STRONG RHETORIC BUT MILD INTEREST AS REFERENDUM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUDAPEST 000245 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/NCE; PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR ADAM STERLING E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2013 TAGS: PGOV KDEM HU SUBJECT: STRONG RHETORIC BUT MILD INTEREST AS REFERENDUM APPROACHES Classified By: P/E ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: As voters prepare for this weekend's referendum throughout Hungary's 19 megye (regional districts),opinion leaders on both sides have been escalating their rhetoric. Despite the intensity of their comments, last-minute polling indicates softening turn-out and the general sense of resignation indicates declining interest in politics altogether. End Summary. RED MEGYE; BLUE MEGYE ¶2. (SBU) Commentators aligned with the opposition continue to cast the referendum as a vote of no-confidence in what they portray as a government that is neither democratic nor legitimate. ¶3. (C) Ivan Baba of "Budapest Analysis" has written that the Gyurcsany government's goal is to strip the state of both its power and its productive capacity through a stage-managed privatization process. Their desired end-state, he charges, is an impotent and irrelevant government unable to threaten a narrow plutocracy which will control the means of production. The goal, he alleged to us last week, is "a system that looks democratic ( like Putin's Russia." ¶4. (C) Orban advisor Karoly Dan echoes this theme, describing the Gyurcsany government as "not just in a different lane on the same highway, but on a different path altogether." After a week which saw another Gyurcsany trip to Moscow, a step back from Kosovo recognition, and further accusations of bankrupting public services, Dan contrasted the present government with what he described as the more cautious, consultative, and pro-Atlanticist Socialist government of the mid-1990s. "The MSzP is right about one thing," Dan concludes, "it has changed: it has gotten much worse." THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK ¶5. (C) For its part, the coalition continues to take aim at FIDESZ's populist rhetoric, casting its own reforms as an attempt to "remove the last vestiges of Communism." The PM has vowed to "honor the results of the referendum," but some are now arguing that there would be no obligation to annul the educational and medical fees until January of 2009. There is also a fine line between the government downplaying the referendum's significance and downright ignoring the voice of the people. ¶6. (C) MSzP contacts have been quick to seize on Orban's comments that Hungary is "not radical enough," raising the specter that he would stop at nothing to topple the Gyurcsany government. Baba admits that FIDESZ is vulnerable to these charges, conceding that "Orban makes all the decisions ( including whether or not Orban will be the Prime Ministerial candidate." For the first time in years, that has become more than an academic question, particularly after popular Debrecen Mayor Lajos Kosa publicly expressed his willingness to stand as the FIDESZ candidate. Dan notes that the party's own polling reflects a far better response from swing voters to Kosa than to Orban, and other opinion surveys show FIDESZ gaining more ground on the MSzP ( but losing it to respondents who favor "a third force in politics." These factors may combine to at least obligate party insiders to think twice as they prepare for the next elections. YAWNING IN ANTICIPATION? ¶7. (C) Comment: For all the extreme rhetoric prior to the beginning of the mandated "silence period" March 8, the atmosphere in the days before the referendum remains curiously flat. The government's South Stream decision has diverted much of the attention of the major players, and each of the parties has its own internal distractions. Although the most prominent scandal is the allegation that SzDSz President Koka was elected by a fraudulent ballot, the results of the referendum could present opportunities for rivals within the MSzP and even within FIDESZ. The latest polling indicates that efforts to build up the referendum may be having diminishing returns. Some predictions regarding turn-out show a plateau and others a decline; moreover, only 30 percent of respondents in one poll believed that the government should step down as a result of the referendum, undermining efforts to cast the vote as a de facto vote of no confidence. The government may welcome these indications that "March 9 will not change March 10," but they cannot dismiss the prospect of a storm despite the current quiet. Whatever happens on March 9, however, all parties should be concerned about the strong indications of public apathy BUDAPEST 00000245 002 OF 002 evident on March 8. End Comment. FOLEY