U.S.-RUSSIA MISSILE DEFENSE NEGOTIATIONS IN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 BUDAPEST 000345 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/NCE MARC NORDBERG E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2017 TAGS: PREL MARR PARM MASS PAO KNNP NATO EU EZ PL RS, IR, HU SUBJECT: U.S.-RUSSIA MISSILE DEFENSE NEGOTIATIONS IN BUDAPEST ON DECEMBER 13, 2007 REF: A. SECSTATE 146521 ¶B. MOSCOW 05059 ¶C. MOSCOW 04956 Classified By: Ambassador April H. Foley: Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: In the fourth round of expert-level meetings in Budapest December 13, U.S. and Russian delegations, led by Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Rood and Deputy Foreign Minister Kislyak, continued to discuss U.S. plans to place a missile defense (MD) system in Central Europe (delegation lists at paras. 23-24). U/S Rood put forward a number of transparency and confidence building measures to deal with Russia's stated concerns. The Russian side responded to the U.S. proposed Joint Regional Missile Defense Architecture and the threat assessment indicators and confidence-building measures, reiterating a number of objections made in previous talks. Kislyak stressed that Russia does not see Iran as a threat, believes there is no need for the proposed MD system, feels the system threatens Russia, and objects to the fact that the U.S. will "go ahead no matter what." At the end, Kislyak undertook to look for ways to reduce Russian concerns as the U.S. goes forward with deployment, as damage control. U/S Rood also took the opportunity to register U.S. disappointment on Russia's suspension of the CFE treaty. Kislyak responded that the U.S. and Allies are to blame and "we are not going to return to the old treaty." END SUMMARY. "There is No Threat" ==================== ¶2. (C) Concerning Russia's thoughts on the U.S. proposed Joint Regional Missile Defense Architecture, Deputy Foreign Minister Kislyak opened by stating "there is no threat compelling deployment of a defense any time soon," that the U.S. is "creating facts on the ground" and there needs to be agreement on what the threats are. Kislyak said Russia had a problem understanding what "jointly" means in the architecture proposed. General Buzhinskiy added that Russia does not understand the degree of jointness, asking about who would take decisions on engagement, the level of decision making, and what the command and control structure would look like. Kislyak argued that it was more logical to go back to the original step-by-step proposal which President Putin �00A;offered at Heiligendam: joint monitoring of the threat, development of a joint threat assessment, and then later developing a joint architecture based on the needs of the assessed threat. Noting that the U.S. is proposing parallel monitoring and missile defense deployment for "threats yet to be defined," Kislyak said Russia does not understand the purpose of this system that is "not in our national security interest." He said Russia had a problem "not only about technicalities, it's the concept" they have a problem with, but the U.S. will "go ahead no matter what" Russia says. No Missiles in Europe ===================== ¶3. (C) Buzhinskiy said he understood the discussion of "non-activation" of the European MD system at the "2-plus-2" meeting to mean that missiles would not be brought into Europe. He said now the U.S. is instead talking about not activating missiles in silos, which is "a completely different thing." Kislyak said sharing information and building a system before agreeing on what the threats are is not "joint" cooperation. While stating that the U.S. has the right to do what it needs to do, so does Russia. If the U.S. does something deemed "destructive to our own national security interests, we will take measures." He stated there were a number of conditions that would reassure Russia the system will not serve against Russia interests. The two most important Russian conditions are: suspension of negotiations on a third site and no deployments of weapons in space. The "best guarantee" for Russia, Kislyak said, would be for the U.S. to renounce current plans for the proposed European MD system. ¶4. (C) U/S Rood supported cooperation on a joint regional missile defense architecture as the best way for Russia to gain confidence that the system would not adversely affect BUDAPEST 00000345 002 OF 006 Russia's interests. The U.S. is also open to more modest radar cooperation, and we have elaborated on President Putin's proposal in our ideas. Rood expressed interest in hearing