Argentina: Government Subsidy Increases Could Squeeze

UNCLAS BUENOS AIRES 001218 SIPDIS SENSITIVE USDOC FOR 4322/ITA/MAC/OLAC/PEACHER AND SABOTTA USDOC for 3134/ITA/USFCS/OIO/WH/RD/LEBLANC E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON EFIN PGOV EINV EAGR ENRG ETRD AR SUBJECT: Argentina: Government Subsidy Increases Could Squeeze Fiscal Stability REF: (A) Buenos Aires 1160 (A) Buenos Aires 1053 (B) 07 Buenos Aires 2313 (C) 07 Buenos Aires 2251 -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Government subsidies, mostly for energy, transportation, and food, have been surging in 2008 and threaten to undermine one of the pillars of the GOA's economic model, a primary fiscal surplus in the range of 3% of GDP. In the first half of 2008, the GOA spent over US$4 billion on subsidies, a 215% year-on-year nominal increase, in an effort to hold down prices of electricity, gas, train, subway and bus fares, as well as meat, milk, bread and pasta. While domestic consumption subsidies are generally acknowledged to be economically inefficient, curbing their growth could prove politically difficult for the Kirchner administration given that the subsidies are intended to support the GOA's core constituency, the urban poor. Conversely, raising taxes to fund subsidies in the wake of the recent agricultural crisis also appears problematic. Recent increases in some electricity and airline tariffs are, at best, a small start at addressing the budgetary burden of expanding subsidies. With this increasing fiscal squeeze, the primary surplus, one of the truly successful legacies of the Kirchner era, could be in jeopardy. So far, the government is pledging to maintain the surplus. END SUMMARY -------------- Subsidies exploding . . . -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Subsidies, mostly for energy, transportation, and food, have been surging in 2008 and threaten to undermine one of the main pillars of the GOA's economic strategy: a primary fiscal surplus in the range of 3% of GDP. In the first half of 2008, the GOA spent some US$4.04 billion on subsidies, according to local think tank Argentine Association of Budgets and Public Finance (ASAP),a 215% increase in nominal peso terms over the same period as last year, and largely to keep pace with inflation and to hold down prices of electricity, gas, train, subway and bus tariffs, as well as food staples such as meat, milk, bread and pasta. According to ASAP, about two-thirds of the subsidies go to cover the difference between GOA-mandated energy tariff ceilings and higher production costs owing to higher world prices for gas and other fuels. Total 2007 subsidies amounted to US$5.28 billion, or 11.6% of total GOA expenditures. ASAP and other private sector analysts estimate that the GOA could spend US$8-US$10 billion on subsidies in 2008, out of a roughly US$60 billion in 2008 primary outlays, or 13-17% of the total. This could represent an estimated 107% of Argentina's primary fiscal surplus, over 3% of GDP, and more than triple the burden in 2006. According to Ricardo Delgado of Ecolatina, GOA spending on subsidies will continue to be very strong and there is no reason to believe that the GoA can or will substantially reduce them anytime soon, owing to the GOA's need to limit the prices for these energy, transportation, and food items, for its core political base, the urban poor. -------------- Squeezing the GOA fiscal account -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Private sector economists have widely commented that the GoA's ability to maintain a fiscal surplus in its target range of 3-4% of GDP could be compromised in the future. Apart from these costly and growing subsidies, the GOA also faces "worrying" increases in public salaries, pensions, and transfers to the provinces, according to local think tank ASAP. Commodity prices for major exports have already declined in the last month (for example, by 23% for soy and 25% for corn). ASAP analysts particularly highlight the fact that public pension outlays could rise substantially in 2009 due to Supreme Court rulings that could (pending congressional ratification) force the GOA to raise payments for all recipients. (According to ASAP, 2008 pension outlays will grow 7% in nominal terms over 2007, and could grow 25% in nominal terms in 2009 over 2008.) ASAP has also noted that the 2009 Congressional elections could be another incentive to increase spending. -------------- -------------- Little economic - or political - room to maneuver -------------- -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Political and economic analysts note that, while the chances of the GOA substantially reducing subsidies appear to be slim, raising taxes is not an easy option either. Although the GOA did increase taxes in recent months (refs C and D: November 2007 export tax increases for some mining, hydrocarbon and agricultural products),and recently imposed a 35% capital gains tax on income from investments in mutual and trust funds, the recent agricultural crisis makes many analysts believe that there is little room for substantially higher taxes. The rollback of the increased agricultural export tax could cost the GOA roughly US$2.6 billion in potential 2008 revenue, or about 4.4% of primary expenditures, according to local economist Carlos Melconian. Further, Argentina has already had a steep rise in tax pressure in recent years, and federal, state and local tax revenue as a share of GDP has risen from around 21% of GDP in 2001 to over 32% of GDP in 2007, according to local consultant Poliarquia. ¶5. (SBU) While GoA subsidies are intended to support President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner's (CFK) core political base, the largely urban poor, economists and opposition parties contend that they are an inefficient way of assisting them. A widely-cited example is the fact that the capital's upper and middle classes benefit disproportionately from electricity subsidies. On the other hand, with poverty and inequality rates now reported to be back on the rise, any subsidy cuts would significantly impact those at or below the poverty line. Many forecasters put the rate of consumer inflation in the 25-30% range this year, and real salaries are struggling to keep up, particularly for the almost 40% (at the end of 2007, and according to the GOA national statistics agency) of the workforce that is informal. According to Ernesto Kritz, head of labor consultancy Sociedad de Estudios Laborales, real wages are now stagnant at best, and poverty - now at about 30%, according to some unofficial estimates - and income inequality are on the rise. -------------- --- Recent tariff increases a start, but more needed -------------- --- ¶6. (SBU) Recent modest electricity rate hikes for Greater Buenos Aires (ref B),while easing margin pressures on distributors, are, according to energy company officials, inadequate to fund needed investment new distribution capacity and compensate these companies beset by inflation accumulated since 2002 and rising union wages. Electricity prices in greater Buenos Aires are still very cheap: neighboring provinces and countries still pay substantially higher rates - up to 10 times more in Rio de Janeiro, for example. Similarly, recent GoA rulings allowing domestic airfares to increase by up to 40% are welcome, but local sector analysts agree that further hikes are needed to spur significant new investments, and allow carriers to be profitable. Nor is it even clear that such tariff increases will lessen the GOA's subsidy burden, which is one of the GOA's stated goals for imposing these increases: train and subway fares were increased an average of 21% in January 2008, yet subsidies to these sectors actually increased 61% from January-June 2008 over the same period in 2007. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶7. (SBU) GOA subsidies are rising at rates that outpace increases in overall revenue growth. GOA options to either halt subsidy growth and/or increase taxes appear limited. The combination of declining GoA popularity, upcoming 2009 Congressional elections, and a more assertive and restive Congress could increase the temptation to ramp up spending, making it more difficult to tighten fiscal policy and contain inflation, which could further strain the fiscal account. And with the possibility of lower commodity prices and sustained higher public debt financing costs (ref A),the primary fiscal surplus - an anchor of Argentina's recent macroeconomic stability and one of the truly successful Kirchner legacies - could also be in jeopardy. So far, however, the government is still pledging to maintain that surplus. WAYNE