ARGENTINA: OVERVIEW OF CIVIL NUCLEAR PROGRAM

UNCLAS BUENOS AIRES 001745 SENSITIVE DEPARTMENT FOR T - MARC HUMPHREY COMMERCE FOR SARAH LOPP E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ENRG TRGY BEXP BTIO AR SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: OVERVIEW OF CIVIL NUCLEAR PROGRAM REF: STATE 127468 ¶1. (U) This message is sensitive but unclassified, and not for Internet distribution. ¶2. (SBU) Summary: Argentina has had a nuclear program for nearly sixty years and currently draws on two power reactors to supply approximately nine percent of its total electricity generation. The country is engaged in ongoing nuclear research and development, and is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group as a provider of nuclear material and services in the international market. Argentina is currently expanding its nuclear power program by completing the construction of a third nuclear power plant, developing plans for a fourth, and signing several international nuclear power cooperation agreements. It is also signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, has a well-developed nuclear regulatory capability, and dedicated state entities for the administration and oversight of both its domestic and foreign nuclear programs and projects. Although Argentina has a well-trained nuclear work force, a generation gap has lessened its organic ability to staff large-scale start-up projects without outside assistance. Its cadre of nuclear experts has been able to sustain a high quality of research and development, but has not enabled it to conduct large-scale start-up operations without substantial involvement by foreign firms. A personnel shortage, coupled with ambitious expansion plans, opens the door to the possibility of increased trade in the fabrication of nuclear components and subsystems, and in the longer term, of treatment or management of nuclear waste. End Summary. -------------- Plans for expansion of nuclear program -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Argentina has two pressurized heavy water nuclear power plants in operation, one under construction, three critical assemblies, three research and isotope production reactors, 25 major radioactive facilities, and more than 1,500 facilities for medical, industrial, research, or training purposes which use radioactive material or sources. The two functioning nuclear power plants, Atucha I and Embalse, supply the country with approximately nine percent of its power needs. The third power plant, Atucha II, is currently under construction after 23 years in mothball status. Initial planning is underway for a fourth power reactor. The Government of Argentina (GOA) plans to increase its nuclear consumption from 9 percent to 15 percent of total power consumption to meet a perceived growing internal demand and address rising global prices for fossil fuels. ¶4. (SBU) Plans for Argentina's nuclear program are based on four principal objectives: the completion of the Atucha II power reactor, life cycle extensions for the Atucha I and Embalse power reactors, the completion of a locally designed small-scale grid power reactor (the CAREM),and the construction of a fourth power reactor. Argentina is motivated to expand its nuclear capability to ease domestic dependence on imported fuel, to keep energy prices low, and to build on its reputation as a provider of nuclear materials and services in the international marketplace. ¶5. (SBU) All of Argentina's nuclear reactors, both for power and for research, use low-enriched uranium (LEU),and Argentina has been an innovator in the use of LEU for both power and research reactors. Argentina has established the capability to enrich uranium at a mock-up enrichment facility at Pilicaneyeu, but has chosen not to conduct actual enrichment operations. We believe Argentina established the capability in order to be "grandfathered" into any future resolutions limiting uranium enrichment to those with an existing capability. ¶6. (SBU) Although Argentina has ample natural uranium, it is not currently engaged in mining operations. Areas where mining previously occurred are not active, and there is significant local resistance to uranium mining by environmental groups. Given market prices, the GOA considers it cost-effective to purchase uranium on the world market for domestic processing and use. Its principal source of concentrated uranium oxide ("yellow cake") is Kazakhstan. -------------- Key Nuclear Decision-Making entities -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Nuclear decision-making falls within two distinct GOA ministries. For foreign policy issues, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is the lead agency. The MFA advises on the GOA's nuclear relationship with the international community, membership in international control regimes, non-proliferation issues, and import/export control issues. The Directorate for International Security and Nuclear Affairs (DIGAN) is the MFA office responsible for advising the Office of the Presidency and executing GOA policy. Ambassador Elsa Kelly is the DIGAN Director, but is scheduled to retire in February 2009. As of December 2008, the GOA had not yet named her successor. ¶8. (SBU) For the development of nuclear power within Argentina, the Ministry of Federal Planning, Public Investment and Services is the lead Agency. The current Minister of Planning is Julio De Vido, a close confidant and advisor to ex-President Nestor Kirchner and current President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (CFK). De Vido has named Roberto Baratta as his point man on nuclear issues. ¶9. (SBU) For