STAMPEDING INTO COALITION, PERHAPS INTO A TRAP

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUCHAREST 000971


STATE FOR EUR/CE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL ENRG RO
SUBJECT: STAMPEDING INTO COALITION, PERHAPS INTO A TRAP
TOO: PSD LEGISLATOR ON INTRAPARTY CABINET NEGOTIATIONS

Classified By: CDA Jeri Guthrie-Corn for 1.5 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: PSD Deputy Georgian Pop confirmed that the
PSD would support Teodor Stolojan as the next Prime Minister
(Note: Basescu just made this selection public in an
afternoon broadcast),but said that two key remaining
sticking points were the PSD's insistence on excluding the
UDMR from the next government, and the choice for the next
Justice Minister--former JusMin Monica Macovei or PSD
Spokesman Cristi Diaconescu. We used the meeting to
underscore that the choice for Justice Minister would be a
litmus test of the next government's resolve to continue with
Justice Sector reforms and the fight against corruption. Pop
also provided his picks for possible cabinet choices. End
Summary.


2. (C) Polcouns and Pol Specialist met with PSD Deputy
Georgian Pop December 12. Pop confirmed that Teodor Stolojan
was acceptable to his party as the next Prime Minister and
that a remaining major sticking point in negotiations between
his party and Basescu's PD-L was the PSD's insistence that
the UDMR be excluded from the next government. It was both a
matter of "hard feelings" and policy, he said, as the PSD
leadership still smarted from the UDMR's 2004 volte face that
secured victory for Basescu's D-A alliance. The UDMR had
also reneged on their pre-election agreement with the PSD and
PNL to jointly announce on election day that they had a solid
parliamentary majority and expected to form the next
government.


3. (C) Pop said that one reason he had requested the meeting
was to gauge the diplomatic community's reaction if the UDMR
were excluded from the next government: what sort of reaction
might this generate in Washington? Polcouns responded that
he had no specific advice regarding the composition of the
next government but observed that--in terms of optics--an
ethnically diverse cabinet lineup helped send a positive
message of inclusiveness both here and throughout the Balkan
region. Moreover, this issue might also be a matter of
interest to the ethnic Hungarian-American community in the
United States.


4. (C) Pop confirmed that a stampede had begun among PSD
officials to join the next government. Plenty of "greedy and
stupid" people in his party--especially those who had failed
to win posts in the recent election--were hoping for access
to government positions and government resources. He evinced
mixed feelings about joining the PD-L in governance,
acknowledging on one hand that his party was unlikely to
remain intact if it failed to get into governance for another
four-year election cycle. On the other hand, joining the
PD-L was tantamount to walking into a trap set by President
Basescu: many of the "stupid and greedy" people in his party
might not resist the temptation to fall into their old
corrupt ways. President Basescu controlled the security
services, and would save up evidence of PSD misdeeds to
humiliate the PSD just before the next Presidential election.
Basescu had held out the prospect for the PSD to
take over the premiership after two years, but it was
doubtful the coalition would last that long, he said.


5. (C) Polcouns noted that one issue of continuing interest
to the western diplomatic community was justice sector
reform. We were now seeing a series of events that helped
focus attention on this issue, including the presence in
Bucharest of the European Commission monitoring team
preparing the next progress report on corruption benchmarks;
the pending expiry of DNA head Daniel Morar's temporary
appointment; and a covert effort by the PSD to convene the
Justice Committee during the election recess to block the
corruption investigation of former Prime Minister Nastase.
The choice of the next Justice Minister would likely be seen
as a litmus test of Romanian resolve to continue the fight
against corruption.


6. (C) Pop winced and acknowledged the PSD's "special burden"
on the corruption issue, but insisted that "all the parties"
had something to hide. Moreover, the one issue that the
three most powerful oligarchs agreed on (i.e.,Dinu Patriciu
for the PNL, Sorin Ovidiu Vantu for the PD-L, and Dan
Voiculescu for the PSD/PC) was the need to keep prosecutors
from prying too closely into their affairs. Pop added that
many influential PD-L leaders including former Interior
Minister Blaga, reputed Presidential Paramour Elena Udrea,
former Bucharest Mayor Videanu, and PDL Vice President
Negoita--all had corruption issues to hide.


7. (C) Pop said that the choice for Justice Minister now
boiled down to two candidates--former Justice Minister Monica
Macovei or PSD Vice President (and spokesman) Cristian
Diaconescu. The oligarchs, most of the PSD, and many PD-L
leaders as well wanted Diaconescu. (Note: Pop asked how
foreign embassies might respond to Diaconescu's nomination.
Polcouns responded that Macovei's international reputation
was well-established; Diaconescu was well-regarded for his
foreign policy expertise, but his formative prosecutorial
experiences dated back to the Ceaucescu era. Polcouns also
reminded Pop of his concerns that the PD-L was out to
"humiliate" the PSD: wouldn't his party become the lightning
rod for shortcomings in Romania's justice sector?) Asked
whether there were any other candidates in play for the
position, Pop said the other names now being floated on the
talk-show circuit were strictly "for show" only. He
dismissed PSD legislator Victor Ponta's prospects as
"impossible--he's all talk only, and nobody in our party
trusts him."


8. (C) Pop's Picks: Pop provided the following observations
regarding possible ministerial appointments:

Deputy PM: (to PSD) Current Senate Speaker Ilie Sarbu. Pop
said that Geoana will become the next Senate Speaker

MFA: (to PSD) SecGen Titus Corlatean (or Diaconescu if he
fails to get the JusMin portfolio)

MOD: (to PD-L) Basescu likely to reserve this for former
Presidential Advisor Mihai Stanisoara

MOI: (to PD-L) Stanisoara if he fails to get the MOD slot or
Vasile Blaga. (Pop mused, "he's getting too powerful and
Basescu might keep him out for a while.")

MOJ: Diaconescu or Macovei

Development: (to PD-L) former Bucharest Mayor Adrian Videanu.
(Pop's comment: "prime job, handles lots of money...")

Finance (to PSD) former Finance Minister and current IMF
official Mihai Tanasescu

Labor: (to PSD) Marian Sarbu

Agriculture: (to PSD) Ilie Sarbu if he fails to get Deputy PM
slot

Transportation: (to PSD) Liviu Dragnea

Economy or Energy: (to PSD) Iulian Iancu. (Pop's comment:
"Watch out for this guy-he's owned by Gazprom and he'll
support South Stream and the Russian proposal for gas storage
facilities in Medias, Moldova, and Bucharest. He added
parenthetically: "Basescu also supports South Stream now,
that's what he told Putin in a phone call recently--check
this out, you'll see I'm right...Nabucco is dead.")


9. (C) Comment: It was clear that we were being demarched by
the PSD to gauge our reaction to two issues--exclusion of
ethnic Hungarians from the next government, and our reactions
to Cristian Diaconescu serving as the next Justice Minister.
Pop made it clear that for Romania's powerful oligarchs--and
many in both the PSD and PD-L, this is an existential choice
where there will be no compromise. Pop's comments also
reflect the PSD's mixed feelings about going into coalition
with the PD-L, and his expectation that next year's
Presidential election will be the leitmotif for political
maneuvering in the coming year. We agree that the
oil-and-water PD-L-PSD coalition by its very nature will
likely prove to be a volatile and possibly unstable one.
Finally, while Pop's picks for future ministerial
appointments comprise an interesting list, they need to be
taken with the usual dose of salt given that there is little
unanimity--and still plenty of jockeying between
candidates--for these slots. End Comment.


GUTHRIE-CORN