DAS SWAN SUPPORTS SOUTH AFRICAN MEDIATION WITH THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUJUMBURA 000183 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2018/04/03 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR BY SUBJECT: DAS SWAN SUPPORTS SOUTH AFRICAN MEDIATION WITH THE REBEL FNL Classified By: Ambassador Patricia Moller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: During his visit to Burundi to facilitate the Tripartite Plus meetings taking place March 24 - 27, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, James Swan met separately with President Pierre Nkurunziza, First Vice President Yves Sahinguvu, and Minister of Defense, Lt. General Germain Niyoyankana, to reaffirm USG support for the return of the PALIPEHUTU-FNL (FNL) to negotiations with the Government of Burundi (GOB) in Bujumbura, and to express USG appreciation for Burundi's peacekeeping effort in the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). DAS Swan emphasized USG support for the South African facilitation of the Burundi peace process, stressed the international community,s impatience with FNL intransigence, and suggested that the GOB offer the FNL prominent positions in the government as well as additional guarantees for the security of FNL members as they return to Burundi. While expressing its frustration with the constant and ever-changing demands of the FNL, the GOB maintain that every effort will be made, within constitutional limits, to show flexibility in attracting the FNL back to Burundi and back to the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JVMM). The GOB also agreed to deploy a second peacekeeping battalion to Somalia, possibly as soon as June, when the needed financial and logistical support are in place. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) In a morning meeting on March 25, President Nkurunziza thanked DAS Swan for the U.S. facilitation of the Tripartite Plus (TP ) meeting taking place in Bujumbura. Recognizing the importance of the TP meetings as a significant step towards peace in the region, President Nkurunziza stated that Burundi could play a pivotal role in the regional affairs of the Great Lakes nations because of Burundi's relative neutrality in the disputes between its neighbors. The President added that Burundi would never be an obstacle to peace in the region. -------------- Flexibility with FNL Demands -------------- ¶3. (SBU) President Nkurunziza asked for U.S. and international assistance in exerting pressure on the FNL to return to the negotiating table. Claiming that the GOB is open to continuing dialogue with the FNL, Nkurunziza expressed frustration with the ever-changing demands made by the FNL before it will agree to resume participation in the JVMM in Bujumbura. Despite the frustrations, Nkurunziza stated that the GOB will do everything possible to create the conditions necessary for resuming dialogue with the FNL as long as FNL demands do not run counter to constitutional law. For example, one of the demands put forth by the FNL as a pre-condition for returning to the negotiations is the privilege of using "PALIPEHUTU" (Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People) in the name of their political party. Burundi's constitution prohibits the use of ethnic references in the names of political parties. ¶4. (SBU) In responding to the FNL's demand for justice and social equality, Nkurunziza stated that discussions are ongoing concerning the formation of a "Truth and Reconciliation Commission" (TRC) which will be responsible for delving into the honest and judicious accounting of events and actions during Burundi's civil strife. (COMMENT: The FNL is demanding the formation of a "social contract" which would provide justice and equality for all of Burundi's people, a guarantee that the FNL claims is not presently available. END COMMENT.) Recognizing that Burundi is just emerging from years of ethnic strife, Nkurunziza acknowledged the problems that exist between the different ethnic factions but pointed to social programs introduced by his administration addressing education and health care which he asserts are a component of national reconciliation and equality. Nkurunziza added that Burundi's recent accession to the East African Community also helps respond to the FNL demands for social equality by providing commercial opportunities and greater regional stability. ¶5. (SBU) As in his meetings with President Nkurunziza, DAS Swan explained to First Vice President Sahinguvu that the international community is prepared to put increased pressure on the FNL but urged that the GOB demonstrate flexibility by offering prominent non-cabinet positions to high ranking members of the rebel movements, and by addressing the security issues the FNL claims are an impediment to its return to Bujumbura. Sahinguvu echoed Nkurunziza's response, BUJUMBURA 00000183 002 OF 003 claiming that positions in the government must be secured constitutionally and through elections. However, both leaders agreed that senior level appointments such as Ambassador or Director General positions in state enterprises are negotiable and certainly a possibility. The First Vice President contended that the