technical issues, the National Commission on Atomic Energy (CNEA, in its Spanish acronym) is the lead agency to administer the GOA's nuclear plans and programs. CNEA falls under Minister of Planning De Vido. In mid-2008, following a public corruption scandal involving misuse of public funds by the then-CNEA President, De Vido selected Norma Boero as the new President of CNEA. Boero is a CNEA careerist and a fuel specialist with significant technical experience. Boero has dedicated much of the early part of her tenure to improving accountability within CNEA. ¶10. (SBU) The Nuclear Regulatory Authority (ARN) is responsible for establishing and enforcing all regulatory functions related to nuclear activity in Argentina. This includes radiological protection issues, nuclear safety and security, and the licensing of all nuclear facilities, sales, purchases, and other nuclear matters requiring special approvals, in accordance with Argentine law and international agreements to which Argentina is signatory. ¶11. (SBU) Argentine law gives ARN the ability to conduct routine or unscheduled inspections of any facility involved in the use of radioactive material. This includes the environmental monitoring of mining sites. ARN employs approximately 190 staff members, with an additional 100 contractors. According to ARN figures, 90 percent of those positions related directly to technical tasks. The President of ARN is Dr. Raul Racana, a career nuclear expert with a strong technical background. ARN is an executive agency which reports to the Office of the Presidency, which extended Racana's tenure as President of the organization in 2007. As an executive agency, ARN is an independent oversight entity outside the realm of nuclear decision-making. However, as one of Argentina's principal nuclear entities, ARN wields considerable bureaucratic influence over domestic nuclear issues. -------------- Domestic Companies in Civil Nuclear Sector -------------- ¶12. (U) There are a limited number of companies within Argentina involved in the nuclear industry. However, they run the gamut of nuclear products and services. Their activities include uranium research, the construction of fuel and control elements, reactor and plant design and construction, and facility administration. Should Argentina resume domestic uranium mining, their activities would expand to include mining activities. The principal companies are the following: - Applied Research (INVAP by its Spanish acronym) is a high-tech company owned by Argentina's Rio Negro Province, but functioning as a private company without public subsidy. INVAP provides nuclear design and fabrication services to Argentina and other countries. Because of its unique capabilities, INVAP is a principal private contractor to CNEA and is currently involved in the resurrection of the Atucha II nuclear facility. Although INVAP's General Manager/CEO, Dr. Hector Otheguy runs INVAP on a day-to-day basis, four of the members of its Board of Directors are CNEA officials, and two are appointed by Rio Negro Province. As of late 2007, Otheguy or other senior INVAP officials routinely accompanied the Argentine President, or senior GOA officials, on state visits and official delegations. - Nucleo-Electrica Argentina (NA-S.A) is the private company which manages Argentina's two current power reactors (Atucha I and Embalse) and will run Atucha II when it reaches criticality. - CONUAR S.A is a private company which constructs fuel elements and control rods for use in Argentine nuclear reactors. Grupo Perez Companc is a 67 percent share holder in CONUAR S.A., with CNEA owning the remaining 33 percent. In addition to its production of fuel elements and other components for Argentine nuclear reactors, CONUAR S.A. is a nuclear services provider for Argentina's research reactors. In addition to other Argentine companies and state entities, CONUAR S.A. does business with public and private sector entities in Belgium, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Romania, Canada, and Brazil. - DIOXITEK is a parastatal company owned 99 percent by CNEA and one percent by the Province of Mendoza. DIOXITEK produces uranium oxide and cobalt 60 for conversion into fuel for nuclear reactors. Currently, DIOXITEK obtains "yellow cake" from outside Argentina for domestic conversion to low enriched uranium for use in the country's reactors. - ENSI S.E. (Neuquen Business for Engineering Services, State Enterprise, in English) is another parastatal company, owned by CNEA and the government of Neuquen Province. ENSI S.E. administers the heavy water plant in Arroyito, Neuquen. Arroyito produces heavy water for use in Argentine reactors. As of November 2008, it was not exporting heavy water, all of which the GOA needed for its expanding program of additional reactors for power generation. -------------- Local Manufacturing Base -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Argentina has a domestic ability to meet many of its current needs in the nuclear field. However, its expansion plans will likely stretch domestic resources to their maximum. The companies mentioned above are currently fully committed to the Atucha II restart, especially in the production of fuel elements. CONUAR has significantly increased its operations to produce fuel rods and fuel rod assemblies for the facility and INVAP is involved as a contractor in the fabrication of specialized welding machines, and in other aspects of the project. Some outside participation is likely, as Argentina submits other aspects of Atucha II to an open competitive bid process. Plans to construct a fourth power reactor, unlikely before 