ARGENTINA'S SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLE PROGRAM: THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 000170 SIPDIS SIPDIS ISN FOR D. MAHLEY AND P. DURHAM OES/SAT FOR B. FORD CIA/WINPAC FOR J. CASKER E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2018 TAGS: MTCR KSCA PARM TSPL PREL MNUC AR SUBJECT: ARGENTINA'S SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLE PROGRAM: THE EMBASSY'S PERSPECTIVE REF: A. BUENOS AIRES 138 AND PREVIOUS ¶B. STATE 10771 ¶C. BUENOS AIRES 00124 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: AMBASSADOR E. ANTHONY WAYNE, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) This cable provides the Embassy's recommendation for policy change regarding longstanding USG opposition toward Argentina's space launch vehicle (SLV) program. We believe that opposition, based on Argentina's 1992 assurances that it would not develop a space launch vehicle ""for the foreseeable future,"" is no longer productive. A better approach would be to switch to a neutral stance toward the program, while in the process securing agreement that Argentina maintain complete transparency by briefing and/or offering program access to experts of our choosing or to the Missile Technology Control Regime. Such a step could be a cost-free way to remove a longstanding bilateral irritant. End Summary. -------------- Why This Step Now? -------------- ¶2. (C) Ref (A) reported on a recent conversation with Argentine space agency (CONAE) Executive Director Dr. Conrad Varotto. During that meeting, Varotto stressed that Argentina's political leadership continues to place great importance on Argentina's space launch vehicle (SLV) program, which the USG has opposed. With Argentina unwilling to abandon the program, and with the understanding that interagency discussions regarding possible U.S. courses of action are currently ongoing, we hope to contribute to the successful resolution of this seeming dilemma with the recommendation in this cable. -------------- The Argentine Case -------------- ¶3. (C) Argentina offers a number of reasons why it does not consider itself bound by 1992 assurances to U.S. officials and to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) that it would foreswear development of a SLV. Specifically, the GOA claims to have made a number of diplomatic representations arguinig for release from the commitment dating from 1999, and has since that time consistently expressed its disagreement with the idea that its pursuit of a ""peaceful"" SLV should be limited. The GOA is also proud of its non-proliferation record subsequent to the dismantling of the Condor program, a point Varotto stressed February 4 when he said: ""It is important that people in Washington understand something. Those of us involved in sensitive programs -- nuclear and other (sic) -- invented our own export control regime even before Argentina had any export control legislation. You're not talking to enemies, but rather to promoters of export controls."" ¶4. (C) Varotto also claims that Argentina is working toward the eventual establishment of a regional space agency, a development he understands will be difficult to achieve but one that he purports to believe is inevitable. A reg]m Bq,jb1\BQbignal Trafficking in Arms Regulations (ITAR),while the higher costs of other providers render their services inaccessible. Partnerships with launch providers have proven imperfect mechanisms, because although costs are reduced, Argentina has found on a number of occasions that the needs of more senior partners mean instruments important to Argentina are left behind. -------------- A Trump Card -------------- ¶5. (C) The GOA understands that solid arguments against all of the preceding points exist, but it believes it holds a trump card. That is, the GOA believes that because it qualified its 1992 assurances to the USG and to the MTCR with the phrase ""for the foreseeable future,"" instead of more clearly foreswearing SLV development for all time, those assurances are no longer valid. Argentina has seen eight different presidents since 1992, goes the argument, and it is not reasonable to demand policy consistency through such change and over almost sixteen years absent a more binding international agreement. (Comment: We find considerable merit in this argument. End Comment.) -------------- Practical Realities -------------- ¶6. (C) Leaving the Argentine arguments aside, it is useful to examine our own ability to influence the GOA's position toward its SLV program. High-level GOA officials -- including the current foreign minister -- have publicly proclaimed the program to be a national priority. GOA officials would find it difficult to backtrack from those statements. Current president Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, as well as her predecessor and husband Nestor Kirchner, have shown themselves to be extremely sensitive to perceived slights, and have often played the anti-American card in response to an act or statement seen as an encroachment upon Argentina's sovereign prerogatives (Ref C). Forcing the issue with the president would likely lead to an other-than-optimal outcome. We also understand that any attempt to enlist a significant number of MTCR partners to join us in reinforcing our opposition would be unlikely to bear fruit. We must therefore conclude -- and Varotto has told us as much -- that there is little the USG can do to convince Argentina to renounce its SLV program. -------------- -------------- Our Recommendation: Making the Best of the Situation -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Because we are not aware of any information that indicates that the Argentine SLV program represents a nonproliferation danger, and taking the factors above into account, we believe the best path to a mutually acceptable and final resolution to this longstanding irritant would be to release Argentina from its 1992 commitments. As a condition, we could ask that Argentina brief its program and keep it open to the MTCR and/or to experts of our choosing, a step Varotto has indicated the GOA is willing to take (although Varotto also noted that Argentina's political leadership would probably only agree to unobtrusive briefings/inspections). Turning Varotto's pledges of transparency into action is worth a concerted effort, in our view. ¶8. (C) Additionally, such a course of action would be construed by the GOA as a gesture of friendship, and would be seen as recognition and vindication of Argentina's strong anti-proliferation vocation since the demise of the Condor program. Best of all, it would put this issue to bed at no cost, give us leverage to intervene if program developments give rise to proliferation concerns, and show that we are serious when we say that all states should be allowed to reap the benefits of space for peaceful purposes. WAYNE