TWENTY QUESTIONS: FIDESZ TURNS 20

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BUDAPEST 000391 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/NCE; PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR ADAM STERLING E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREV KDEM PHUM HU SUBJECT: TWENTY QUESTIONS: FIDESZ TURNS 20 Classified By: P/E COUNSELOR ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: FIDESZ celebrates its twentieth anniversary in a position of unprecedented popularity, having channeled broad public discontent with the Gyurcsany government's policies to build an imposing lead in opinion polls. A movement long before it became a political party, FIDESZ's identity and its agenda continue to evolve under Viktor Orban's leadership. Its current incarnation is increasingly moderate, substantive, and Atlanticist; its current opposition is divided, defensive, and increasingly focused on minimizing the magnitude of their defeat in the next elections. Skeptics near and far, however, continue to impose a heavy burden of proof regarding the distance FIDESZ has put between its present policies and its populist rhetoric, its nativist impulses, and its political associations. End Summary. POPULARITY POPULISM = OPTIMISM ¶2. (C) Despite the reflexive fears of some in the party that the Socialists will somehow manage to rally before the next elections, many FIDESZ members are becoming uncharacteristically optimistic about their political fortunes. Polling shows over two-thirds of committed voters expressing support for FIDESZ, and 42 percent in favor of new elections. MSzP and SzDSz officials can agree about little other than the probability of a FIDESZ victory in the elections of 2009 and 2010, and FIDESZ Parliamentary Faction Leader Tibor Navracsics believes the party's "Open Arms" approach can retain many of the Socialist swing voters who sided with them during the recent referendum to form a long-term majority (reftel). ¶3. (C) If they are bullish on their own political future, however, they remain overwhelmingly negative regarding the country's. FIDESZ members young and old frequently rail that "Communism, corruption, and clientism" are undermining the principles and the promise of 1989. Orban has managed to capitalize on this frustration with a deft bit of political alchemy, positioning FIDESZ as "the party of hope" by comparing it to "the government everyone hates." Addressing diplomatic and corporate representatives March 31, Orban described FIDESZ as the only means to break with decades of "rule by a self-proclaimed liberal elite" which has "made 
corruption the rule rather than the exception." Many party members see Hungary losing credibility abroad and time (and for that matter population) at home. TAKING STOCK ¶4. (C) From our perspective, FIDESZ has worked hard to burnish its Atlanticist credentials and ) albeit more slowly ) to take the political center. This has been a conscious decision and a delicate balancing act with a voting base that can be anti-Russian without necessarily being pro-American. (As the saying goes, "Hungary is a small country - we have only one mob.") Orban now feels confident that Hungarians see the difference between "an unstable government and a stable opposition." ¶5. (C) To seal the deal, however, FIDESZ will have to continue to define itself by what it supports in addition to what it opposes. That will mean answering the following lingering questions from Hungarian voters, international investors, and foreign governments: IDEOLOGY: THE HOBGOBLIN OF SMALL MINDS ¶6. (C) As one Ambassador recently asked Orban, "aren't you awfully leftist to be a conservative?" Others have leveled the same charge, noting the party's frequent resort to populist rhetoric ) particularly on the state's role in the economy, its occasional broadsides against foreign investors, and its reflexive support for public ownership. SzDSz Prsident Janos Koka dismisses FIDESZ's platform as a "populist pamphlet," and Gyurcsany advisor Klara Akots condemns the opposition for "going through three elections with no ideas." ¶7. (C) Disquiet with FIDESZ's current stand is often compounded by long memories. Although voters continue to feel a strong personal connection to Orban, many are uneasy with his circumnavigation of the political spectrum from liberal to populist. His recent comments regarding the importance of promoting competitiveness, reforming the tax structure, and maintaining fiscal discipline are welcome to investors, but corporate officials in particular recall with disquiet his comments before the 2006 elections, when he responded to questions regarding his campaign promises by assuring them they could "ignore what I say." BUDAPEST 00000391 002 OF 004 ¶8. (C) Orban himself has downplayed ideology altogether of late, focusing primarily on proving to the public - and assuring President Solyom - that the party is "ready to govern." "I never use the word 'conservative' in Hungary," he commented recently, and he has argued that parties should be judged by "their principles and not by their policies." He explains to us privately that "it's not complicated - we are telling the people that we will restore the nation's greatness and telling