ARGENTINA: FISCAL SOLVENCY CONCERNS REMAIN,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BUENOS AIRES 001682 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2018 TAGS: EFIN ECON PREL PGOV AR SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: FISCAL SOLVENCY CONCERNS REMAIN, DESPITE GOA TAKEOVER OF PENSION ASSETS REF: A. BUENOS AIRES 1680 ¶B. BUENOS AIRES 1643 ¶C. BUENOS AIRES 1667 Classified By: Ambassador E. Anthony Wayne for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The Argentine government's nationalization of the country's private pension system entered into force December 9, giving the GoA access to about US$25 billion in financial assets and US$4 billion in annual contributor payments. Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (CFK) has already announced plans to tap these assets to fund economic stimulus projects. Even prior to the President's announcements, analysts were concerned that these new funds might not suffice to help the GoA cover future debt obligations AND significantly increase spending to counter rapidly slowing growth and buy back political support ahead of the 2009 mid-term elections. While worries about a possible default in 2009 are overstated, reckless politically motivated spending in 2009 could imperil the GoA's ability to meet debt obligations in 2010 and beyond. As evidenced by the market reaction since the President's October 21 announcement of the pension nationalization, there is still great anxiety and uncertainty in the private sector, and Argentine assets are still priced at highly distressed levels. End Summary. -------------- GoA plans to use AFJP funds to prime the pump -------------- ¶2. (C) As reported Ref A, President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (CFK) signed into law on December 4 the GoA's nationalization of Argentina's private pension funds (known as AFJPs). The law entered into force December 9. The GoA is already planning for the use of the AFJPs' US$25 billion in assets and $4-5 billion in annual cash flow, as evidenced by the President's November 25 announcement of ambitious tax incentives, export tax reductions, and US$ 21 billion public works plan (Ref B),and December 4 announcement of a further US$ 3.9 billion stimulus plan (Ref C). ¶3. (C) While the additional flows strengthen the GoA's finances, rapidly decelerating GDP growth and lower commodity prices are already resulting in lower than expected rvenues, and this trend is expected to worsen into 2009. The GoA has limited ability to issue debt at this time due to high yields on Argentine bonds, limited domestic interest in buying GoA debt, and lack of access to international capital markets stemming from the threat of lawsuits from so-called ""Holdout"" bondholders. Since this situation is unlikely to change soon, there are still concerns in the market place about the GoA's capacity to meet debt payment obligations during 2009-2011, when its annual debt amortizations increase by roughly a third over prior years. While the GoA's recent announcements of increased spending may be welcome news to Argentine companies and consumers, they exacerbate worries about GoA finances going forward. -------------- GoA Finances Look Adequate for 2009 -------------- ¶4. (C) There are undeniable fiscal benefits for the GoA of the AFJP nationalization, in terms of both higher revenues and lower debt payments. First, the GoA now has greater access to the AFJPs' US$25 billion in assets and roughly US$4 billion in annual contributor flows. The GoA can tap this source of financing via bond sales to ANSES, the social security administration, which under the new law assumes control over the AFJP assets. Second, the GoA can now also easily refinance with ANSES the debt amortizations it would have owed to the AFJPs, as well as the debt buybacks the GoA is required to make under the terms of the 2005 debt restructuring. ¶5. (C) This combination of new flows and reduced debt payments strengthens the GoA's ability to meet total debt obligations coming due in 2009. This is especially true when considering that the GoA also has greater access to borrowing from the Argentine Central Bank (BCRA) and Banco de la Nacion (BNA). (In the 2009 budget bill, Congress authorized changes BUENOS AIR 00001682 002 OF 004 to BNA's charter to allow the GoA to borrow up to 30% of its deposits held at BNA, and to the BCRA's charter to allow expanded lending to the GoA, which in theory could be used to pay sovereign debt obligations.) ¶6. (C) Doing the math shows that the GoA has the