ARGENTINA: SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLE UPDATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 000691



SIPDIS



ISN FOR D. MAHLEY AND P. DURHAM

WHA FOR BSC J. SHOWELL AND M. DRUCKER

OES/SAT FOR B. FORD

CIA/WINPAC FOR J. CASKER



E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2018

TAGS: MTCR, PARM, PREL, ETTC, TSPL, AR

SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLE UPDATE



REF: STATE 50050 AND PREVIOUS



Classified By: AMBASSADOR E. ANTHONY WAYNE, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D)



1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 10.



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Summary

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2. (C) The head of Argentina's space agency is confident

that the GOA will eventually agree to our request for

greater transparency in Argentina's space launch vehicle

(SLV) program. However, that will be a decision taken at

the highest political levels, and will likely be subject to

an evaluation of the intrusiveness of the measures we

propose. We also suspect that the GOA will ask that the

USG formally release Argentina from its 1992 assurances

not to develop an SLV before agreeing to make its program

fully transparent to the U.S. End Summary.



Transparency Requested

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3. (C) The Embassy delivered reftel points May 16

requesting that Argentina provide the U.S. with full

transparency into the Argentine space launch vehicle (SLV)

program. Dr. Conrado Varotto, head of Argentine space

agency CONAE, and Ambassador Elsa Kelly of the MFA's

Directorate of International Security, Space, and Nuclear

Issues received the demarche. Emboff followed up with a

May 19 meeting with Dr. Varotto, and we plan to meet with

Ambassador Kelly next week (she is currently traveling).



CONAE's Informal Reaction

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4. (C) Dr. Varotto told Emboff May 19 that his government

still "needs to take a very careful look" at our points,

but his initial reaction is that, from CONAE's technical

perspective, Argentina could agree to everything. The

problem, Varotto continued, is that this issue has risen to

the political level, and it is therefore difficult to predict

how things will be decided. Varotto pointed to our request

for annual consultations as key to the GOA's decision-making

process. Specifically, if such consultations are to consist

of Varotto sending a progress report once a year to the U.S.

Ambassador and inviting Embassy officials to witness program

milestones, such as rocket launches, then Varotto believes

the GOA will have no problems in acquiescing to our request.

If, however, our idea of consultations is to send teams of

U.S. experts to Argentina in what would likely be

high-profile visits, then that might be more difficult to

sell.



5. (C) Varotto said that his aim is to somehow bring the

issue back to a working/experts level, and he will best be

able to manage that if whatever we work out does not appear

to involve anything particularly intrusive. Both Varotto

and CONAE General Secretary Felix Menicocci expressed

optimism about the chances that this issue will soon find

an amicable resolution. Putting that feeling into words on

the way to the elevator after the meeting, Menicocci held

up reftel points and said: "This is not a bad paper."



Gestures of Goodwill

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6. (C) Varotto insisted that the GOA has given every

indication possible that it is serious about keeping the

SLV program transparent. For example, the GOA, as it has

in the past, invited the Embassy's ESTH counselor to

witness a scheduled May 15 launch of its Tronador 1 rocket

(reftel). The Embassy's DAO office provided transportation

to the launch site, which was located within the grounds of

the Puerto Belgrano Navy Base (located at 61 55 59 W - 38

56 00 S),but the anticipated launch was aborted twice that

day, and no Embassy official was present when it

successfully lifted off May 16. Still, ESTH counselor was

afforded every consideration, given unfettered access to

the rocket itself and to all persons involved in the

launch, and was allowed to take photographs of the rocket

from all angles.



7. (C) Embassy DAO officials had been denied access to the

same event, however, a circumstance that Emboff told

Varotto called into question GOA assurances of complete

transparency. Varotto countered by saying that military

officials had been deliberately excluded to avoid the

possibility that anyone (read: the U.S.) might imagine

there to be a military component to the SLV program. He

stressed that the GOA made a conscious decision to invite

only scientific counselors from interested embassies

(Brazil, France, Italy, and the U.S.). Emboff then asked

why, if that was such a concern, the GOA chose to use the

grounds of a military base for the launch site. Varotto

explained that CONAE had contracted with the Argentine Navy

for logistical support for the launch. The base was the

only place in Argentina remote enough for the purposes of

the launch that possessed the requisite manpower and

firefighting capabilities and also had sleeping quarters

for the CONAE team. (Note: It was ESTH counselor's

impression that the members of the Argentine armed forces

present at the launch site were there only in a support

capacity. CONAE scientists were making all the decisions.

At the same time, Elsa Kelly admitted to DCM that the

decision to hold the launch on a military launch was likely

to give rise to questions outside of Argentina about the real

nature of the program, though she insisted, like Varotto,

that resources and logistics were the sole reasons for that

decision.)



8. (C) As further evidence of Argentina's openness, Varotto

pointed to the GOA's May 19 formal declaration to the

International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile

Proliferation. That declaration explained the context of

the launch, gave the location of the launch site, and

otherwise complied with the notification provisions of the

Code.



9. (C) Varotto also said that he would be happy to brief

MTCR partners at the annual plenary, but he had questions

about the possible utility of such a briefing. That is,

Varotto noted that there was an almost complete overlap

between signatories of the MTCR and of the International

Code of Conduct, which Argentina had just advised of the

test. An exception is Brazil, but Varotto and Menicocci

said Brazil is well aware of the Argentine SLV program.



Action Request

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10. (C) We request further details concerning how the

Department envisions the "annual consultations" we are

requesting, and how the U.S. proposes to conduct the site

visits. As Varotto explained, those details will be key

factors in the GOA's eventual response to our request.



Comment

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11. (C) Despite Varotto's optimism regarding the chances of

quickly putting this issue behind us, we suspect that he and

his nominal supervisors at the MFA will ask for something in

exchange for formalizing Varotto's frequent offers of

providing the U.S. with full transparency into Argentina's

SLV program. Specifically, Varotto hinted that the GOA

will suggest the following quid pro quo: the GOA will

agree to full transparency, with yearly bilateral

consultations (whatever form those eventually take),in

exchange for the U.S. agreeing that enough time has passed

to render obsolete and therefore invalid the 1992

assurances that Argentina would not develop an SLV program

for the "foreseeable future."

WAYNE