ARGENTINE MARKETS RECOVER, BUT WITH RISING

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BUENOS AIRES 001529 SIPDIS ARGENTINE MARKETS RECOVER, BUT WITH RISING APPREHENSION ABOUT DEPOSIT OUTFLOWS AND WEAKENING OF THE PESO E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EFIN ECON ETRD PREL AR SUBJECT: ARGENTINE MARKETS RECOVER, BUT WITH RISING APPREHENSION ABOUT DEPOSIT OUTFLOWS AND WEAKENING OF THE PESO REF: BUENOS AIRES 1521 ¶1. (U) This document is sensitive but unclassified. It should not be disseminated outside of USG channels or in any public forum without the written concurrence of the originator. It should not be posted on the internet. -------------- Summary -------------- ¶2. (SBU) After two weeks of financial market turmoil following the Argentine government's October 21 proposal to nationalize Argentina's private pension funds, local stock and bond prices have stabilized and even rebounded in recent days, in part due to GoA and Central Bank direct intervention in the markets. However, the level of uncertainty remains high, as investors await the outcome of the Congressional debate over the GoA's initiative and concerns mount over worrisome levels of deposit withdrawals and the peso's continued weakness (despite increasingly aggressive GoA and BCRA tactics to fortify the currency). End Summary. -------------- Argentine Markets Recover -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Local stock and bond prices have stabilized and even rebounded somewhat in recent days, in line with the global rebound, after plummeting precipitously following the GoA's October 21 announcement regarding its plans to propose to Congress the nationalization of the country's private pension funds (reftel). After closing down 27% for the week ending October 24, the Buenos Aires Stock Market (MERVAL) rebounded roughly 36% from its low between October 29 and November 4 (including a 6% jump on November 4). The Merval is still down roughly one-third from a month ago and is about 50% below its 2008 high. ¶4. (SBU) Bond markets have also recovered dramatically, particularly during the last few trading days. Yields on benchmark dollar denominated 2033 Discount and Par bonds (issued under New York law as part of the 2005 debt exchange) fell 24.4% and 10%, respectively, from their October 29 highs through market close November 3. JPMorgan uses these two bonds to calculate its Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI ) country risk premium for Argentina. After peaking at over 2,000 basis points (20%) following the pension nationalization announcement, Argentina's EMBI rating fell to about 15% at mid-day trading November 4. Short-term peso and dollar bonds were still trading on November 4 at phenomenal yield levels of 45-70%, but were down from yields between 60 and 90% on October 29. -------------- -------------- With a Helping Hand from the Government and Central Bank -------------- -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Official intervention has likely played a role in buoying both Argentine bond and equity markets since October ¶20. According to Post's banking sector contacts, the GoA and possibly the BCRA are reputed to have intervened directly in equity markets in recent weeks, with the aim of halting the slide in stock prices. The GoA's intervention was reportedly heaviest last week, when through government-owned Banco Nacion it intervened (buying or posting buy offers on stocks) in local equity markets on a daily basis (generally in the afternoon),with the goal of capping broad market declines in the range of market movements in Brazil and other neighboring countries. ¶6. (SBU) The GoA and Central Bank (BCRA) have also reportedly both intervened to buy GoA debt instruments in recent weeks in order to take advantage of bargain-basement prices to retire expensive debt prior to maturity (reaping enormous fiscal savings in the process) and also to support prices and counter the massive loss of confidence in Argentina's debt markets. The BCRA, in particular, has intervened heavily by purchasing dollar-denominated GoA bonds, particularly the Boden 12, the GoA's shortest maturity dollar bond. (This is in contrast to the BCRA's purchases of roughly $2 to 2.5 billion in peso Discount bonds during the farming conflict earlier this year, which hit peso-denominated bond prices much harder than the GoA's dollar bonds.) While the BCRA's BUENOS AIR 00001529 002 OF 003 interventions from October 20-31 aimed to prevent further bond price declines, BCRA Boden 12 purchases this week have just reinforced an upward trend that was already in play. -------------- But High Anxiety Continues -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Despite Argentine financial assets gains of the last few days, Post's financial sector contacts report that there is great uncertainty and fear about the direction of the Argentine economy. While most observers expect the Argentine Congress to pass the GoA's pension nationalization bill fairly rapidly with only minor modifications, local markets will stay highly volatile as long as final Congressional approval remains pending. Furthermore, there is increasing apprehension that the Argentine economy will decelerate faster than expected, with many economists and financial sector analysts predicting a recession in 2009, and even optimistic real growth assessments in the range of 2-4%. ¶8. (SBU) Post's contacts among local and foreign banks are extremely worried about the levels of peso-denominated deposit outflows from the financial system. The chief economist of one of the largest private Argentine banks told Econoff October 31 that the top 10 or so banks operating in Argentina did an informal poll on deposit outflows in October, which resulted in an estimate of a 7-8% outflow for the month. This is about the same level or slightly worse than in May, the worst month of the March-July farm strike, and the outflow accelerated during the second half of the month after the GoA announced its initiative. (The Argentine Central Bank reports deposit numbers with a 7-10 day lag, so the exact figures for the month are not yet available. However, through October 24, the Central Bank reported about a 6% decline in peso deposits.) ¶9. (SBU) Demand for dollars has increased in tandem, causing the peso to depreciate by about 7-8% during October, despite heavy intervention (selling dollars) by the BCRA. According to press reports, in addition to BCRA activity in the futures market, the BCRA sold over $1 billion spot during the week of October 20-24, and an additional $1 to 1.5 billion last week, succeeding in keeping the peso just below 3.4 pesos/USD. At one point, on Wednesday, October 29, pressure on the peso grew so intense that the BCRA responded with an unprecedented offer to sell $1 billion in the spot market. While the BCRA ended up selling in the range of $400 million that day (followed by similar or slightly higher amounts on October 30 and 31),this demonstration of its preparedness to defend the peso helped stabilize the nominal exchange rate in the 3.37/3.38 peso/USD range on November 3. -------------- -- BCRA and GoA Unveil New Tactics to Support Peso -------------- -- ¶10. (SBU) The peso actually strengthened November 4 from 3.38 to 3.28 pesos/USD. However, this seems to have been the result of an all-court-press by the BCRA and various GOA regulatory agencies (including tax authority AFIP, Argentina's equivalent of the SEC -- the CNV -- and infamous Internal Trade Secretary Guillermo Moreno, who is reputed to be behind enforcement of the GoA's price controls and manipulation of inflation statistics.) According to press reports and anecdotal reports from Post's contacts among banks and the private sector, BCRA and GoA inspectors descended on banks and currency exchange houses, forcing them to reduce their listed exchange rates under threat of audits for tax evasion. -------------- -------------- Comment: Hard Currency Market Numbers Hard To Come By -------------- -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Post's contacts point out that no level of BCRA reserves is sufficient to counter a full-blown run on the peso if the situation eventually deteriorates to that point. As for Post's analysis of BCRA market interventions, it is important to clarify that the BCRA publishes data on changes to reserve levels with a 7-10 day delay and does not publish any data on its dollar sales (which it does through blind trades),so Post's estimates of BCRA currency trading volumes come from our informal contacts with bank traders. While BUENOS AIR 00001529 003 OF 003 these contacts have proven generally reliable, their estimates are guesswork based on trading patterns and known BCRA methods and objectives. KELLY