ARGENTINA'S CENTRAL BANK PRESIDENT CONCERNED ABOUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 001124 SIPDIS PASS NSC FOR MICHAEL SMART US SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2028 TAGS: EFIN ECON PGOV PREL OREP AR SUBJECT: ARGENTINA'S CENTRAL BANK PRESIDENT CONCERNED ABOUT MONETARY/FISCAL POLICY GAP REF: BUENOS AIRES 984 Classified By: AMBASSADOR E. ANTHONY WAYNE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Central Bank Governor Martin Redrado called his central bank,s aggressive response to the June/July run on Argentine bank deposits wholly successful in staunching the outflow and in punishing currency speculators. This rsponse included the sale of $3.5 billion in dollar reserves over a 60-day period (roughly 7% of Argentina,s $50 billion reserve cushion) and a managed appreciation of the Argentine peso from the 3.12-3.16 range to the 3.02-3.06 range. Redrado contrasted his "prudent and anti-cyclic" monetary policy with profligate GoA fiscal spending that has whittled down a healthy 2004 primary fiscal surplus of 5.2% to a 2.2% surplus in 2007. With monetary and fiscal policy so far out of alignment and a worried business sector now openly complaining about uncertainties generated by manipulated "official" inflation numbers, businessmen are unwilling to look out beyond six months. As a result, investment in productive capacity and supportive infrastructure is insufficient to sustain high levels of growth. Redrado noted longer term private sector investment opportunities in value-added agro-industry- and human capital-intensive sectors that speak to Argentina's comparative advantages. He confirmed that the Economy Ministry has internally put forward a Paris Club restructuring strategy, but said that President Kirchner is still "weighing her options." Redrado called himself a central bank president who is "independent-minded, but not isolated" from Argentina,s broader political reality. End Summary. ¶2. (U) Visiting Senate Foreign Relations Committee Professional Staff Member Carl Meacham and State WHA/BSC Deputy Director Bruce Friedman joined Ambassador and EconCouns in an August 7 meeting with Argentine Central Bank (BCRA) President Martin Redrado. The BCRA President used the opportunity to review the central bank's response to recent market volatility. -------------- BCRA Monetary/Currency Policy Sound -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Argentina has faced two linked mini-crises in the past three months, Redrado said: the first was the contagion of the U.S. sub-prime crisis which led in July/August 2008 to a wholesale sell off of emerging market debt and portfolio losses for domestic holders of these securities, including pension funds and insurance companies. Uncertainties generated by this sell-off combined with generally increased global market volatility to spook wary Argentines, who have lived through -- and become acutely sensitized to -- periodic boom and bust cycles. This, Redrado said, led to a linked "invented crisis" in Argentina ("We Argentines, if we don't have a real crisis, we feel obliged to invent one!") with Argentine peso deposits in local banks sold off for dollars in a wave that saw an 8% decline in total bank deposits in just a three-week period. The BCRA's response included the sale of $3.5 billion in dollar reserves over a 60-day period (roughly 7% of Argentina,s $50 billion reserve cushion), linked forward market dollar sales, a hike in domestic inter-bank interest rates (as a result of BCRA dollar sales absorbing peso market liquidity),and an appreciation of the Argentine peso from the 3.12-3.16 range to the 3.02-3.06 range. Redrado called it "wholly successful" in staunching the deposit flow and in punishing currency speculators. "This was the first time in 30 years that we've had the tools (i.e., an adequate reserve cushion) to address such exogenous market pressures," he said. -------------- -------------- But Fiscal Excess Constrains Ant-Inflation Impact -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Describing BCRA's approach to domestic inflationary pressure, Redrado called his monetary policy, with M2 growth well below the rate of nominal GDP growth (M2 grew 16% y-0-y on the first 6 months of 2008),both "prudent and anti-cyclic." "Would that our government's fiscal policy was also anti-cyclic," he lamented. "If you're looking for (someone to blame for) inflation, look elsewhere," he said, noting that he agreed with U.S. Federal Reserve Governor Randy Kroszner's assessment that inflation is a monetary phenomena in the long run but a broadly fiscal phenomena in the short run. (Kroszner has confirmed his attendance at the BCRA's September 1-2 annual Money and Banking Conference. This year's theme is the impact of global financial turmoil on emerging market economies.) In the first half of 2008, Redrado explained, GoA spending was up 40-50%, though revenue inflows had only increased in the 30% range. This type of domestic pump priming, he concluded, has seen a healthy 2004 primary fiscal surplus of 5.2% whittled down to a 2.2% surplus in 2007. -------------- GoA's Lack of Economic Vision -------------- ¶5. (C) With monetary and fiscal policy so out of alignment and a worried business sector now openly complaining about uncertainties generated by the gross manipulation of "official" inflation numbers by GoA statistics agency INDEC, the economy's main problem is a "lack of horizon," Redrado said. The "horizon" of both business and government needs to be extended. Businessmen are unable or