DAS MERKEL'S CONSULTATIONS IN BUDAPEST

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUDAPEST 000940 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/NCE JAMIE LAMORE, PASS TO NSC DAMON WILSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL EPET RS GG UP HU SUBJECT: DAS MERKEL'S CONSULTATIONS IN BUDAPEST Classified By: P/E Counselor Eric Gaudiosi, reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (SBU) Summary. During his September 9-11 visit to Budapest, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Russia David Merkel focused on energy and the Russia/Georgia conflict with a broad range of senior Hungarian officials. Encouraging greater visible support for Nabucco and a slow down/suspension of South Stream negotiations, as well as strong support for Georgia and other countries in the region, DAS Merkel heard the Hungarian response ) Nabucco first, South Stream second, no business as usual with Russia ( but "no harsh reaction." On MAP, "Hungary is with the majority" but Ukraine needs to get the message that "you have to help yourself if you want help from others." End Summary. -------------- ENERGY ) IT,S THE ECONOMY -------------- ¶2. (C) In meetings with the Hungarian Energy Company (MOL) Group CEO, the Prime Minister's Security Policy and Foreign Affairs Advisor, the Chairmen of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs and European Affairs Committees and MFA State Secretary for Russia, the dominant Hungarian message was clear ) diversification is important and Nabucco is our first priority, but with limited resources in gas and oil, South Stream has a role to play. Only Zsolt Nemeth, Fidesz Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, called upon the Government to suspend South Stream negotiations with Russia and give priority to Nabucco. Refering to the "Nabucco is dead" message in EU media, Nemeth said that the U.S. needs to push momentum - encouraging DAS Bryza to further engage on the issue - as "Russia,s aim is clear - to kill Nabucco." Matyas Eorsi, the European Affairs Committee Chairman, disagreed with Nemeth,s call for a freeze on negotiations, commenting that if South Stream is built and Hungary suspends negotiations "there is a danger that we will be left out ) South Stream could bypass Hungary completely." (Note: Eorsi has reiterated these comments to us in subsequent conversations, arguing that "Hungary cannot do anything alone.") ¶3. (C) MOL Group CEO Gyorgy Mosonyi told DAS Merkel that the problem with Nabucco is that "it is like a theater with different actors playing games ) their words are different than their actions. However, this is not the case for Hungary ) Hungary and MOL are aggressively pursuing Nabucco, but we are more or less alone." Mosonyi highlighted the "problems" with Nabucco: Central Europe is too fragmented and the EU's traditional powers have reached accommodations with Moscow. Nabucco can only work if third parties sign up to use the capacity and if it takes Russian gas as well. ¶4. (C) Queried as to Austrian OMV,s 20 percent shareholding in MOL and concern over Gazprom,s interest, Mosonyi responded that Russia's ambition is to own all of MOL through OMV channels. While the 20 percent stockholding "is out of our control," Austria has to have a sense of "reality" about Russia and we are sending our message to the Austrian politicians ) "it is our biggest worry." Additionally, although Austria is managing the Nabucco project, they are slowing down because of the Russia/Austria relationship. ¶5. (C) In separate meetings with Karoly Banai, Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister, and Gyorgy Gilyan, MFA State Secretary for Russian affairs, DAS Merkel stressed the importance of focusing attention on diversification to decrease dependence on Gazprom, as well as the need to slow down/suspend South Stream negotiations in response to the Russian military intervention in Georgia. Banai responded that Hungary needs energy, but "we are discussing whether we can slow down and wait." He asked if the U.S. has raised the issue with Italy as the biggest shareholder in South Stream ) are they willing to share their view on slowing down? Banai commented that Hungary cannot step out on its own, but "we would participate" and provide influence if Italy would initiate a political level meeting. Continuing, he highlighted Hungarian efforts on diversity: an October 3 regional energy conference and the Nabucco summit in January 2009, stating "we need U.S. help to push the conference in other capitals." Responding to DAS Merkel,s comments that Hungary can play a role in helping to shape EU consensus and to secure a commitment to President Aliyev on markets, Banai, referring to Prime Minister Gyurcsany,s recent trip to Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, stated "that,s why we went: to tell them we are interested in buying gas." Banai underscored that the January Nabucco conference is a good opportunity to express commitments to buy Azeri and Kazak gas. ¶6. (C) Gilyan, an economist by training, sketched a lengthy table-top diagram of Hungary,s energy sources, reiterating Hungary,s limited resources in oil and gas. While stating that "Hungary must have stable economic relations with Russia for energy and exports," Gilyan outlined the recent parliamentary resolution on energy that addressed three areas ) security, reliability and sustainability, noting that the document places priority on Nabucco first and South Stream second. Gilyan commented that the Prime Minister,s recent visit to the Caucuses was a "strong statement of support for Nabucco." Sitting in on the meeting with DAS Merkel, MFA Russia and Balkans Director Marianne Berecz commented that it is "not business as usual with Russia, we are pushing the EU for a common energy policy." That said, Gilyan also noted that they are currently preparing the "founding document" for South Stream with an end-of-year 2008 deadline. -------------- --- RUSSIA/GEORGIA CONFLICT ) A BIT SLOW IN REACTING -------------- --- ¶7. (C) Moving to a discussion of the Russia/Georgia conflict with Banai, DAS Merkel highlighted three important areas for Hungarian consideration: maintaining international community support for Georgia; bolstering countries in the region to include a clear path for Ukraine to EU and NATO membership; and ending "business as usual" despite Russia,s perceived energy influence. While expressing appreciation for the Prime Minister,s firm statement on Georgia, DAS Merkel emphasized that a single statement is not sufficient ) more statements, more often, are needed. The goal is not to isolate Russia, but Russia's own actions have done that. ¶8. (C) Banai acknowledged that "we were a bit slow in reacting in the first few days ) not because we were in favor of the Russian action - but due to our crisis management response process." Continuing, Banai said that while Georgia made a tactical mistake, Russia committed a strategic mistake in the size and scope of its intervention - making a very dangerous argument to "protect Russian citizens wherever they may live." Banai stated that "as a question of principle, we belong in the same club ) if it were a black and white issue, there would be no doubt of Hungary,s position ) full support and solidarity with Georgia." He highlighted the political symbolism of opening the Hungarian Embassy in Tbilisi three months earlier than planned as a firm message to Russia on solidarity with Georgia. ¶9. (C) Commenting that he got the "no business as usual" message, Banai stated that the GOH is considering a slowdown in annual consultations with Russia on trade, commercial issues and technology cooperation scheduled for December in Moscow. He expressed his belief that it will not take place, as now "is not the appropriate time to shake hands and smile for the public. Although we do have commercial relations with Russia, this would send the wrong message. We need to send message to our allies that we are all in the same boat and we have to engage NATO/EU to keep Russia on the right economic, political, and democratic path ) but Russia could retaliate." ¶10. (C) During Russia/Georgia discussions at the MFA, Berecz, noting Hungary,s geographic closeness to Russia, emphasized the importance of working to initiate measures which unite EU/NATO partners to "deplore the invasion action." At the same time, she stressed the importance of engaging Russia in negotiations in international fora, as "Hungary is a small country and shouldn,t be alone in pressing them. Rather than sanctions, the international community needs to get Russia to create a culture of meeting commitments, and we are not in favor of a harsh reaction ) that would put both sides in a corner." ¶11. (C) Both Parliament Committee Chairmen expressed significant concerns with the six point agreement. Eorsi, a frequent visitor to Georgia with the Council of Europe, said the plan already was a mistake ) from the beginning it was not about territorial integrity. Nemeth commented that the French President had set no conditions related to South Ossetia and Abkhazia ) this was a mistake, as the status of the two areas should be a pre-condition for normalization of relations with Russia. Continuing, he said "we need to find something for revenge ) we need to respond to Russia with NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia and move ahead on the Nabucco pipeline. We need to step up now and tell Russia that you are not going to close this door." Eorsi also told DAS Merkel in reference to official South Ossetia and Abkhazia representation at the Geneva Conference on refugees that "no one should sit down with them ) Geneva should not be their introduction into international institutions." -------------- MAP FOR UKRAINE AND GEORGIA? -------------- ¶12. (C) In meetings with Banai and Gilyan concerning MAP offerings for Ukraine and Georgia, DAS Merkel stressed the importance of moving forward on MAP in December. Acknowledging that we all need to overcome Germany,s position that MAP is not the final door to membership ) Russia,s provocative steps cannot have a voice in alliance decisions. Banai responded that Hungary was probably the first country to ratify the NATO membership documents for Croatia and Albania, sending a message that enlargement is not finished. Continuing, he said that Hungary wants to maintain close, friendly relationship with Ukraine ) citing three PM meetings in 2007. He was not happy to see turmoil in Ukraine as we approach a decision on MAP, and Ukraine needs to get the message that "you have to help yourself if you want help from others." Gilyan, agreeing that Hungary agrees that MAP is a process rather than the final step before invitation, stated "Hungary is with the majority." (Comment. Gilyan,s bland commitment to the MAP process tracks with Hungary's views prior to the Bucharest Summit -never ready to lead, always ready to follow. End comment). ¶13. (C) Meeting with members of the Prime Minister,s Foreign Policy Advisory Board, DAS Merkel encouraged Hungary to play a