HUNGARY: EU-ORIENTED ENGAGEMENT ON BELARUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUDAPEST 000057 SIPDIS SIPDIS EUR/FO FOR DAS KRAMER, EUR/NCE FOR NORDBERG, G FOR FERRAO E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2027 TAGS: PREL BO HU SUBJECT: HUNGARY: EU-ORIENTED ENGAGEMENT ON BELARUS REF: A. 07 BUDAPEST 1968 ¶B. 12/21/07 BUDAPEST-STATE-MINSK EMAIL ¶1. (C) Summary: Hungarian Belarus Office Director Ambassador Ferenc Kontra outlined a restrained, incremental approach to Belarus engagement, as Hungary prepares to formally open its embassy in Minsk. Regarding the ICDT Belarus Task Force, Kontra indicated that task force activities to date have been fully outside official government channels, and that he believes meetings with ICDT in Budapest will help clarify the government's views as key ICDT underwriter. Specifically, Kontra fears that direct meetings between foreign reform advocates and opposition or potential Belarus opposition leaders would be counterproductive, inevitably resulting in sharp reprisals from the Lukashenko regime. Hungary is just now ratcheting up their Belarus engagement, which Kontra expects to remain lower than that of more engaged countries, including the other Visegrad Four partners. Worries remain that Poland will attempt to present its views as a common Visegrad Four or European position when in fact its main objective is a bilateral concern for the Polish minority in Belarus. End Summary. Establishing a Diplomatic Presence ¶2. (C) In a cordial January 8 discussion, Ambassador Kontra outlined Hungary's methodical plans for selective engagement with Belarus, with several details evidently decided in the last few weeks (Ref A). With all activities in close harmony with EU views but far less extensive than in other Visegrad Four and EU member states, Kontra hopes that Hungary will be able to occupy a productive niche in Belarus. While Belarus is apparently clear on Hungary's commitment to democracy and Hungary denied entry of a Belarus minister and military general who attempted to attend an Atomic Energy meeting in Budapest, Kontra believes that Belarus may actually sometimes be appreciative because Hungary "does not seem to be out to embarrass Lukashenko." Kontra hopes Hungary will be able to capitalize on this quasi-goodwill as it seeks out its niche activities in Belarus. After sending a charge d'affaires to set up office space and local staff for an embassy in December 2007, Kontra believes that a one-diplomat post will be open in Minsk as soon as April. With cost-free visa issuance (target: 5,000 per year) a hallmark of EU outreach in Belarus, Kontra expects that the officer will be tied up primarily with consular activities, thus limiting frequent engagement with government and/or opposition officials. Largely because of this constraint, Hungary has decided to channel a budget of approximately 100,000 euros evenly into two projects that require limited oversight: European Radio for Belarus and the European Humanities University in Vilnius. This three-pronged engagement, officer on the ground, financial support for established projects and free visa issuance, will form the core of Hungarian engagement on Belarus. Limited Engagement Based on Belarus Realities ¶3. (C) Despite the attraction of reaching out to opposition leaders or dissatisfied officials directly, Kontra strongly discourages overt engagement with dissidents by foreign groups because these are easy targets for Lukashenko, who can place individuals on a foreign travel ban list, "kill" their professional and personal prospects, and expel foreign organizations who appear too active in sensitive areas in Belarus. Mindful of both the real risks to dissidents in this situation and to organizations who mis-step in their relations with Belarus, Kontra supports broad-based travel and exchange programs to introduce the greatest possible number of Belarus citizens to the values of democracy. Possible exchanges could be in cultural or even targeted law enforcement areas, but should avoid issue groups such as civil rights initiatives because they would draw the nearly inevitable ire of Lukashenko. Persuaded by an Oxford University analytical paper, Kontra foresees an evolution rather than a revolution in Belarus, at least in the short term. As western business moves out, the monolithic onslaught of Russian pressure, investment, and influence will likely provoke a reaction in the populace, though Kontra notes this could go either way, if Lukashenko is able to cast himself as a pure advocate of an independent Belarus against "Russian invaders." Hungary plans to observe all European seniority limits on engaging with Belarus government officials, and Lukashenko "will be a stranger" at any Hungarian-sponsored activities in Minsk. Government and ICDT Pursuing Both Shared and Distinct Agendas ¶4. (C) Hungary is prepared to seek and support common BUDAPEST 00000057 002 OF 002 positions on Belarus in both the EU and the smaller Visegrad Four context. Kontra notes its current engagement is a direct response to the perception that Hungary needs to be more active in this area of shared concern. It is critically important to Hungary that the pro-democracy concern be shared and not derailed due to aggressive advocacy for one country's bilateral agenda, such as Poland's deep concern for its ethnic minority in Belarus. In this light, Kontra specifically welcomes international European initiatives such as the ICDT task force (Ref B),even though he does not expect to formally meet with ICDT about the task force activities until later this month. While he hopes that ICDT will do things that Hungary as a government cannot, Kontra is confident that ICDT will begin to understand the realities of working in Belarus, such as recriminations against dissidents who meet with foreign pro-reform groups, and extending to all areas in which the government in Belarus has power. By contrast, Kontra enthusiastically supports the radio initiative, because it focuses on popular music with only an occasional breakaway for unfiltered news, such as a phone call from a demonstration in downtown Minsk, because it is a bold step away from a pure propaganda channel whose signal Lukashenko would block but which would not have many listeners in any case. With their embassy on the verge of opening in Minsk, Kontra sees the next few months as full of opportunities for renewed engagement with ICDT, even as he plans to try to direct them gently away from too aggressive an agenda. ¶5. (C) Comment: With Norwegian project funding and a high-profile former Polish Prime Minister taking an active role, the ICDT Belarus Task Force has moved quickly, despite the extended holiday season, which is just now leaving an opportunity for fuller ICDT-GOH vetting of this initiative. We agree with Kontra that Ambassador Gyarmati will carefully review actual ICDT proposals in terms of realistic goals for Belarus engagement, and expect that GOH will strongly encourage a different path for the Task Force during its upcoming meetings with ICDT. Gyarmati has pushed back his planned visit to the United States until February, giving extra time for both GOH and Embassy advocacy. Hungary is likely to continue its path towards full diplomatic ties, and its measured approach reflects a national agenda that is very likely to influence ICDT as the Belarus Task Force continues. End comment. FOLEY