Palestinian Authority. The Egyptians have urged our incoming administration to support the Annapolis Process (i.e. direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations). On Iran, Egypt is concerned by rising Iranian influence in the region and has supported UN sanctions against Iran's nuclear program, but does not have a comprehensive strategy to counter Iran's regional momentum. The Egyptians have worked with Saudi Arabia and other Arab states to support Lebanese political and territorial sovereignty. -------------- Internal Politics and Economics -------------- ¶7. (C) Our fundamental political reform goal in Egypt remains democratic transformation, including the expansion of political freedom and democratic pluralism, respect for human rights, and a stable, democratic, and legitimate transition to the post-Mubarak era. Egyptian democracy and human rights efforts, however, continue to be stymied, and Mubarak remains skeptical of our role in democracy promotion, lecturing us that any efforts to open up will result in empowering the Muslim Brotherhood (which currently holds 86 of 454 seats in Egypt's parliament). An ongoing challenge remains balancing our security interests with our democracy promotion efforts. ¶8. (C) Economic reform is one of the major success stories of the government of Prime Minister Nazif. Reforms in trade and tax policy, financial reform, aggressive privatization and increased transparency have led to seven percent economic growth for the past three years; however, growth rates are projected to drop in 2009 and beyond. Foreign investment increased from around USD three billion in 2005 to USD 11 billion in the last year, mostly in the petroleum sector. Despite this success, significant problems remain, including 20 percent inflation, high levels of poverty and unemployment, and endemic corruption. At this point, Egypt's financial system appears to be weathering recent turmoil in international financial markets, but the GOE does expect to eventually feel the effects of a global slowdown in the form of reduced tourism, worker remittances, exports, and Suez Canal revenues. ¶9. (C) U.S. economic assistance (ESF) will drop from $415 million in FY 2008 to USD 200 million annually for the next five years starting in FY 2009. The Egyptians are not pleased with the cut, calling it "unilateral and unjustified," and have suggested several ways of using the assistance that would be difficult to obtain through Congress, such as debt relief. We would like to focus assistance on health care and education reform along with poverty alleviation. Negotiations are ongoing over use of future assistance funds. SCOBEY