Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08CAIRO137
2008-01-27 17:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Cairo
Cable title:  

EGYPT SEES RE-OPENING RAFAH AS SOLUTION TO BORDER

Tags:  PREL PTER KPAL EG IS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHEG #0137/01 0271722
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 271722Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7982
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 000137 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER KPAL EG IS
SUBJECT: EGYPT SEES RE-OPENING RAFAH AS SOLUTION TO BORDER
CRISIS

REF: A. CAIRO 136


B. CAIRO 124

C. CAIRO 123

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Stuart E. Jones
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 000137 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2018 TAGS: PREL PTER KPAL EG IS SUBJECT: EGYPT SEES RE-OPENING RAFAH AS SOLUTION TO BORDER CRISIS REF: A. CAIRO 136 ¶B. CAIRO 124 ¶C. CAIRO 123 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Stuart E. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman and senior advisor Hossam Zaki told the CDA on January 27 that Egypt's political vision for solving the Gaza border crisis is to find a solution where "everyone wins something, but the PA comes out a bigger winner than Hamas." For the Israelis this would be the cessation of rocket attacks; for the PA, it would mean a foothold in Gaza and control of the Rafah border crossing; for Hamas, it would mean a seat at the table. Zaki said that Egypt's immediate vision for fixing the Rafah border crisis was to engage the PA and Hamas, separately; secure the border and restore order; and the re-open the Rafah border crossing to normal traffic. ¶2. (C) Zaki said that Khaled Meshaal had called FM Aboul Gheit that morning to thank Egypt for opening the border, and also to accept the GoE offer to mediate. Zaki stressed that Egypt was only willing to talk to Hamas because of the crisis; "this is an exceptional situation that calls for exceptional action." He added that communications with Hamas were conducted exclusively by EGIS at the working level. ¶3. (C) Zaki said that Aboul Gheit had also spoken with Salam Fayyad that morning who had also thanked him for Egypt's position. The CDA asked if Egypt had any plans to punish Hamas for the chaos it had caused. Zaki said that Egypt is extremely upset with Hamas -- "we hate them more than you or the Israelis do" -- for many reasons, but it would be difficult to "punish" Hamas. Instead, Egypt wants a diplomatic and political solution to the crisis, and is therefore willing to work with all parties to resolve it. ¶4. (C) The problem, he explained, is that 600,000 Gazans have flooded across the border, "and the entire population of North Sinai governorate is only 350,000." (Note: We believe the 650K figure is exaggerated; the Egyptians have no idea how many Gazans have crossed into Egypt. End note.) In addition to overwhelming numbers, Egypt has serious security issues. "These are not all your average Palestinians," he said. There has been "bad behavior," and 33 security members of the Egyptian security forces are in the hospital, with five of them in intensive car
e -- "including some with stab wounds, so they're not just throwing rocks." Furthermore, security forces found an explosive belt "forgotten in a taxi." The immediate plan is to gradually but with increasing vigor force the Palestinians back into Gaza. ¶5. (C) Zaki said that Aboul Gheit will call the Secretary on January 28 to discuss Egypt's vision for solving the immediate crisis and for moving forward toward a more stable situation on the border and in Gaza generally. "We need to review the existing border agreements," Zaki said. The CDA asked if that meant Egypt wanted to renegotiate the 2005 Access and Movement Agreement. Zaki said no; he preferred to use the term "reactivate." ¶6. (C) The U.S. interest in resolving the crisis, Zaki pointed out, is to get the parties focused on the Annapolis peace process and moving towards negotiating a final, two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The CDA stressed that the danger now was in Hamas' exploitation of the current crisis, and that we should not strengthen Hamas' position. Zaki agreed, adding that Egypt had appreciated the low-profile the U.S. had taken in regards to the border situation. Nonetheless, the pressure was increasing and the potential threats to Egypt were too great to stand by; "if one man with a suicide belt gets through to Sharm and blows himself up, it will cripple our tourism industry." ¶7. (C) Zaki asked for U.S. help to convince Israel of the importance of opening Rafah, which would be in their interest as well as Egypt's. He said the MFA had sent a note verbale to the Israelis -- "similar to the one we sent you, but less elaborate" -- laying out their vision for solving the border crisis (see reftel for text of note verbale sent to us January 26). Opening the Rafah crossing "two or three times a week" would relieve much of the pressure on the Palestinians. In return, Egypt would work to convince Hamas to stop the Qassem rocket attacks. "We have told Hamas from the beginning that that rockets are stupid; they gain nothing militarily or strategically, but only serve to give the Israelis an excuse to attack you." ¶8. (C) Zaki said that while there is still much public sympathy in Egypt for the plight of the Gazans, some of it had slipped in recent days with the publication of stories of Egyptian casualties. If Hamas does not listen to reason, Zaki said "there will be extreme consequences." Already there are those within the GoE who are pushing for "a much harsher response." ¶9. (C) Turning to a possible UN Security Council resolution or presidential statement concerning the situation in Gaza, Zaki stressed that the Palestinians had to "get something" from a statement or resolution, and the U.S. could be helpful by encouraging Israel to allow language referring to "collective punishment." The CDA said that the U.S. could accept a reasonable statement but it was the Libyans blocking reference to the Qassem rocket attacks into Israel that was holding it up. JONES

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -