ARGENTINA: GETTING PAST SQUARE ONE WITH THE

S E C R E T BUENOS AIRES 000235 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR P - U/S BURNS, WHA - A/S SHANNON, EEB A/S SULLIVAN NSC FOR DAN FISK TREASURY FOR A/S LOERY AND DAS O'NEILL DOD FOR DASD STEPHEN JOHNSON SOUTHCOM FOR ADM STAVRIDIS FBI FOR TOM FUENTES E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2028 TAGS: PREL CJAN KJUS EFIN SNAR MASS VZ AR SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: GETTING PAST SQUARE ONE WITH THE FERNANDEZ DE KIRCHNER GOVERNMENT REF: A. BUENOS AIRES 124 ¶B. BUENOS AIRES 172 ¶C. BUENOS AIRES 178 ¶D. BUENOS AIRES 188 ¶E. BUENOS AIRES 216 ¶F. BUENOS AIRES 225 Classified By: DCM Tom Kelly for reasons b, d. ¶1. (C) Summary: With a seven-week period of bilateral estrangement in our rear-view window, we have an opportunity -- again -- to build a more constructive relationship with Argentina. The warming trend in the bilateral relationship continues. President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner and her government rolled out the red carpet for CODEL Engel and PDDNI Kerr, and the circle of GOA luminaries making positive statements about the United States is growing. Capitalizing on this opportunity, however, will be no easy task. Confidence must be rebuilt on our side and in Buenos Aires. The GOA must demonstrate its commitment to a constructive relationship, including through visits to the United States. But concerted effort is also needed from our side, including visits to Argentina by senior USG officials. The presence of authoritative USG officials here, and the attendant positive media coverage it creates, feed the Argentine need for attention, directly attacking one of the main causes of anti-Americanism here -- the perception that the USG does not care enough about Argentina. The hard work will be worth the effort if we can make a dent in anti-U.S. sentiment and influence Argentina to stay out of the Bolivarian camp. Making Argentina a more cooperative interlocutor and receptive audience for U.S. ideas is achievable. End Summary. An Austral Warming Trend -------------- ¶2. (C) Three weeks have passed since the GOA signaled an end to its bilateral squabble with the USG via a highly publicized meeting on January 31 betweQPresident Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (CFK) and Ambassador Wayne. (The U.S. Ambassador is the only Chief of Mission who has been received privately by CFK; she has now received him three times since her inauguration.) The change in how the United States is treated and portrayed by Argentine authorities is striking. As we had agreed beforehand, CFK insiders followed the January 31 session with positive and conciliatory statements from Cabinet Chief Alberto Fernandez, Foreign Minister Jorge Taiana, and others. From January 31 on, the Argentines have given prominent positive public play to each event involving a USG visitor, including the two (CODEL Engel and PDDNI) that occurred in the last week. ¶3. (C) The chorus of anti-U.S. recriminations has fallen silent. In their place, we are hearing positive pronouncements about our country. On February 20, for example, after a meeting between the Ambassador and Minister of Defense Garre, a hold-over from the first Kirchner administration who had previously resisted close cooperation with the USG, the Defense Ministry issued an upbeat communique on its website noting that "the Argentine side expressed gratitude for American assistance." The statement then proceeded to detail several areas of successful bilateral cooperation that helped to train and transform Argentina's military. ¶4. (C) In the wake of the meeting three weeks ago with CFK, the Ambassador has had friendly and productive meetings with Cabinet heavyweights such as Cabinet Chief Fernandez, MOD Garre, Foreign Minister Taiana, Economy Minister Lousteau, and Justice Minister Anibal Fernandez (reftels A-E). ¶5. (C) More importantly, CFK herself has demonstrated her continuing personal interest in ties with the USG by hosting two meetings in her presidential office at the Casa Rosada with U.S. visitors in rapid succession: a positive, well-covered session with CODEL Engel on February 21, and PDDNI Kerr, who had a productive meeting with her on February ¶25. Privately, Rep. Engel described the CODEL's 90-minute meeting with CFK as "a home-run." The meeting was covered intensively by the media, which characterized the event as a "Gesture of Detente" and "Improvement in Bilateral Relations" in leading daily headlines. PDDNI Kerr's meeting was equally positive. CFK warmly thanked him for his "important" visit, and repeated several times her commitment to the struggle against terrorism (saying, for example, that her government was "strongly committed to fight terrorism at home and internationally" and that her commitment to counter-terrorism was "absolute"). Argentina Is In Play -------------- ¶6. (C) The about-face is striking, because it comes on the heels of a coordinated GOA effort, with the Kirchners and other GOA all-stars front and center, to impugn the motives of the United States in the Miami prosecution of Venezuelan agents connected to the matter of Guido Alejandro Antonini-Wilson's cash-filled suitcase. But the rhetorical course-correction is not surprising. CFK spent much of the latter half of 2007 telegraphing her intention to pursue closer relations with the United States, holding three meetings with Ambassador Wayne and spending a week in New York City wooing investors and the media, as well as meeting A/S Shannon. Just days before her inauguration, in a meeting with the Ambassador, CFK expressed her admiration for the United States and her desire to improve the bilateral relationship. Her Cabinet Chief Fernandez and new Ambassador to the United States Timerman argue forcefully that she wants to change past GOA practices and maintain good relations with the USG. ¶7. (C) Clearly, there is still hard work to be done to build mutual confidence and establish a basis for sustained "good" relations. To maintain and reinforce the recent positive momentum, we need more engagement, not less -- by both sides. The GOA certainly needs to demonstrate its commitment to this effort. But it is important to remember that we also have much to gain if things go well. ¶8. (C) The foreign policy orientation of the fledgling CFK government is very much in play. Moreover, in our view, the prevailing winds in the region favor our efforts to help Argentina evolve into a constructive partner. Hugo Chavez (whom CFK will visit in early March to ink an oil-for-food deal -- septel) is being portrayed in the local media as increasingly on the defensive, and Fidel Castro's withdrawal from the Cuban political scene is being covered here as the end of a radical era. In contrast, neo-left politicians like Lula (who just visited Buenos Aires to sign a number of bilateral agreements) and Chile's Michelle Bachelet are well-regarded here as pragmatic leaders who are making progress on social justice while maintaining good relations with Washington. We read the tea leaves to indicate that CFK much prefers to follow Lula's path than Chavez's, and wants to diversify Argentina's good relations in the world. ¶9. (C) At the same time, there are countervailing forces that could push the new president in another direction. Influential figures within her government, such as Planning Minister Julio de Vido, espouse a close embrace of Chavez's Bolivarian project. Although de Vido's primary motive for tilting towards Chavez may be pecuniary, a Bolivarian approach to foreign policy would sit well with CFK's poor and working class political constituency, and probably appeal at a certain level to the Peronist/populist instincts of CFK and her husband. Nestor Kirchner himself was never as comfortable with the United States as his wife has proven to be. For example, he never received this Ambassador or publicized contacts with us, whereas CFK has met the Ambassador six times and played each meeting positively and prominently in the media. While Nestor Kirchner is still a powerful decision-maker, he is by most reports ceding foreign policy to CFK. ¶10. (C) In our view, the government's left-leaning, nationalistic heritage does not necessarily lead to chronic confrontation with the United States. CFK seems more interested in governance and the longevity of her family's political prospects than in gratuitous Yankee-bashing. Without U.S. engagement, however, our opportunity to develop a more constructive relationship with Argentina could be squandered. We need to stay on the field to win the game. Why Visits Help Educate and Show Interest -------------- ¶11. (C) Engagement means, among other things, senior-level visits in both directions. This is true for symbolic and practical reasons. Like other geographically isolated countries, Argentines keep track of who visits them and who doesn't. The GOA's infatuation with the travel plans of Assistant Secretary Shannon reflects a deep-seated, society-wide insecurity about Argentina's relative importance in the world. Argentines obsess over the perceived indifference of other countries to their interests and concerns, especially that of the United States. Visits to the region by senior USG officials that seem to hopscotch over Argentina are always noted in the press and the corridors of power. ¶12. (C) CFK clearly shares this fixation. She told the Ambassador late last year that she faults the USG for not paying sufficient attention to Latin America (read: Argentina) over the past few years, and repeated that analysis to CODEL Engel on February 21 (ref F). This is not new, or confined to CFK and her constituency. It is a widely shared perception in Argentina that the United States has only rarely sustained positive interest in the Southern Cone. (At a recent lunch with prominent local analysts, businesspersons, and media figures for PDDNI Kerr, this was a recurrent theme -- and none of them were government supporters.) High-level visits can be used to demonstrate our good intentions and sincere desires for stronger relations. For example, Secretary Chao's December visit to CFK's inauguration helped us to rebut accusations of a U.S. conspiracy against the GOA during the furor over the Miami court case. ¶13. (C) Just as importantly, visits help GOA officials to learn. CFK and her husband know little about the way that our society and political system function. This holds true for most of their closest advisors and the Argentine political establishment writ large as well. The recent bilateral crisis, for example, reminded us how few of them (including those in the "pro-U.S." camp) really understand the extent of our justice system's independence. To our great advantage, Argentina is now headed by a President who wants to learn more about our country -- evinced, for instance, by the manner in which she pumps visitors for information about the U.S. presidential race. (Though she initially favored another woman candidate, it was clear by February 21 that she had absorbed much about all three leading candidates, and in both of her meetings with USG visitors in recent days she made positive comments about all three and about the vitality of our electoral process.) Alberto Fernandez told the Ambassador that he recently recommended that CFK accept Gordon Brown's invitation to travel to London for a gathering of international political party leaders precisely because it would be an excellent opportunity for her to learn more