ARGENTINA SHARES CONCERNS OVER PROPOSED NSG RESTRICTIONS OF

UNCLAS BUENOS AIRES 001552 C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - PARAGRAPH MARKINGS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL KNNP IAEA ENRG TRGY AORC AR SUBJECT: ARGENTINA SHARES CONCERNS OVER PROPOSED NSG RESTRICTIONS OF ENRICHMENT AND REPROCESSING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS WITH VISITING DOE NNSA ADMINISTRATOR D'AGOSTINO REF: Buenos Aires 1449 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Vice Foreign Minister Victorio Taccetti told visiting DOE NNSA Administrator Thomas D'Agostino November 7 that the GOA was ready to work for an agreement under paragraph 6 of the draft criteria-based guidelines for the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technology (ENR),but that the GOA was troubled by paragraph 7. The GOA could not accept restrictions on its right to receive and develop new ENR knowledge and technologies. Nonetheless, Taccetti's advisor Rafael Grossi suggested consensus on language would be possible. MFA Nuclear Affairs (DIGAN) Director Elsa Kelly, also constructive and cordial with Administrator D'Agostino, voiced sharper concern about paragraph 7, saying that it was "not fair, nor rational." She suggested that the USG share with the GOA any progress made in talks with Canada, which has also expressed concern about paragraph 7. Administrator D'Agostino emphasized in these meetings and separate meetings with nuclear regulators and managers that the USG appreciated the responsible and constructive role played by Argentina in the management of nuclear technology and materials. He also pledged to provide the GOA with revised text on paragraph 6 (Embassy provided to the MFA on November 12). National Commission for Atomic Energy (CNEA) President Norma Boero emphasized that Argentina needed to sustain a small-scale reprocessing program to preserve its knowledge and capabilities for future spent fuel disposition. Asked about the Megaports Initiative by D'Agostino, Taccetti reiterated past GOA concerns about the confidentiality of any information collected; he also noted that the continuing disagreement between relevant national agencies over control of port security had prevented GOA forward movement. End Summary. ¶2. (U) Thomas D'Agostino, Administrator for the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA),visited Argentina November 6-7 for consultations related to a proposal for criteria-based restrictions on the transfers of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies at the November 19 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) meeting. D'Agostino was accompanied by Adam Scheinman, NNSA Assistant Deputy Administrator for Nonproliferation and International Security and by Captain (USN) Peter Hanlon, NNSA Executive Staff Director and Military Advisor. Mr. D'Agostino was received by Vice Foreign Minister Victorio Taccetti and separately by Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director for International Security, Nuclear and Space Affairs (DIGAN) Elsa Kelly on November 7. Officials from the National Commission on Atomic Energy (CNEA) and the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (ARN) participated in the meeting with Kelly, and CNEA President Normal Boero received D'Agostino at her headquarters. Charge d'Affaires accompanied D'Agostino to the meeting with Taccetti, and Embassy ESTH Counselor and Political-Military Officer (notetaker) attended all meetings. Reserving a Right to Enrichment and Reprocessing -------------- --- ¶3. (SBU) Administrator D'Agostino thanked Taccetti for Argentina's solid record of cooperation on non-proliferation issues, most recently its collaboration in shifting from highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU). D'Agostino said that his visit was motivated by a commitment to consult and to seek Argentina's support on criteria for the transfer of nuclear technology and materials through the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The USG, he said, did not want Argentina and Brazil's position on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Additional Protocol (AP) to prevent agreement in the NSG on criteria for control of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology. Assistant Deputy Administrator Scheinman then briefed on efforts to reach consensus within the NSG, noting Brazil's concerns about the AP as a criteria and Canada's concerns under paragraph 7. He described the effort to fortify what was already standard commercial practice, that of a "black box" through which purchasers of technology would benefit from the use but not gain insights into the workings of the technology. ¶4. (SBU) Taccetti expressed concern about the final point, saying that "Argentina is a compliant country. We don't want to be receivers of a technology we don't manage." In the subsequent meeting, Ambassador Kelly was even more direct, saying that "we are not going to curtail our development of technology. It is not fair, nor rational." She argued that enrichment and reprocessing technologies were clearly dual-use, and that they were "not necessarily proliferating." At the CNEA, President Boero elaborated further on the rationale relating to reprocessing, arguing that Argentina hoped to have five nuclear power plants in operation by 2025, creating increasing burdens for the storage of plutonium-bearing spent fuel. Given that there might be real future risks to shipping plutonium long distances, it would be better to have a country like Argentina with the capacity to reprocess its own and neighboring countries' fuel. This was a technology that Brazil was not interested