the business community what they can expect from a FIDESZ government." Although he asserts that FIDESZ has always been ) and will always be ) a "Christian, patriotic, family-oriented party dedicated to serving the Hungarian nation," he has also admitted that his tactics will vary. "The only standard," he concluded in responding to questions regarding the party's orientation, "is whether our measures are reasonable, timely, and appropriate." It is a testament to Orban's ability to evoke a strong response that this quote will be seen by some as pragmatic ( and by others as unprincipled. DEFINING VICTORY ¶9. (C) These concerns extend to FIDESZ's ultimate goal. Akots and others in the MSzP suggest that their objective is to secure not only a victory in the next elections but a two-thirds majority. This would allow them to make fundamental changes in Hungary's governing structures, and she believes their priority would be the establishment of strong Presidency along the lines of the French model ( with Orban as President. ¶10. (C) Akots charges that FIDESZ has vilified their political opponents, exaggerated Hungary's economic straits, and exacerbated its social tensions, "attacking the government both for its actions and its inaction." The goal, she argues, is to "make people believe that the system itself does not work." Even conservatives such as commentator Ivan Baba concede that "Orban has an authoritarian streak," and former SzDSz President Gabor Kuncze recalls that Orban had "ridiculed the Horn government for not taking full advantage of its two-thirds majority in the 1990s." As a result, he concludes, for many in the MSzP ) and in his party as well - the goal is not victory in the next elections but rather denying Orban a super-majority. WHO'S NEXT TO WHO'S IN CHARGE? ¶11. (C) To all appearances, Orban continues to dominate the party's decision-making (and reportedly its purse strings). Originally a triumvirate of Orban, Janos Ader, and Laszlo Kover, FIDESZ has broadened into a political corporation, led by Orban in recent years. Ader has been largely sidelined despite his status a Deputy Speaker of Parliament, and Kover has limited his public profile, serving as the party's point man on intelligence and national security issues. ¶12. (C) In their place, the party has brought a broad array of officials into the spotlight. The party tends to direct certain issues to certain designated spokespersons. Their leaders and especially their staff are increasingly open to - and well-scripted for - contacts with the diplomatic community. They have entered the information age with initiatives such as their chat room "Right Click." ¶13. (C) This new degree of diversity has inevitably led to widespread conjecture regarding divisions within the party, and our diplomatic colleagues confess to a degree of "Kremlinology" in handicapping the maneuvering within the party. Tactically, Orban continues to prefer the direct approach in confronting the Gyurcsany government. "Sooner is better," he told Ambassador Foley regarding his desire to replace the Prime Minister, concluding that FIDESZ will be prepared to move quickly in the face of a divided MSzP. He believes a year of activism including tax reduction will yield results that will "look big compared to where we are now." ¶14. (C) Orban's more aggressive approach stands in contrast to the more gradualist approach of moderates including popular Debrecen Mayor Lajos Kosa (who has outpolled Orban in personal popularity),former Minister of Education Zoltan Pokorni, and Parliamentary Faction Leader Tibor Navracsics, who all seem in less of a hurry to inherit the dilemmas currently confronting the government. Moderates in the party note that Orban's personal approval ratings remain much lower than the party's, most recently in a survey that found him enjoying only a 10-point lead over Prime Minister Gyurcsany. ¶15. (C) That said, Orban still reigns supreme. His instincts have seemingly been vindicated by the results of BUDAPEST 00000391 003 OF 004 the March referendum, and he has been extremely jaunty of late. If there is a decision as to whether Orban will be the party's Prime Ministerial candidate next time around, at the moment the decision appears to be Orban's alone to make. Whatever the shades of gray within the party, there are no signs that anyone is abandoning ship. To the contrary, foreign policy commentator Anita Orban tells us that many moderate conservatives ) herself included ) are "coming home" to FIDESZ. Their recent events have been very well-attended, and party leaders also hold out great hope that the strong conservative sentiment among younger voters means that "the future is ours." HOW CLOSE TO THE RIGHT IS JUST RIGHT? ¶16. (C) But holding the center will mean abandoning the party's relationship with the far right. Political Scientist Zoltan Kiszelly tells us that Orban has always held to one cardinal rule throughout his career: never expose yourself to attacks from the right. That has led the party to coexist - and occasionally cohabitate - with the far right, which has traditionally served as an important source of support in national elections. ¶17. (C) FIDESZ is now making attempts to distance themselves from a