ARGENTINA'S SPECIAL AMIA PROSECUTOR DEFENDS HIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 000739 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2028 TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV KJUS AR SUBJECT: ARGENTINA'S SPECIAL AMIA PROSECUTOR DEFENDS HIS ACTIONS REF: A. BUENOS AIRES 717 ¶B. BUENOS AIRES 702 Classified By: Ambassador E. Anthony Wayne for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: AMIA special prosecutor Alberto Nisman explained to Embassy Officers on May 27 his reasons for requesting the arrests of former President Carlos Menem and other officials (ref B) for their alleged roles in obstructing justice in the investigation of the 1994 terrorist bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center. He denied the motivation was political, regretted the coincidence of his announcement with the visit of the FBI Deputy Director, and discounted this would negatively affect the case against the Iranian indictees. Nisman's vigorous defense of his actions rings hollow given that there was no overriding urgency to go public with his findings, and he could have turned the evidence over to the prosecutor who is investigating malfeasance in the first AMIA investigation and let him recommend (or not) the arrest of Menem et al. End Summary ¶2. (C) AMIA special prosecutor Alberto Nisman met with LegAtt, A/LegAtt, and PolOff on May 27 to explain his reasons for his public recommendation May 22 (ref B) that former President (and currently Senator) Carlos Menem and several others be arrested for their alleged roles in covering up and protecting the "local connection" in the 1994 AMIA terrorist bombing that killed 85 persons. In court documents, Nisman had accused them of protecting Alberto Kanoore Edul, Jr., who is suspected of facilitating the local logistics of carrying out the attack for former Iranian Cultural Attache and suspect Moshen Rabbani. ¶3. (C) With emboffs, Nisman rejected the idea that his action was politically motivated, describing in some detail the evidence supporting his conclusions. He stated that it was his duty as a prosecutor to come forward with his conclusions and recommendations for the arrests. Information/testimony in the old case files, combined with information in national intelligence agency (SIDE) files declassified in 2005, and interviews with witnesses, he said, made clear that there had been an orchestrated effort in the weeks immediately following the July 18, 1994 bombing to cover-up/impede the investigation of Kanoore Edul's complicity. He insisted that the breadth of the cover-up, the individuals and entities involved, could only have occurred with the knowledge of then President Menem. Interestingly, Nisman stated that his investigation did not discover any motive for President Menem to orchestrate a cover-up of Kanoore Edul's alleged involvement in AMIA beyond Menem's generous personality and generalized willingness to help friends, even though Menem's alleged connection to Kanoore Edul is based on an unproven, common ancestral bond dating back three generations to a village in Syria. ¶4. (C) Emboffs noted that Nisman's actions did not appear to be prompted by any new information but were based on a rehash of old theories about the "Syrian connection" and could complicate international efforts to bring the Iranian indictees to justice. Nisman contended that the call for Menem's arrest evolved as his team continued to review files and interview witnesses. He said he developed the evidence, made his recommendations and turned the information over to judge Ariel Lijo, who is presiding over the court case/investigation into the mishandling of the first AMIA investigation. He noted that it was up to Lijo and another prosecutor to review his evidence and decide whether to act on his evidence. Nisman stated that he had no further role in that aspect of the case and that he would continue his focus on uncovering new leads and strengthening the evidence against the Iranian indictees. He also stressed that Kanoore Edul is not implicated in the bombing itself, rather in the procurement and supply of the vehicle used in the attack and that this could not be used by the Iranians to cast doubts about the indictments against them. In response to Emboffs noting press speculation about political motives behind his actions, Nisman asked what possible political benefit could be gained by going after Menem, whom he described as politically "dead." ¶5. (C) In an unrelated meeting with the DCM, the Foreign Minister's Chief of Staff Alberto D'Alotto told the DCM that the MFA had been "surprised" by Nisman's announcement and suspected that they were politically motivated, echoing some of the things the DCM had heard from other MFA contacts (ref A). D'Alotto said that he had not thought through the ways that Iran could use these latest events to its advantage, but he seemed to understand immediately when the DCM told him that there was concern in Washington about this recent development. ¶6. (C) Comment: Nisman is not the sort to have gone public with the recommendation for Menem's and other's arrests without some direction from higher-ups. From what has been made public, there appears to be little "new" information to have warranted his highly publicized arrest recommendations, which leads to speculation about political motives. Nisman may still be currying favor from the Casa Rosada with a view to a favorable judicial appointment in the future. As noted ref A, the Casa Rosada may have hoped Nisman's charges against Menem and the others would bump the farm strike and other bad news off the front pages. (They didn't.) If the GOA was hoping to appease victims' family groups that have been pressuring the GOA to show progress on the AMIA investigation(s),they have had little success there, either. WAYNE