in pursuing, so Argentina, which "was not new to reprocessing technology," would fill that role. Argentina, Boero emphasized, was not talking about moving to a commercial-scale NNSA ADMINISTRATOR D'AGOSTINO effort for many years. Better Safeguards, not NSG Controls -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Ambassador Kelly registered concerns that the NSG, comprised she said of many members with no indigenous technology, would vote to limit Argentina's development of nuclear technology. Restrictions on technology transfers would not stop would-be proliferators but would penalize those with a legitimate need to develop enrichment or reprocessing technology. Instead, she said, better safeguards and controls were the key. We needed to move toward the next generation of safeguards, which should be established multilaterally at the IAEA rather than through the NSG. ¶6. (SBU) D'Agostino agreed with Kelly on the need for strengthened IAEA safeguards, and in that regard thanked Kelly for GOA participation in a recent meeting on DOE's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative in Washington. He also emphasized that one of the criteria being proposed within the NSG was subjective, based on whether the technology in question made sense given a country's nuclear development plans and capabilities. Additional Protocol and Paragraph 6 -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Both Taccetti and Kelly described Argentina's general comfort with the AP and reiterated that the GOA could move forward with the AP when Brazil was ready. Taccetti reiterated that because Argentina and Brazil were joined by the IAEA in a "trilateral" safeguards mechanism (the ABACC),Argentina could not move forward without its partner. Argentina was also relatively comfortable with mention of the AP under the criteria-based approach, but it would look to Brazil on this as well. Administrator D'Agostino emphasized that the USG was working hard for consensus at the NSG, and that he hoped to provide the GOA with USG-approved language later in the day in a formulation of paragraph 6 that would assuage Brazil and Argentina's concerns as non-signatories of the AP by recognizing the possibility of implementing the AP or an equivalent through the existing regional safeguards arrangement. He noted that the revised paragraph 6 would not impact Argentina or Brazil's respective fuel cycle programs and ensures that any future transfers they might make are to states that accept the highest nonproliferation standards. Such a decision could be taken now in the NSG as Argentina and Brazil resolve implementation issues associated with adherence to the AP, which remains a U.S. objective. ¶8. (U) In all three meetings, D'Agostino invited Argentina to send a delegation of experts to the U.S. to see how the United States was implementing the AP. The experts would be welcome to Oak Ridge and other facilities. Taccetti agreed, saying that a visit by ARN and CNEA officials would be useful for Argentina. Bottom Lines on NSG Arrangement -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Taccetti was joined by Rafael Mariano Grossi, Director General for Political Coordination. Grossi emphasized at the end of the meeting that Argentina and the United States were "not that far apart on the AP" and other issues, and that a NSG consensus should be possible if the U.S. could "accommodate our technical concerns." Kelly remained more cautious, emphasizing that Argentina would object to any attempt to codify a "black box" approach to sharing technology. "We are not in agreement with this," she said. She requested that the USG share with Argentina any progress made in its discussions with Canada on paragraph 7. Although Canada and Argentina shared similar concerns, she said, they were not necessarily identical. Administrator D'Agostino emphasized that the U.S. Government was willing to work with Argentina on language, prompting Kelly to lament that the USG often provided revised text where the words were changed but the meaning was still the same. Argentina, she reiterated, would not abandon its rights to develop ENR technology or to exchange information on such technologies with other responsible NPT members. India -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Taccetti and Kelly shared once again their reservations about the U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Arrangement. Kelly, specifically, asked about USG views on the future of the NPT and whether other non-NPT states would get special treatment. D'Agostino and Scheinman emphasized that the U.S. wanted to see a coherent and strengthened NPT. Scheinman also said he saw little reason to expect that Israel or Pakistan would be considered for similar treatment at the NSG in the near or medium term. Megaports -------------- ¶11. (SBU) D'Agostino also raised the question of Argentine participation in the Megaports Initiative, noting how positive it would be to identify participation or at least forward movement by Argentina in documents prepared for the U.S. transition team. Taccetti said Argentina had wanted an agreement, but that he knows some in the GOA were concerned about how sensitive information would remain confidential following screening. Grossi then emphasized that the main obstacle was an internal GOA one, centered on a dispute between the Coast Guard and Customs over which agency would be the responsible partner in such a program. D'Agostino promised to follow up on the GOA confidentiality concerns while awaiting Argentina's resolution of the bureaucratic dispute. ¶12. (SBU) This cable was cleared in draft by DOE/NNSA's Adam Scheinman and Peter Hanlon. WAYNE