Russia's concept of jointness. Responding to Russia's call for the U.S. to renounce its plans for a MD system in Europe, U/S Rood clearly stated that the U.S. is not prepared to do so and that the U.S. has been consistent on this point. He noted U.S. funding for space-based efforts was very limited. Rood also said the U.S. had not stated that we would not bring interceptors into Europe. "Not an Add-On to Whatever You Do" ================================== ¶5. (C) U/S Rood asked Kislyak to elaborate further on what Russia sees as "joint" cooperation and their development path on the Putin proposal. Kislyak said Russia sees a step-by-step process whereby there is a "joint architecture" for a monitoring system and a joint center to exchange information. Regarding a joint information center, he proposed another center in Brussels in order to include Europeans in a "joint" cooperation framework. Kislyak said it is "too early to say" what a solution would look like because there are different assets to be offered and it depends on the threat. Kislyak stated that these steps would represent real "joint" cooperation, "not an add-on to whatever you do." Buzhinskiy added that it is not just about assets "but joint analysis, joint evaluation, and joint conclusions to make decisions. Who will make the decision to fire the system?" ¶6. (C) Kislyak said that by pursuing a parallel process of monitoring and missile deployment, the U.S. is rejecting the Putin proposal. However, he also said in response to Rood's question that the Putin proposal was not a "take it or leave it" one. He lamented that the U.S. was "cherry-picking" from Russia's proposal, using the Putin proposal as a "bolt on" to the U.S. approach. Kislyak claimed that Poland and the Czech Republic were "making statements" of being "extremely unhappy" about a MD system. However, upon leaving the State Department in Washington, Polish and Czech diplomats were saying "it's not Iran, it's Russia." He cited the Czech Foreign Minister's comment that the MD system was "against a big country that has the capabilities now," meaning Russia. Responding to the "cherry-picking" comment, U/S Rood expressed disagreement, further emphasizing that the U.S. has not rejected the Putin proposal, but rather has expanded upon it and reaffirmed U.S. interest in strategic cooperation with Russia on MD. As for comments by Polish and Czech officials, the best step Russia could take would be to not make comments about targeting Poland and the Czech Republic. Saving Iran's Face ================ ¶7. (S) Reiterating that Russia does not see Iran as a threat, Kislyak stated "we do not understand" why the U.S. is "rushing to establish" an architecture. He asked what other realistic threats are there, offering that Israel is the only other "threat" in the region. Kislyak said the U.S. is asking Russia to work jointly on a MD system that the Russian military believes "will work against us." Furthermore, he said Russia has no desire to form an alliance with the U.S. against Iran. He said Russia is attentive to Iran's national pride, as well as maintaining the "political instruments" to help provide the Iranians "a way out." ¶8. (S) U/S Rood stated that North Korean proliferation has enabled Iran to acquire and produce missiles and created the potential and grave concern for the least responsible states, such as Damascus, to acquire this technology. Technology transfers and the global availability of these technologies are concerns that will not abate. Emphasizing that leading nations have a special responsibility for maintaining peace and security, U/S Rood stressed that Iran is in violation of Security Council resolutions and any face-saving measures need to be accompanied by continued international pressure to come clean on their nuclear development programs. Armavir Visit: Russia "Less Interested" ======================================= BUDAPEST 00000345 003 OF 006 ¶9. (C) Regarding the Moscow ABM system, U/S Rood asked if it countered an Iranian threat. Kislyak responded that the Moscow system was built to focus on the U.S., and furthermore, Russia does not see a strategic threat from Iran "politically, technologically, or economically." Turning to the Qabala visit, U/S Rood asked if a similar visit to Armavir radar site would be possible. Kislyak responded that the Qabala visit was for the purposes that Putin had proposed. Kislyak said he was disappointed with the results of the visit and by General Obering's statement that Qabala "would not be a substitute." Emphasizing that Qabala was meant to be part of a system