recent spate of extremist statements and actions. By eventually opposing the formation of the Magyar Garda, speaking out against the Magyar Garda,s discrimination of Roma, organizing the April 7 counter-demonstration against neo-Nazi protestors, and participating in the April 11 National Roma Intellectual Conference, FIDESZ distanced itself from the Garda (and implicitly from its sponsors in the far-right Jobbik party). However, FIDESZ differs with the government regarding the controversial Arpad flag, a historical symbol whose orgins date back to the arrival of the Hungarian tribes but whose more recent associations include the fascist World War II-era Arrow Cross. ¶18. (C) Party members bridle at charges of association with anti-Semitic elements, often alleging that the accusation is a long-time Socialist tactic to smear the opposition. Some go so far as to charge the government with "creating" the Magyar Garda in order to demonize FIDESZ, and many minimize the extent of anti-Semitic sentiment in the country - as do many members of the Jewish community. The party's response to an article by founding FIDESZ member Zsolt Bayer, in which he said &the mere existence of Jews justifies anti-Semitism,8 was ambiguous and left room for misinterpretation. Critical statements from FIDESZ members including the Chairman of the Parliamentary Human Rights Committee and Orban's Chief of Staff followed, but so did photos of Orban with Bayer at a FIDESZ anniversary event. ¶19. (C) After a week of small but visible neo-Nazi demonstrations in Budapest, the issue is drawing renewed attention. FIDESZ has the opportunity to separate themselves even further from the far right, and sources close to Orban tell us privately that they are committed to "depriving the far right of oxygen." But their approach is likely to be deliberate - too deliberate to please critics who believe that only the center-right can defeat the far-right. THE NEIGHBORHOOD, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE TRANS-ATLANTIC COMMUNITY ¶20. (C) FIDESZ has scored impressive successes in coming in from the cold with regard to the trans-Atlantic community. Orban has privately acknowledged the damage done to his reputation and his relationship with the U.S. over his decisions on the Gripen purchase and Hungary's Iraq deployment, and over the past years he has hewed closely to a robustly pro-Atlanticist line on issues ranging from NATO enlargement to energy security. Orban has raised his international profile considerably, including as Vice-President of the European Peoples Party, and made trips to both Belgrade and Doha in the past week. He told Ambassador Foley April 11 that consensus on Afghanistan and other key foreign policy issues would continue, confiding that he had even reached a "secret agreement" to support plans for Hungary's 2011 EU Presidency. ¶21. (C) FIDESZ staffers in Parliament are not unmindful of the political advantages of this approach, regarding the International Community as the Gyurcsany government's greatest source of support during the demonstrations of 2006. They believe that Gyurcsany's international status has eroded considerably in the past 18 months, and that his government's trans-Atlantic bona fides are vulnerable to attack. They also see a European political landscape that is much more to their advantage. FIDESZ has reached out to conservative parties throughout Europe, most notably in the BUDAPEST 00000391 004 OF 004 UK and Germany, both to seek advice and to establish themselves more firmly in the European conservative mainstream. ¶22. (C) Our colleagues in the diplomatic community here tell us the results have been mixed, however. Some share domestic concerns regarding the party's populist rhetoric, and many feel that a FIDESZ government would be a disruptive force in the region due to its long and deep commitment to ethnic Hungarian communities abroad. Ambassador Istvan Gyarmati, Director of the International Center for Democratic Transition (ICDT),highlights FIDESZ's tendency to blur the distinction between "the country and the nation." As a result, he assesses that an Orban government would be "better with Washington, not bad with Brussels ( and a problem in the region." TOO EASY? ¶23. (C) Comment: If the Gyurcsany government continues on its present downward trajectory, FIDESZ will continue to gain support by default. As Orban himself stated, "even people who hate me prefer my government to no government at all." He is clearly thriving on the present chaos - and on describing the present as chaos. He believes that "all is uncertain for now except one thing - that we will win." Indeed, he tells us privately that he "has never had it so easy so early" in an election cycle. So easy, in fact, that his only concern is that "it might be too easy." This current margin may obscure the progress made in grappling with questions regarding the party's future, and may limit their motivation to provide details to a public more eager for a change than a platform. It may also undermine the motivation for making a clean break with a past that continues to concern many of the voters who will have to be convinced to realize the party's vision of a lasting majority. End Comment. FOLEY