unwilling to look out beyond six months and no one believes in any of the INDEC figures. As a result, investment in productive capacity and supportive infrastructure is insufficient to sustain high levels of growth. Currently, Redrado said, investment stands at 23% of GDP, but for GDP to continue growing at an annual rate of 8%-plus, Argentina will need to see investment in capacity jump by 5% of GDP to a full 28%. This is not happening, and growth is slowing as a consequence. (Note: 2008 GDP growth is independently projected in the 6.5 ) 7.2% range.) ¶6. (C) The GoA lacks a fiscal vision, Redrado continued. To have any chance of controlling inflation, the annual nominal growth in GoA expenditures must drop from 40% to 25%. Establishing and sticking to more sustainable spending government spending patterns would encourage longer term private sector investment in sectors that speak to Argentina's comparative advantages. Redrado cited agribusiness (e.g., production of value-added agricultural equipment and high value-added end-products, such as the wine industry produces),as well as sectors exploiting Argentina's highly educated and capable workforce (e.g., software and tourism). ¶7. (SBU) Asked whether the Argentine Central Bank was a truly independent institution, Redrado replied "I am independent-minded, but not isolated" from the broader political reality. He recalled that media coverage of his comment at a 2007 London conference that he was very "concerned" by inflation earned him a sharp scolding from then-president Nestor Kirchner. Redrado has seen five Economy Ministers during his tenure as BCRA President and said he hoped to serve out his term which ends in 2010, making him the first BCRA President in 20 years to complete his mandate. He pointed out that the BCRA's recent second quarter inflation report is the first GoA document to admit "divergences" in inflation estimates. While Redrado did not offer an inflation number, he argued there was no inflation spiral today in Argentina. ¶8. (SBU) Comment: The BCRA published its "Quarterly Inflation Report" July 24, in which it predicts a deceleration of real growth in 2008 to 6.5% y-o-y from 8.7% in 2007. While the BCRA avoided providing an estimate for 2008 inflation, the report noted: "current macroeconomic conditions do not provide for an acceleration of inflation, as long as the fiscal front remains solid, credit to the public sector remains tight, and the current account of the Balance of Payments has a surplus. Still, a reduction in inflation is linked to the evolution of GoA fiscal and income policy, as well as the performance of monetary policy." This careful caveating reflects the BCRA's desire to blame the GoA's expansionary fiscal policy for Argentina's inflation problem. The BCRA report acknowledged a wide range of price statistics that come close to reflecting the true inflation rate (estimated by private analysts at around 25% y-o-y, compared to the official CPI of 9.3% as of June). Always careful to mention only official figures, the BCRA highlights the following indices: 1) the INDEC core CPI (defined as the residual inflation after stripping out seasonal and regulated prices),which increased 12% y-o-y in June; 2) the Cost Construction Index, up 17.4% y-o-y in June; 3) the GPD price deflator, up 20% y-o-y in QI 2008; and 4) the private consumption deflator, up 15.6% y-o-y in QI 08. Local media incorrectly interpreted the BCRA's review of these alternative indices and reported that the BCRA had estimated inflation at 20%. End Comment. -------------- Paris Club and Political Churning -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Redrado confirmed media rumors that the Economy Ministry has internally put forward a Paris Club strategy, but no defined GoA position has yet been set. "The President is still weighting her options," he said. ¶10. (SBU) On the political churning unleashed by the Senate's "no" vote on variable retentions, Redrado counseled patience. Argentina, he said, is still in the process of rebuilding its democratic institutions and consensus in the aftermath of the 2001/2 economic turmoil. In light of the magnitude of Argentina's fall from grace, Redrado suggested that 10 years -- from 2002 to 2012 -- is a reasonable period of time to allow for such a recovery. He called upcoming 2011 presidential elections a good inflexion point to look to. He expressed concern, though, at the opposition,s ongoing inability to organize itself. For its part, he called the Peronist party "PRI-like," apparently referring to its ability to retain its hold on power indefinitely. -------------- -------------- Comment: BCRA President and the Moral High Ground -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) Redrado's defense of his central bank tenure runs as follows: while his BCRA has conservatively managed monetary policy, poorly intermediated Argentine financial markets (with total financial system credit only 14% of GDP vs. over 30% in Brazil) limit monetary policy multiplier effects and, in any case, his efforts have been overwhelmed by GoA overspending. Many independent economists here question Redrado's claim, noting that, since he took office, the BCRA's accommodation of the Kirchners' cheap peso/strong dollar policy (via BCRA's only partial sterilization of large dollar reserve accumulations) has added significant inflationary momentum to the economy. In this context, Redrado's admission that he is "independent-minded but not isolated" from Argentina's broader political reality is telling. WAYNE