to monitor the threat and not to serve to support a third site against Iran, Kislyak said if the U.S. proceeds with negotiations with the Czech Republic and Poland then Russia would be "less interested" in a U.S. visit to Armavir. Referring to Kislyak's earlier comment that the Putin proposal was not a "take it or leave it" offer, DASD Green then asked if there was not a contradiction with Russia's condition that the U.S. not proceed with current third site negotiations. Kislyak responded that if the U.S. goes ahead with the negotiations, then "you are brushing aside the Putin proposal." Qabala "Turned Off" =================== ¶10. (S) Moving the discussions to indicators on threat assessments, U/S Rood referred to Russian FSB General Vnietsiyev8 comments in Paris that a flight test of a two-stage solid propellant missile from Iran would be an indicator that would change their perception of an Iranian threat. Kislyak and Buzhinskiy both responded, stating that General Vnietsiyev was unable to make it to this experts, round, but they did not recall this statement as a Russian threat assessment "criterion." Kislyak emphasized that a missile's range is the important criteria for Russia. U.S. delegation intelligence analyst Kozlusky provided details on the November 20 Iranian flight test of the two-stage, solid fuel "Ashura" from the Semnan region in central Iran. The U.S. noted that, although the launch encountered guidance problems, the missile is projected to have a 2,000-2,500 km range. Buzhinskiy acknowledged that Russia was not aware this had occurred, but doubted that it was a solid propellant missile, stating Qabala had been switched off for maintenance during that time period. Kislyak drove the point home that "Qabala was created against you", but now "we are relaxed and could afford not to service it." Buzhinskiy also added that there had been no "political decision" to use Qabala to monitor Iran, hence it was not configured to do so. Pointing out the unprecedented nature of U.S. shared intelligence with Russia, U/S Rood suggested that Russia provide information to change U.S. views that Iran is not a threat. Buzhinskiy responded by asking the U.S. to provide "real" technical data and "not just words." You Say Milestones, I Say Criteria ================================== ¶11. (S) Kozlusky provided a briefing on a number of indicators of long-range missile capability, including testing to a range of 2000-2500 km, demonstration of staging, and use of high energy propellants. Kislyak commented that there is a difference in what he sees as "milestones" to watch for and "criteria" for joint action. He believed that such criteria require a "political decision" based on an analysis of technical, military, and political considerations. Buzhinskiy went further, stating that the indicators presented were very broad and general in nature, highlighting, for example, that some chemical "indicators" are also used to manufacture household paint. He said the "only criteria" he would consider is a "successful test of a missile at a certain range." When asked to provide a list of more detailed criteria, Kislyak responded that he was being asked for a "list for your criteria, for your decision." Summing up his views on the indicators presented, Kislyak said "we have not been convinced" and "the system you are deploying is targeted at us and not Iran." He added that the U.S. threat indicator idea was "politically awkward" for Russia, because if they agree to criteria/milestones, then they are implicitly accepting the eventual construction of the MD sites. Before there can be agreement on indicators or related actions, Kislyak stated, there must be agreement on BUDAPEST 00000345 004 OF 006 if the threat is "real or not." Continuing, he pointedly asked if the U.S. already had people permanently stationed at the proposed construction sites. U/S Rood responded that the U.S. only had people at the site examining geographical suitability. U/S Rood pointed out that not all indicators need to be present to reach a threat assessment. He encouraged Kislyak to develop a joint set of indicators; this would help to bring about a convergence of views. ¶12. (C) Kislyak said that the U.S. had presented a "serious" paper on indicators, which the Russian side would need to seriously study. He added that Russia's concerns could be reduced through transparency and confidence building measures. The ministers at the 2-plus-2 had come close. Some ideas had been put forward that must be developed. Addressing Russian Concerns =========================== ¶13. (C) Responding to Russian concerns with the proposed MD system, U/S Rood provided nine transparency and confidence-building measures for Russian consideration that include: - Regular exchanges of information on MD policy, program, technical, funding, threat assessments in a U.S.