2012, will also open up opportunities for sales of U.S-origin components and sub-systems. -------------- Nuclear Trained Work Force -------------- ¶14. (SBU) Argentina has a well-trained but aging nuclear work force which has experienced a significant generation gap. Argentina embarked aggressively on its nuclear program in the 1950s, resulting in a cadre of skilled physicists, engineers, and chemists. Many of this generation have been lost to attrition, and many of the subsequent generation left Argentina during difficult economic times to seek more profitable employment in Europe or the United States. Although Argentina has the academic capacity to produce skilled technicians, it has not been wholly successful in retaining them. ¶15. (SBU) A further problem is the lack of project management capability within public sector nuclear entities. Until recently, Argentina had not embarked on any major nuclear projects in many years. The relative lack of activity was detrimental to the country's ability to manage a project from start to finish. This has caused the GOA to rely on private sector contractors with experience in reactor start-ups. INVAP, which sold start-up research reactors and major sub-systems to both Egypt, Australia, Peru and Algeria, has provided know-how to the Atucha II project. ¶16. (SBU) Argentina is slowly addressing the effects of the generation gap through the continued training of highly qualified technicians and scientists. Improved economic conditions in Argentina since 2003, relative to the economic collapse of 2001, improved the GOA's ability to retain their best students for the domestic nuclear work force. A possible downturn in the Argentine economy in 2009 could, however, complicate efforts to retain members of the younger generation of nuclear experts. -------------- Opportunities for U.S. Industry -------------- ¶17. (SBU) U.S.-based company Westinghouse is heavily committed in Argentina, as are several smaller U.S. firms which serve as subcontractors to Argentine entities. U.S. firms produce zirconium rods for use in fuel bundles, and there is significant interaction between Argentine companies and the U.S. university and National Lab systems. One developing technology between INVAP and Westinghouse is the use of LEU Molybdenum targets for cancer treatment. ¶18. (SBU) In addition to the ongoing commerce with U.S. companies, there is room for expansion of trade into the field of waste processing and storage. Argentine nuclear officials involved in the "back-end" of the nuclear fuel cycle have made candid comments that Argentina needs to pursue a long-term solution to its increasing stores of spent fuel rods and other forms of nuclear waste. U.S. companies specializing in long-term storage of spent fuel may find the GOA receptive to business discussions. The ongoing Atucha II project, and plans for the construction of a fourth reactor, may also provide an opening to U.S. firms with experience in the construction of LEU reactors and subsystems. -------------- Foreign Competitors -------------- ¶19. (SBU) The Canadian firm Atomic Energy of Canada, LTD. (AECL) has significant business dealings in the Argentine nuclear sector, having built the Embalse nuclear power plant in the 1970-80s and signed a Memorandum of Understanding for its refurbishment in 2006. AECL also signed an MO to restart the Atucha II project, and to begin exploratory work on a possible fourth power reactor. The German firm Siemens constructed the Atucha I reactor in the 1960s, and was the contractor for Atucha II before the project went into mothballs in the mid-1980s. Siemens has a tangential role in current nuclear operations, likely limited to assisting Atucha II project by identifying technicians who formerly participated in its construction. ¶20. (SBU) Argentina signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia in December 2008, but the details of the agreement are still unclear. Argentina also signed a broad nuclear agreement with Brazil in 2007. The agreement with Brazil established the "Binational Enrichment Company" (COBEN),but little concrete progress seems to have occurred following the initial announcement. One issue which has since stalled was a desire of the GOB to build a nuclear-powered submarine with assistance from the Argentine nuclear community. In December 2008, Argentina and the Republic of South Africa signed an agreement to share technology on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The concrete results of that agreement are still unclear. Recent history demonstrates the GOA's eagerness to sign broad international cooperation agreements, which result in little actual business activity or technology transfer. -------------- Political Considerations -------------- ¶21. (SBU) Argentina is signatory to the Treaty of Tlatalelco, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and other bilateral and multilateral nonproliferation agreements. Decisions to enter into agreements with nuclear supplier states are subject to the requirements of Argentina's nonproliferation commitments, which the GOA takes seriously. Argentina prefers to conduct its nuclear activities under the rubric of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It has ratified the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC). Argentina and Brazil have successfully addressed old tensions over respective nuclear programs through the Brazilian-Argentina Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC),in which the IAEA also participates. ABACC facilitates a robust joint inspection regime of civilian nuclear facilities between the two countries. WAYNE NNNN