role in shaping a clear, united, and principled EU stand on Russia, on Georgia, and on energy security. Following Russia,s "strategic ambush" in Georgia, only a strong European commitment to "no business as usual" will demonstrate that Moscow,s "overreach" is unacceptable. Trans-Atlantic values should not be sacrificed for European consensus. ¶14. (C) Hungarian attendees cited the accelerated plans to open an Embassy in Tbilisi as an important signal of Hungary,s commitment, but expressed concern over the deep divisions within the EU and the perceived risk of a broader spill-over in relations with Russia. Although they recognized the importance of continued engagement with Tbilisi, they were noncommittal regarding MAP invitations for Georgia and Ukraine and shied away from his suggestion that Budapest work in concert with other capitals to slow or suspend progress on South Stream, emphasizing that "all options are important." ¶15. (C) DAS Merkel emphasized that the goal should be "a two-way relationship" with Russia that serves our interests and advances our values. The region faces critical decisions as Moscow attempts to assert a sphere of influence: the trans-Atlantic community must send a clear message of support to the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Bearing in mind that MAP is a process, we believe that an invitation is "the right decision" at a critical time and hope Europe will be prepared to think creatively and to act decisively to support regional security. ¶16. (C) In a closing meeting with MFA Political State Secretary Gabor Szentivanyi, the State Secretary commented that the EU is at a crossroads. Specifically citing point 11 of the EU document on the Russia/Georgia conflict, he said that the EU must deeply examine its relationship with Russia. Noting similarities between post-Cold War Russia and post-World War One Germany ) collapsed central governing system, collapsed economy ) followed by a concerted effort to regain influence at the same time NATO/EU is expanding, Szentivanyi commented that "the U.S. and the EU will need a cooperative, constructive relationship with Russia in the struggle with China. (Note: This novel reference is at odds with both the personal fascination of PM Gyurcsany in China and the sharp increase of Chinese investment here. End Note.) It is better to have a democratic, cooperative Russia ) one that fits into the trans-Atlantic community." The question remains as to whether the current situation is a temporary "malfunction" or a longer term issue. ¶17. (C) Queried as to whether the EU is placing economic interests ahead of common values, with a danger that Russia will view the EU as nothing more than an economic union, Szentivanyi responded that "there should be red lines to make Russia aware it is impossible to violate." Noting that the November EU-Russia summit will potentially provide such an opportunity for the EU to find an accommodation with Russia, Szentivanyi questioned who can influence Russia more - "the EU is eager to see how the U.S. reacts; the U.S. should find an arrangement with Russia; if there are common interests an accommodation can be found." In response, DAS Merkel commented that if the EU is quiet on the Russia actions in Georgia, Russia will judge the EU as having no leverage. The EU,s way forward must reflect what has happened and bolster Georgia, Ukraine and their neighbors. Szentivanyi highlighted his hope that the EU will come up with a strong platform that reflects "no business as usual," speeding up development of a common energy policy, as well as the Eastern Neighborhood initiative ) which he cited as "more important than Sarkozy,s Euro-Mediterranean dialogue." He closed with the consistent Hungarian message on MAP offerings for Georgia and Ukraine, stating "we support MAP and are willing to join the consensus." ¶18. (C) Comment. These discussions provided a useful window into the Hungarian Government,s thinking on energy and relations with Russia. While all of the interlocutors expressed support for diversification and the Nabucco project in principle, it is clear that Hungarian decisions are considerably influenced by their current dependency on Russian gas supplies ) the media comments by Economic Ministry State Secretary Abel Garamhegyi following DAS Merkel,s interview in the daily Nepszabadsag, and Ambassador Foley,s opening remarks at a Freedom House event on September 11, capture the Hungarian bottom line on the issue ) "Hungary will not suspend negotiations on South Stream." ¶19. (C) Comment continued. The Russia/Georgia conflict highlights the foreign policy challenges Hungary faces when reality intervenes on its efforts to balance "Western values and Eastern interests." At the dinner meeting with DAS Merkel, Klara Akots of the Prime Minister,s Foreign Policy Advisory Board commented that economics is the "principled issue" in relations with Russia. Although Banai told DAS Merkel that we would hear more statements from the Prime Minister on the Georgian conflict, Gyurcsany remains relatively silent. Opposition party leaders, such as Viktor Orban and Zsolt Nemeth of Fidesz and Matyas Eorsi of SzDsz have been more openly critical of Russia. The Hungarian Government's diplomatic approach continues to rely on working within the EU and NATO rather than a direct approach to Russia ) underscored by the consistent statements on MAP, where Hungary is reluctant to lead but "willing to join the consensus." End comment. ¶20. (U) This cable has been cleared by DAS Merkel. Foley