-Russia Transparency Working Group; - U.S. assurance not to construct in Europe more than 10 silo-launchers for 10 long-range GBIs without prior notification and discussions; - U.S. assurance of no major modifications of interceptor silo-launchers without prior discussions; - U.S. assurance to take into account developments in Iranian missile program in decision making to bring the interceptor site in Poland and the radar in Czech Republic to full operational status; - U.S. assurance not to conduct interceptor flight-tests from silo-launchers in Poland; - Sharing of "real-time" radar tracking data via centers in Moscow and Brussels; - Reciprocal stationing of U.S. and Russian personnel at missile defense facilities in the United States and Russia; - Potential visits to MD facilities in Poland and/or the Czech Republic (subject to Host Nation agreement); and - U.S. to provide Russia with rapid alerts via the Washington-Moscow Direct Communications Link ("Hotline") of any long-range ground-based missile defense interceptor launches. What Do You Mean By Operational? ================================ ¶14. (S) Considering the proposal to use missile interrupter plugs as a confidence-building measure, Buzhinskiy responded that since it would only take several hours to make the missile operational again, "it is not sufficient." Regarding the possibility of storing missiles next to silos instead of in them, Russian MoD Division Head Yegeniy Ilyin expressed the concern that it would take only ten days to put the interceptor in a silo. Mr Englander stated that MDA's experience is closer to 20 days for each interceptor. Reiterating their interpretation of Defense Secretary Gates, comments at the "2-plus-2" meeting, that not having missiles in silos meant no missiles in Europe, Buzhinskiy boiled down the Russian condition to "silos are empty, missiles not in Europe." Kislyak, further elaborating the Russian position, stated that not fully operational means the interceptors don't work, that Russia knows they don't work, and that Russia knows this in advance. The best way to ensure that interceptors are disabled is to keep them in the U.S. Furthermore, he said if there are no missiles in the silos, then there is no requirement for the radar to be turned on either. This would allay Russian concerns about the radar reaching into their territory. ¶15. (C) Rood said there are a number of ways to ensure that interceptors won't work. Plugs could be installed in ways that physically disable the interceptors. Visits or technical monitoring could be used to determine that the interceptors are disabled. Kislyak said Gates had said that interceptors would not be put in silos. Rood replied that BUDAPEST 00000345 005 OF 006 our concept is to bring interceptors to Europe and store them in the silos. Is Russia interested in not loading the silos? Would that decrease Russia's concerns? We propose an interrupt mechanism, if you suggest the silos be empty, then we can take that back to capitals. ¶16. (C) Kislyak asked to expand on ideas for the radar. Rood said the U.S. is open to Russian ideas, and we could examine ways to keep the radar off rather than on. Buzhinskiy said the radar is useless when missiles are not in their silos. Englander said that the radar is generally off unless directed to engage a missile. Green said the radar needs to be calibrated periodically. Buzhinskiy repeated that if there are no missile in silos, that makes it easier to deal with the radar. ¶17. (S) Buzhinskiy asked if the rapid alerts via the "Hotline" would be pre- or post-notification. He said the Russian early warning system will automatically react and a post-notification would be too late. U/S Rood said the U.S. could not assure Russia that it would be able to provide pre-notifications. Buzhinskiy then went on to say that the U.S. "may simply change the warhead to be nuclear." ¶18. (S) Responding to Kislyak's question on whether it was the Poles and Czechs that did not want Russian observers at the third site or the U.S., U/S Rood said it is a combination of both. The U.S. does not think having daily observers is necessary, and, furthermore, the Poles and Czechs have obvious sensitivities with stationing a permanent Russian force in their countries. Regarding the reciprocal stationing of personnel in the U.S. and