wherewithal to meet 2009 debt obligations solely through tapping domestic sources of financing, particularly if it shows reasonable fiscal restraint. Total scheduled debt service, including principal and interest, increases to about US$21 billion per year during 2009-2011, compared to US$16 billion in 2008. The Central Bank's consensus estimate for the primary fiscal surplus (before interest payments on debt) is approximately 3% of estimated 2009 GDP, or about US$10.5 billion (at the current exchange rate of 3.45 pesos/dollar). However, many economists expect that rapidly falling tax collection -- due to lower growth rates and much lower commodity prices -- will reduce the primary fiscal surplus to the 2% range, or about US$7 billion. While this more conservative estimate leaves a financing gap of about US$14 billion, the GoA has numerous means to meet its 2009 financing needs: -- US$4 billion in approximate new flows from pension fund contributors following the AFJP nationalization (accessed via new bond issuances to ANSES). -- US$1.5-2 billion in savings via rolling over AFJP-held GoA bonds and GDP warrants, instead of issuing new debt, as estimated by noted Argentine Economists Miguel Kiguel and Carlos Melconian (the GoA estimates the savings at US$3 billion). -- US$2.5 billion in debt buybacks, which the GoA is legally obligated to do under the terms of the 2005 debt exchange. (Instead of repurchasing bonds from the market, the GoA can just buy them from ANSES, in return for new bonds.) -- US$1.5-2 billion in financing from public agencies, including the tax authority AFIP, the national lottery, and ANSES (using flows from contributors that were not AFJP members). -- US$6.5 billion estimated lending from the BCRA ($3bn) and BNA ($3.5bn). -- US$1 billion estimated net positive funding from the World Bank, IDB, and CAF (Andean Development Corporation). ¶7. (C) This totals between US$17-18 billion, easily enough to cover financing needs in 2009, although also possibly optimistic, particularly with regards to possible funding from AFJP flows, BCRA and BNA lending, and IFI flows. However, in a pinch, the GoA could also attempt to do a debt swap with local financial institutions of the so-called ""Prestamos Garantizados"" (Guaranteed Loans). The illiquid PGs comprise US$4bn out of the total $21bn debt amortizing in 2009, and an optimistic assumption is that the GoA could rollover about US$2-2.5 billion in annual PG maturities over the next three years, via an exchange for slightly longer-term and more liquid securities. Regardless, this accounting demonstrates that the GoA has access to one kind of financing or another on the order of US$15-20 billion. ¶8. (C) Analysts remain apprehensive, however. Kiguel and Melconian both argue that even with the additional funding from the AFJPs, the GoA can cover debt obligations in 2009 and 2010 only if it pursues moderate fiscal policies. Assuming low or no real GDP growth and inflation of 15-20% in 2009, with average commodity prices staying at current levels (i.e., soybeans trading US$300-400/metric ton),and the Brazilian Real also at its current level (having depreciated about 40% against the dollar this year),Kiguel and Melconian predict that Argentina has fiscal space to increase nominal spending in 2009 by only 10-20% (compared to 28% in 2006, 46% in 2007, and roughly 35% so far in 2008),while staying current on debt service in 2009 and 2010. ¶9. (C) The broader concerns are that the economic downturn will be more severe than anticipated, or that the GoA will use up all its various sources of financing to realize a substantial spending increase in 2009 (to counter the economic deceleration and win political support prior to October 2009 mid-term legislative elections),or both. This strategy would greatly increase the risks of at least a partial (""selective"") default in 2010. The market's expectation that the GoA will indeed ramp up spending BUENOS AIR 00001682 003 OF 004 significantly in 2009 is likely the primary reason why Argentine financial instruments are still priced at default levels. The GoA's recent stimulus announcements give credence to those who argue that the Krichner's plan is to boost spending. -------------- Market Response: Major Thumbs Down -------------- ¶10. (C) Without question, local capital markets resoundingly rejected the President's AFJP nationalization initiative, and many observers have speculated that the initiative has in effect killed off local capital markets. CFK's October 21 announcement touched off a month of financial