SUMMER RERUNS: A PAUSE IN THE (IN)ACTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUDAPEST 000550 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/NCE; PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR ADAM STERLING E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/2013 TAGS: PGOV KDEM HU SUBJECT: SUMMER RERUNS: A PAUSE IN THE (IN)ACTION Classified By: P/E COUNSELOR ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) The traditional summer "cucumber season" will be longer than usual this year, with Parliament scheduled to be on recess from June 9 through September 15. Although the Parliament has passed bills on issues ranging from our bilateral data-sharing agreement to Papa Airbase in recent days, the government continues to shuffle slowly through its latest cabinet reshuffle. New Ministers are in place at newly-formed Ministries, but they seem to be getting up to speed only slowly. None of the new Ministers, for example, has had an introductory meeting with representatives of the Diplomatic Corps, and the Ministries are still laboriously moving into new office space. FREEZE FRAME IN THE SUMMER ¶2. (C) In his public remarks, Prime Minister Gyurcsany has characterized the months ahead as a time of "risk and opportunity," noting that minority government will make "government decisions easier but Parliamentary consensus harder." Zoltan Kisfaludy, a former IV recipient who started in mid-May as the Prime Minister's Deputy Chief of Staff, believes that the challenge of ruling without a coalition partner will now give the MSzP the opportunity to "rise or fall" on its own. MSzP Deputy Faction Leader Attila Mesterhazy believes that the summer will be "good for us," arguing that the months ahead will allow the government to reach a new entente with the SzDSz ) especially if Janos Koka loses his reelection bid on June 7 - and to act without a critical Parliament in session. ¶3. (C) As for prospective changes at the top, Mesterhazy bluntly notes that "if it would have been easy to replace Gyurcsany we would have done so already." Although Defense Minister Szekeres' Cabinet Chief tells us that "no ONE knows what is going on inside Gyurcsany's head," First Lady Dr. Klara Dobrev told Ambassador Foley May 28 that her husband will be "hard to remove." She acknowledged that "you'll hear plenty of rumors" ) the latest among them Gyurcsany's intention to become the EU Tax Commissioner ) but she argues that "no ONE else has his charisma." Ultimately, she believes his support within the party leadership beyond the Praesidium will allow him to remain in office in order to "ride the rising tide" as EU assistance begins to resuscitate the economy next year. ¶4. (C) Staffers in the PMO, meanwhile, are said to be avidly circulating copies of "The West Wing" in search of inspiration for the months ahead. By contrast, FIDESZ MP Mihalj Balla describes the Ministries as "graveyards," comparing the Gyurcsany government unfavorably with former Socialist PM Gyula Horn. As Kisfaludy admitted, the PMO will seek to dictate the policy agenda but also to "control the narrative" in the press in the months ahead. As FIDESZ staffer Eniko Csontos notes with some asperity, "with a new scandal every day," the government should be eager to guide news coverage during the summer lull. SERIOUS BUT STABLE CONDITION? ¶5. (C) The MSzP has clawed back slightly in the latest polling, but continues to trail FIDESZ by up to forty points in most surveys. Conservative commentator Istvan Stumpf argues that the Socialists are using government positions and government policy as tools to resolve their internal disputes. He maintains that their smartest move would be to submit to early elections now, hope that the smaller SzDSz and MDF would fail to cross the Parliamentary threshold, and take the opportunity to reorganize themselves in opposition as Hungary evolves into a two-party system. Both Mesterhazy and Kisfaludy are clear, however, that the MSzP will not support early elections. ¶6. (C) But, many ask, what policies can they support? PM Gyurcsany has called a curious "summit meeting" with his own party for the week after Parliament's recess, with press speculation describing the session as an attempt to hash out a legislative agenda for the fall session. This will likely include revision of the HEALTH Care legislation and expansion of nuclear power. All eyes are also turning to the coming budget debate, with MSzP insiders expressing private concern that the failure to win support for their draft budget would further convince the public that the party is incapable of governing. THE FORECAST CALLS FOR PAIN ¶7. (C) FIDESZ has also been meeting behind closed doors ... but public leaks of recent comments made by Party President Orban have been in heavy circulation. According to press BUDAPEST 00000550 002 OF 002 reports, Orban predicted "two years of pain" ahead in managing the economy during a meeting with Political Scientists on April 30. He also reportedly discussed halting various projects - including the controversial Budapest metro expansion ) and suspending increases in public subsidies. With regard to domestic politics, Orban reportedly commented that he would "follow (WW II-era Regent) Horthy's example" and "spank the Magyar Garda and send them home." He is also alleged to have claimed that FIDESZ ) under his leadership ) would win "the next three elections in Hungary." ¶8. (C) MSzP officials have quickly seized on Orban's speech, dubbing it "Orban's Oszodi speech" in reference to PM Gyurcsany's infamous "lies" address at Balatonoszod in 2006. Early polling shows predictably strong opposition to the prospect of reduced state support, and we expect the speech to feature prominently in debate over the months ahead. Indeed, the MSzP has moved quickly to exploit the speech, blitzing the media with full-page ads accusing Orban of practicing "the politics of revenge" and predicting a dark future under a FIDESZ government. CONFRONTATION AND KADARISM ¶9. (C) Sociologist Pal Tamas of the prestigious Hungarian Academy of Sciences warns, however, that the continued din could have diminishing returns. Noting recent opinion surveys reflecting a clear majority of respondents viewing the Kadar era favorably compared to the present, Tamas believes many Hungarians prefer the illusion of "a past of prosperity without competition" to a time of "economic troubles and political intrusion." (Even Foreign Minister Goncz has commented privately that the late Socialist period is remembered fondly compared to a transition seen as "leaving many behind.") Tamas' research indicates that Hungarians are reaching saturation with a divisive political debate that "is with them from the breakfast table to the bedroom." This, he argues, is why the parties tend to combine "their confrontational rhetoric and familiar, Kadarist policies." ¶10. (C) Comment: That remains a dangerous combination. Although the summer break may make the slow pace of minority government less conspicuous, the growing gap between the parties' promises and their likely accomplishments will remain long after Parliament returns in September. ONE poll indicates that over 80 percent of Hungarians believe the country is headed in the wrong direction. From our perspective, it is actually headed in two wrong directions simultaneously: toward stasis in its policy and toward the extreme in its rhetoric, reflecting a disturbing tendency to "go backwards when the going gets tough." Stumpf has publicly suggested that the Gyurcsany government represents "the last nail in the coffin of the Third Republic." Even with less activity likely over the summer ) or perhaps because of it ) many are buying into the proposition that the Hungary's straits are a reflection of flawed institutions as well as flawed individuals and flawed ideas. End Comment. Foley