Russia, Buzhinskiy said Russia does not see the U.S. as a threat and instead sees the MD system in the Czech Republic and Poland as the real threat. DASD Green offered that the U.S. missile defense facility in Colorado is a worldwide monitoring center and would be well suited to reciprocal stationing. "First Time in History" ======================= ¶19. (C) Emphasizing again Russian concerns about the MD system, Kislyak stated that the "best guarantee for us is canceling the program." He said it would be the first time in history that such missiles would be on "our borders." He repeated that "if there is a threat to our assets, we will take on the threat." Responding to the U.S. proposed transparency and confidence-building measures, Kislyak said Russia is being transparent in expressing the concerns of the Russian people to a "non-existent threat" and that "we have to respond to our people." He emphasized the U.S. needed to understand that Russia sees this MD system as working against them and "this is how we see the system." The Road Ahead ============== ¶20. (C) Concerning the U.S. proposed confidence-building measures, Kislyak said that he would delegate to his experts for further consideration. His delegation will report everything that had been discussed to Putin by the end of the year. Kislyak said he appreciated the effort to address Russian concerns. He had come to the view, however, that the U.S. has decided to deploy without Russia, no matter what. We now have to consider what can be done for "damage control." He went on to say that the consequences of the program will be much larger than what "you do in the Czech Republic and Poland", that it will have long-term consequences regarding proliferation, and "we will have to calculate our options" about the "problems you are creating." Russia will look at what can be done to reduce the concerns it has as the U.S. goes forward. Most probably there are significant limits on what the U.S. can do. The U.S. paper was carefully written to ensure there would be no veto for Russia. Kislyak said Russia would look at the ideas presented. Russia wanted a way to gain a feeling that a system, deployed in the absence of a threat, could not be used against its interests. ¶21. (C) U/S Rood countered that the U.S. wants to continue BUDAPEST 00000345 006 OF 006 to find a way to address most of Russia's concerns. We will reflect on today's discussions and Russia's initial reactions to our ideas on indicators and confidence-building measures, and the point that had come out in the discussion that the radar would be off in the absence of a missile launch except for calibration. He expressed optimism that there was still time for dialogue since 2013 would be the earliest the U.S. could make the third site operational. Expressing a desire for continued dialogue, the U/S proposed that the group reconvene in January or early February 2008. CFE and MD: Separate Issues =========================== ¶22. (C) U/S Rood also took the opportunity to register U.S. disappointment regarding Russia's suspension of the CFE treaty. Kislyak reiterated Russian claims that the U.S. and Allies are to blame for the failure to ratify the Adapted Treaty. He said "we are not going to change our views, we are not going to return to the old treaty." He also said the CFE treaty suspension has nothing to do with the MD discussions. Providing a final thought on the treaty suspension, Kislyak said "we are waiting for you." (NOTE: The U.S. provided Russia with a revised Parallel Action Plan on 21 December.) Participants ============ ¶23. (SBU) U.S.: Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Rood (Head of delegation),Ambassador Foley, EUR DAS Judy Garber, DASD Brian Green, State/T Senior Advisor James Timbie, State/T Chief of Staff Hugh Amundson, OSD Missile Defense Policy Office Paul Dodge, EUR/PRA Director Anita Friedt, OSD Col. Jon Chicky, DOD Regional Expert Richard Trout, JCS J5 Scott Roenicke, MDA Keith Englander, MDA Dan Lally, Senior Intelligence Analyst Robert Kozlusky, MD Delegation Executive Secretary William Shobert, Interpreter Yuri Shkeyrov, and SIPDIS Embassy notetaker. ¶24. (SBU) Russia: Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Kislyak (Head of delegation),MoD Chief of Directorate General Yevgeniy Buzhinskiy, MFA Deputy Head of North America Department Oleg Burmistrov, MFA Deputy Head of Security and Disarmament Department Sergey Koshelev, MFA Division Head Vladimir Pavlov, MoD International Treaty Directorate Division Head Evgeniy Ilyin, and MFA Counselor and Interpreter Alexander Obukhov. FOLEY