ECONOMIC REFORM ISSUES I: THE TAX WEDGE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BUDAPEST 001201 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/CE, EB/OMA, INR/EC; USDOC FOR SAVICH; TREASURY FOR ERIC MEYER, JEFF BAKER, LARRY NORTON; USEU FOR HAARSAGER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON EFIN PREL HU SUBJECT: ECONOMIC REFORM ISSUES I: THE TAX WEDGE ¶1. (U) This is the first in a series of reports on structural economic reforms proposed by economists and macroeconomic analysts to help Hungary achieve higher economic growth, reduce macroeconomic vulnerabilities, and to remain economically competitive in the region. THE HIGH TAX BURDEN ON LABOR ¶2. (SBU) The high tax burden on labor often tops economists' lists of areas in which structural economic reform is needed in Hungary. Taxes on labor influence both workers' decisions about how much labor they supply, and firms' decisions about how much labor they employ. Critics complain that Hungary's current labor tax rules discourage employment, encourage the under-reporting of wages, and stifle the economic growth potential of businesses. They assert that if not addressed, Hungary will at best continue to be the economic laggard of the region, or at worst, it could face a new financial or economic crisis as investor confidence and Hungary's business climate continues to erode. ¶3. (U) The OECD reports that the tax wedge in Hungary - the difference between an employee's net take-home pay and the cost of their employment, including income taxes and social security contributions - is the second-highest in the OECD, falling only behind Belgium. In 2007, single workers in Hungary without children earning the average wage in services and manufacturing industries faced a tax wedge of 54.4 percent of the cost of their labor. The average for OECD countries was 37.7 percent. ¶4. (U) Although the personal income tax rate in Hungary is not the highest in the EU (ranging between 18 and 40 percent),Hungary's large tax wedge also comes from employee and employer contributions to the social welfare system. Hungary's national bank agrees, noting that Hungary's high labor burden for employers and employees is due to "extremely huge social security contributions." In general, employers pay approximately 29 percent of their employees' income for pension and health care contributions, and individuals pay an additional 17 percent. ¶5. (U) Worse still, the size of the tax wedge in Hungary is growing. Between 2006 and 2007, the tax wedge in Hungary grew more than in any other OECD country (2.5 percent). In addition, the government is becoming increasingly reliant on taxes on labor as a source of revenue, likely making future reforms more difficult. Oriens Capital Investment notes that the share of taxes on labor in the total government budget increased from 45 percent in 2004 (as a percentage of total government revenue) to nearly 50 percent in 2007. DISCOURAGING EMPLOYMENT ¶6. (U) Economists point out that Hungary's high tax wedge discourages employment, and that reducing it is critical to increasing an employment rate which is among the lowest in the OECD. According to March 2008 data, Hungary's labor force participation rate for people age 15-64 was just 56.3 percent, well below the regional and OECD average of 70 percent. The IMF raised this issue in its latest Article IV consultations, remarking that "a shift of the tax burden away from labor and to consumption and wealth would improve work incentives and boost employment." In a recent report, the Hungarian National Bank recognized that the "large tax wedge increases non-employment, or at least diminishes labor demand and supply in the formal sectors." Increasing the level of legal employment would generate additional government revenue and help offset revenue lost through tax cuts. ¶7. (SBU) Hungary's tax laws also impose a high marginal cost on employers who hire more than a certain number of employees, discouraging the growth of companies in Hungary. Combined with the overall high tax burden on labor, this has had the effect in certain industries of promoting the use of subcontractors or even illegal workers. In the construction industry, for example, Oriens reports that the average construction company in Hungary only employs three people, whereas the Slovakian equivalent employs 19, and the average Romanian construction company employs 13. Other analysts point to these elements of the Hungarian tax system as the reason why there are relatively few large-sized companies or franchises of Hungarian origin. UNDER-REPORTING OF WAGES ¶8. (U) It is also widely believed that Hungary's tax wedge BUDAPEST 00001201 002 OF 002 not only overburdens those paying taxes, but also contributes to the high level of tax evasion in Hungary (septel). Both employers and employees have an incentive to underreport their actual income. Estimates of illegal employment in Hungary are among the highest in the EU. In 2004, income produced by the illegally employed as a share of GDP was estimated to be over 20 percent, and many believe the figure to be as high as 30 percent. By contrast, the EU-15 average was estimated to be 6.4 percent in the year 2000. ¶9. (U) The current labor tax system in Hungary also imposes high marginal costs on raising salaries above a relatively low level, which contributes to an under-reporting of income (and subsequently a reduction in government revenue). Oriens points out that under current tax rules, there is a significant jump in the marginal costs to employers for employees whose gross monthly incomes exceed HUF 150,000 (approx. USD 750). The steep increase in marginal costs at a relatively low level (the current minimum wage is HUF 69,000 - approx. USD 345),encourages the non-reporting of income above this rate. ¶10. (U) There is also a high marginal cost to employees as the personal income tax rate in Hungary jumps from 18 percent to 36 percent at a relatively low income level. Currently, earnings below HUF 1,700,000 per year (Approx. USD 8,500) are taxed at 18 percent, while earnings above this amount are taxed at a rate of 36 percent. This creates an incentive to report only those wages that fall within the 18 percent tax bracket, and confirms the assertion of economists that tax rates, when combined with corruption, exert a strong influence on the size of the hidden economy. REDUCING DEMAND ¶11. (SBU) The high tax wedge squeeze on households' disposable incomes also has the effect of dampening consumer demand, which is already suffering from the effects of the global economic downturn and IMF/EU stabilization package austerity measures. In Spring 2008, the "big four" tax firms and the AmCham presented a series of tax proposals which they believe would help boost economic growth, promote additional employment, and help reduce the size of the informal economy. The centerpiece of this proposal is a simplification of the tax system, which would reduce the tax burden on labor, and shrink marginal tax burdens. They believe the plan would immediately result in an increase in GDP growth by 1 percent over the current growth plan, and could result in a growth rate of 4.5 percent within four years. Oriens believes comparable results are achievable under its plan, which also calls for the simplification of the tax system, and a shift in the tax burden from labor to consumption. ¶12. (SBU) Comment. Although recognizing the problems high labor taxes create in the economy, the GoH maintains that significant tax cuts are not possible in the near term as it focuses its attention on meeting deficit reduction targets of the IMF/EU stabilization package. Many economists do not believe, however, that tax cuts and fiscal consolidation are mutually exclusive, maintaining that a reduction in the tax wedge, offset by shifting some of the tax burden to consumption, would not be an impediment to fiscal consolidation efforts. They argue that a reduction in income from lowering taxes on labor will be offset by increased revenues resulting from higher growth rates and lower levels of tax avoidance. End comment. Foley