turmoil and uncertainty, and Argentine asset prices currently trade at highly distressed levels. ¶11. (C) While the domestic sell-off coincided with the late October global sell-off, and also follows 15 months of steady declines in Argentine asset prices (ever since the global crisis began in July/August 2007),there are two aspects of the local crisis that differentiate it from events transpiring in the world and among Argentina's neighbors. First, the nationalization removes the largest source of investment to the private sector, and early indications are that ANSES will prioritize infrastructure investments, and direct funding to the GoA over providing financing to the private sector. The net effect will likely be a significant crowding out of the private sector. ¶12. (C) Second, the new regime also gives ANSES significant ownership of major companies operating in Argentina, and it is as yet unclear how the GoA will act in this regard. Choosing to divest these holdings, which in a number of important local companies exceeds 20% of total outstanding shares, could affect already beaten-down share prices. A further complicating factor is that Argentina's Mixed Economy Companies Law (N 15.349),covering companies that include both public and private ownership, seems to require that the GoA appoint the director and at least a third of the Board of Directors of all companies, and have veto power over Board decisions. Although GoA officials have reassured companies that they have no intention of controlling them, it is unclear how this issue will evolve and the pension nationalization law exacerbates the uncertainty by not clarifying the GoA's role. (Comment: Private sector contacts tell Post that it is clear from their conversations with GoA officials that they did not contemplate this situation when drafting the pension nationalization law.) -------------- Survey of the Damage -------------- ¶13. (C) Neither the reduced access to financing nor the increased government ownership of companies is good news for an already beleaguered private sector, and this was reflected in the plunge in all asset prices, increase in capital flight, and run on the peso between October 21 and November ¶20. During this period: -- The Buenos Aires Stock Market, Merval, dropped 26% and Argentine dollar-denominated bonds fell on average 35%, while peso bonds dropped 31%. -- As a result, the value of AFJP holdings decreased from 94 billion pesos (about US$30 billion) on September 30 to 78 billion pesos (about US$25 billion) October 31. -- Argentina's sovereign risk rating, as measured by JP Morgan's EMBI plus, widened 518 basis points to close on November 20 at 1,913 bps (after peaking at 1,970 bps on October 22). (For comparison, since January 2008, Argentina's EMBI has widened 1,511 bps while Brazil's has widened only 359 bps.) -- Argentines rushed to pull pesos out of banks and buy dollars, with total private peso-denominated deposits plunging 5.2% in October, worse than the 4.4% drop in May (the worst month of the farm crisis). -- As a result, the peso depreciated from 3.24 pesos/dollar on October 20 to 3.34 pesos/dollar November 20, after hitting 3.43 on October 29. One-year peso futures contracts, trading on local markets, jumped from about 3.5 pesos/dollar to 3.8 BUENOS AIR 00001682 004 OF 004 pesos/dollar, after peaking in early November near 4 pesos/dollar. The one-year non-deliverable forward (NDF, traded offshore),went from 5.46 pesos/dollar on October 20 to 6.33 pesos/dollar on November 20. -- In the face of this run on the peso, banks jacked up interest rates, with BADLAR reference rate on deposits of over one million pesos rising from an already elevated 17% to 18.75%, but peaking at 26% on November 13. -- BCRA contacts tell Post that the BCRA sold US$3.5 billion dollars in October, mostly in the second half of the month, to stem the run on the peso. -- Economist Melconian estimates total capital flight, as measured in the BCRA's Balance of Foreign Exchange, at US$4.7 billion in October. (According to BCRA data, capital flight reached US$ 8.8 billion in 2007 and almost twice that level -- US$16.4 billion -- through the third quarter of 2008. Melconian estimates it will total US$22-24 billion for the full year.) ¶14. (C) While Argentine stocks and government bonds have since rebounded somewhat (in the range of 20%) and are currently tracking global movements, they are still trading at distressed levels, and considerable unrest and uncertainty remains. WAYNE =======================CABLE ENDS============================