about the global scene through direct contact with other world leaders. The Most Promising Areas of Focus -------------- ¶14. (C) On the practical level, despite this Mission's renewed access to every level of the Argentine government, there are a number of concrete policy areas in which Washington-based agencies and their leaders need to engage, including via the personal contact that visits make possible: -- (C) Finance: Achievement of a closer economic relationship, which CFK has told us she wants, will not happen without a Paris Club deal to normalize the GOA's debt to official creditors. That in turn will require Treasury's engagement with CFK's capable young Economy Minister Martin Lousteau. A Paris Club deal would be a critical first step towards an economically resurgent Argentina's broader reinsertion into global capital markets. This, in turn, will lessen Argentina's reliance on Venezuela to help place new Argentine debt, a reliance that comes with Bolivarian political and ideological strings attached. It could also help Lousteau, who is engaged in an internal tug-of-war with less market-friendly forces on many issues critical to the 500 U.S. companies doing business here, establish his primacy within the GOA on economic policy. -- (C) Defense Cooperation: The Ministry of Defense is more friendly to us now than it has been at any time since MOD Garre took office two years ago. The Army chief, who previously kept his distance from the United States, has reached out to us for contact. Argentina's Navy and Air Force are eager to work with us. To capitalize on this attitudinal shift, we need high-profile U.S. military leaders like Southcom Commander Stavridis (scheduled to visit in May) to come to Argentina. His visit could help us bring the military relationship to another level, advancing the ball on issues like Argentine participation in exercises, exchanges, and regional security cooperation. Such a visit could also keep U.S. military suppliers in the race for important contracts like 3-D radars. MOD U/S Forti told the Ambassador last week that he hopes to get MOD Garre to the United States in the months ahead. -- (C) Law Enforcement and Intelligence: Cooperation in this area was a bright spot in the bilateral relationship, even during the most difficult periods of the first Kirchner administration. The worrying freeze in cooperation that took place during the period of estrangement is over, and our cooperation is returning to normal. We need senior-level visits, such as the planned trip by Deputy FBI Director Pistole in May, to advance U.S. interests in intensified counter-terrorism work, and to resume our valuable partnership with the GOA to bring the Iranian-sponsored perpetrators of the 1994 AMIA bombing to justice. We also need to get leading GOA law enforcement officials to the United States for bilateral consultations. -- (S) Intelligence: Argentine intelligence officials highly value their relationship with U.S. counterparts, as PDDNI Kerr's visit amply demonstrated. During a dinner with the PDDNI February 23, the GOA's Deputy Director of Intelligence recounted with pride that his service has shared high-value information with us and worked closely with us in support of U.S. goals. The PDDNI's visit reinforced our superb working relationship with Argentina's service (the National Intelligence Service -- SIDE),and we need to keep developing it through continued cooperation. -- (SBU) Science and Technology: CFK has repeatedly cited this as an area where she hopes to expand contact and cooperation with the United States. ¶15. (C) Visits by high-level U.S. and GOA officials to each other's country on these and other areas will advance our long-term interest in a friendly relationship with a populous, fast-growing country with considerable talent and resources. As importantly, such travel advances key U.S. interests in specific policy areas -- normalization of financial relationships between developing economies and creditors, amicable military-to-military ties, and cooperation on regional counter-terrorism issues -- that matter to our country's security interests. ¶16. (C) Finally, travel by prominent USG and GOA officials to each other's countries directly addresses one of the main causes of anti-Americanism here -- the perception that the USG does not care enough about Argentina. The positive media coverage created by such visits makes Argentines at all levels of society feel relevant in the world and taken into considerations by our powerful country. This cannot help but chip away at this society's collective animus towards out nation, which stems to a large extent from its collective insecurity about itself. Let's Make It Work -------------- ¶17. (C) Events over the past two years remind us that relations with the GOA are not easy. Nonetheless, we have a real opportunity to reach a more positive equilibrium in the bilateral relationship. In his January 31 meeting with CFK, the Ambassador deployed Department-cleared talking points that featured the proposal that both sides would demonstrate interest in the relationship by engaging each other, including via visits in each direction. As reported in ref A, CFK agreed, and expressed interest in a steady stream of high-level visits. We therefore have a deal in place with the GOA on travel in both directions. The Argentines need to hold up their end of the bargain. Cabinet Chief Fernandez told the Ambassador February 21 that he had identified March 8-12 for travel to the United States. Foreign Minister Taiana, MOD Garre, and Economy Minister Lousteau also intend to travel to the United States soon. We should remain committed to our part in this effort, especially after several weeks of positive interaction with the GOA. KELLY