level of security needed by the FNL is already in place, citing that South African forces and the leadership of the African Union are present in Burundi. If a different level of security were required, Sahinguvu suggested that the FNL themselves secure the safety of rebel leader, Agathon Rwasa, or perhaps approach the international community for additional support. Savinguvu summarized his thoughts by stating that, despite the fact that some FNL demands being difficult, all things are possible. He stressed, however, that Rwasa and his rebel movement must be in Bujumbura where negotiations can be conducted "face to face". ¶6. (SBU) Minister of Defense Niyoyankana also expressed fatigue and dismay with the demands of the FNL. In particular, he said granting the FNL immunity from the constitution and permission to use "PALIPEHUTU" in the party name will set a negative precedent and open doors to other groups who may want to skirt other provisions in the Burundian constitution derived from the Arusha peace accords. Niyoyankana also urged the international community not to acquiesce to the financial demands put forth by the FNL in support of combatants. The Minister noted that previous initiatives to provide funding for basic needs to the FNL, particularly by the Netherlands, led to the rearmament of the rebel movement, to the detriment of the population who continue to suffer from vandalism perpetrated by the FNL. As to the question of FNL security once in Bujumbura, Niyoyankana claimed this to be a "false" problem, stating that this has been a constant FNL complaint despite the GOB's efforts to address the FNL's security concerns. Despite Niyoyankana's pessimism about the FNL, he said he still believes that the group will return to the negotiating table as there are no other options open to it. ¶7. (SBU) Niyoyankana stressed that a quick solution must be reached with the FNL before the end of 2008. Niyoyankana fears that if the negotiations drag on, instability in the security sector will remain -- and possibly increase -- in 2009 which may adversely affect the elections of 2010. He called on the international community once again to press the FNL to reach a compromise by 2009 which will help guarantee good political campaigns and a successful election. -------------- --- Financial Support for Burundi's Second Battalion -------------- --- ¶8. (SBU) DAS Swan congratulated the GOB for the Burundian army's performance and professionalism during their ongoing deployment in Somalia. He conveyed that an additional sum of $5 million still needed to be found to complete the $14 million sum required to support the deployment of a second battalion of Burundian peacekeeping troops to Somalia. A USG delegation member added that the $14 million would only finance the battalion until year-end 2008 and proposed to the Minister that the GOB seek additional donors for its AMISOM effort. Appreciative of the USG assistance provided to the Burundian forces thus far, Niyoyankana suggested that the U.S. might be able to use its influence to convince other donor nations, particularly Belgium and the Netherlands, to contribute to Burundi's ongoing peacekeeping efforts. ¶9. (SBU) In his meeting, The First Vice President pointed out that despite the current financial shortfalls, 800 Burundian peacekeepers were waiting to be deployed. He suggested the possibility of sending a smaller portion of the second battalion if the required levels of protection and logistics to support the initial contingent were in place. ¶9. (SBU) Niyoyankana surmised that peace may not be sustainable in Somalia for five to ten years and suggested that the African Union (AU) needed to take a more responsible role in that region rather than leaving the task to individual countries like Burundi and Uganda. Additionally, Niyoyankana put the onus on the Somali government to begin to take greater responsibility for its own security and its internal affairs. The Minister expressed surprise and dismay at the lack of Somali resources to control the stability of its country outside of Mogadishu itself and the lack of vision by its leaders to defend Somalia. He also called on the AU to take a more active role in convincing other African nations to contribute to peacekeeping initiatives on the BUJUMBURA 00000183 003 OF 003 continent. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) COMMENT: The GOB appreciates the impatience that the international community is showing towards the changing demands of the FNL and the willingness of the international community to bring further pressure to bear on the FNL. While taking on board Swan's recommendations that the GOB show flexibility by addressing FNL security concerns and its demands for senior positions, many in the GOB clearly feel they have done all they reasonably can to lure the rebel group back to Bujumbura, to the negotiating table and to actively participating again in the JVMM. With 2010 election preparations looming and international and regional pressure increasing upon the FNL, the GOB may see little advantage in offering further concessions to the rebel movement especially when the FNL continues to pose new conditions that block the process. END COMMENT. MOLLER