ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL TO COOPERATE ON URANIUM

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 000236 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/BSC AND ISN/NESS DOE FOR HE-1 AND HE-23 NRC FOR OIP E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2018 TAGS: KNNP ENRG IAEA OTRA PREL ECON AR SUBJECT: ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL TO COOPERATE ON URANIUM ENRICHMENT, REACTOR DEVELOPMENT, AND IN DEFENSE REF: BUENOS AIRES 0230 Classified By: AMBASSADOR E. ANTHONY WAYNE, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Presidents Fernandez de Kirchner and Lula announced February 22 that Argentina and Brazil will create binational commissions to investigate how the two countries can best cooperate in the enrichment of uranium and in the development of nuclear power plants. The announcement appeared to take members of the Argentine nuclear establishment by surprise. The Argentine press also reported that Argentina and Brazil decided to jointly develop a nuclear-powered submarine, but those reports were met by denials from the Brazilian Defense Ministry and the Argentine MFA. The two countries also announced closer defense cooperation, to include joint production of a lightly armored vehicle. End Summary. -------------- Nuclear Cooperation Bolstered -------------- ¶2. (SBU) A joint declaration signed February 22 by presidents Fernandez de Kirchner of Argentina and Lula of Brazil contained language mandating closer bilateral cooperation on nuclear energy, according to Counselor Sebastian Sayus from the MFA's Directorate of International Security, Nuclear, and Space Affairs. (Note: the declaration itself had not yet been made public as of this writing.) Specifically, Argentina and Brazil are to form a bi-national commission to facilitate joint uranium enrichment for the production of nuclear fuel. The presidents also agreed to establish a separate but similar commission to cooperate on the design and development of a next-generation power reactor. Both commissions have a due date of August 2008 for their first reports. -------------- Joint Enrichment Makes Sense -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Argentina and Brazil have taken different approaches to uranium enrichment, with Argentina developing a variation of the gaseous diffusion method, while Brazil utilizes gas centrifuges. Rather than presenting an obstacle to cooperation, however, the use of the two different techniques could lead to efficiencies in enrichment. According to Marcelo Salvatore, Strategic Operations Manager for Argentine high-tech firm INVAP's nuclear division, the gaseous diffusion enrichment technique used by Argentina is more efficient in enriching uranium up to around one percent U-235, while gas centrifuges operate more efficiently with a concentration of one percent and above of U-235. There exists, therefore, a natural synergy between the two techniques, and Salvatore speculated that it is to take advantage of that synergy that the two countries have committed to joint enrichment. ¶4. (C) To enjoy the efficiencies achievable by employing the enrichment techniques mentioned above, however, Argentina would need to re-open its Pilcaniyeu enrichment plant, which has been mothballed for the last decade. Argentine Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) Director of Institutional Relations Jose Boado told Emboff February 25 that he was unaware of any plans to resume operations at the Pilcaniyeu facility. He expressed doubt that the Pilcaniyeu facility would be able to contribute significantly to any enrichment effort in the short term. -------------- Joint Reactor Development, Too -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Then-President Nestor Kirchner publicly announced in August 2006 that Argentine nuclear engineers had arrived at a proprietary design for a 25MW nuclear power plant (the CAREM). At the time, members of the Argentine nuclear establishment explained that the CAREM would eventually be re-designed to generate between 100MW and 300MW of power, so that it could fill the underserved niche market of isolated areas (e.g. islands, isolated cities) that are not part of a larger power grid. Argentina has yet to advance further than the design of a 25MW CAREM prototype, however. ¶6. (SBU) The joint declaration's establishment of an August deadline for the first report on how Argentina and Brazil will proceed in jointly designing and constructing a nuclear power reactor might therefore be a political impetus to a project that appears stuck. Joint development of this project would also hedge the significant financial risks inherent in the production and marketing of a new reactor. The Government of Argentina might also believe that, by embracing Brazil, it is eliminating a potential source of competition for the CAREM. -------------- But A Nuclear Submarine? -------------- ¶7. (U) A number of media outlets, most significantly top-circulation daily Clarin, also ran stories on a supposed Argentina-Brazil agreement to co-develop a nuclear submarine. According to those stories, Brazil is to produce the submarine, based on a French design, and the nuclear fuel, while Argentina is to design the propulsion reactor, based on the CAREM design. ¶8. (C) Those reports prompted denials by both the Argentine and Brazilian sides. Reports published February 26 quote Brazilian Defense Ministry Spokesman Jose Ramos as saying: "A joint Brazil-Argentina project for the building of a nuclear submarine is something that is not being discussed." Similarly, the MFA's Sayus told Emboff that the joint declaration contained nothing about nuclear submarine cooperation. The Embassy's Naval Attache spoke to an officer in the Argentine Navy's Office of Strategies, Plans, and Policy, who reported that the first and only time he had heard of the submarine plans was in the newspaper. Similarly, CNEA's Boado said that he had been "completely surprised" by the news reports regarding the submarine, adding that "the Commission has no information on any of this." (Comment: This project seems unlikely. It is difficult to understand what would motivate Argentina to participate in such an expensive and potentially destabilizing project. End Comment.) -------------- Enhanced Defense Cooperation -------------- ¶9. (SBU) The presidents also announced closer defense cooperation, to specifically include co-production of the Gaucho Light Strike Vehicle, a lightly armored four-wheel-drive all-purpose vehicle. The Gaucho is designed to complete reconnaissance, assault, transport, and evacuation missions, and is air-transportable. Argentine media also reported that Brazilian aerospace firm Embraer is to enter into a partnership with the Government of Argentina. That agreement would include the sale of an aircraft to replace the Boeing 757 (Tango 01) currently dedicated to the president's use. Some of the reports indicated that Embraer would eventually replace Lockheed Martin at the aircraft production and overhaul facility in the Province of Cordoba where Pampa training aircraft are produced and older aircraft (e.g. C-130s) are refurbished. The Embassy's DAO has been unable to confirm those reports. -------------- Comment: Deliverables Gone Wild -------------- ¶10. (C) What stands out with regard to the nuclear-related aspects of the Fernandez de Kirchner-Lula joint declaration is how little in-depth planning seems to have gone into the announcements. Officials in the CNEA, MFA, Navy, and at INVAP were all taken by surprise. That suggests that these nuclear initiatives were hastily initiated and agreed at the political level, under pressure from the two presidents to produce deliverables, rather than evolving organically in response to a real need. There is nothing unusual about that, but it does suggest that the closer nuclear cooperation agreed by both presidents might take a little longer than mandated by the declaration's timeline. KELLY