SYRIA AND IRAN: UNVIE AMBASSADOR SCHULTE AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000955 SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2016 TAGS: PREL ECON EFIN KTFN MNUC KNNP PARM IR SY EUN SUBJECT: SYRIA AND IRAN: UNVIE AMBASSADOR SCHULTE AND SOLANA'S DEPUTY CONFER ON NEXT STEPS BRUSSELS 00000955 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Alyce Tidball, Acting Political Counselor, for reasons 1 .4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) During a June 13 visit to Brussels, U.S. Mission to the IAEA Ambassador Gregory Schulte met with EU Council Secretariat Director General Robert Cooper to discuss nuclear non-proliferation efforts vis a vis Iran and Syria. Schulte obtained Cooper's assurance that the EU would take formal action on June 23 to designate several Iranian entities and individuals, including Bank Melli, for asset freezes and travel bans. (NOTE: The EU adopted the measure at a ministerial Council meeting on June 23, reported septel.) On the eve of his departure for Tehran to deliver the P5 1 enhanced package, Solana had "zero" expectation of positive results. His main objective would be to gain positive and widespread media coverage of the package in order to fuel debate on the nuclear issue among Iranian elites. Amb. Schulte shared U.S. views on the suspected Syrian nuclear site bombed by Israel and asked for EU support on next steps on the subsequent IAEA investigation of the Syrian activities. Cooper was interested in determining whether Tehran knew of Syria's nuclear activities before the Israeli attack on the site, since the case could be used to illustrate to Iran's leadership that such illicit nuclear programs only served to decrease national security and regional stability. END SUMMARY. Low Expectations, More Sanctions Coming -------------- ¶2. (C) On the margins of a June 13 visit to the Brussels Media Hub for media programming, U.S. Ambassador to the IAEA Gregory Schulte, accompanied by CDA Murray and poloff notetaker, met with EU Council Secretariat Director General Robert Cooper to review next steps on Iran and Syria in the IAEA and the EU. At the outset of the meeting, Schulte obtained Cooper's assurance that the EU would take formal action on June 23 to designate several Iranian entities and individuals, including Bank Melli, for asset freezes and travel bans. Cooper noted that his boss CFSP High Representative Javier Solana had not wanted the EU to take the designation action on June 16 because, according to EU procedures, the issue for decision would have had to have been published on June 13, just hours before his departure for his June 13-15 trip to Tehran. Despite efforts to improve atmospherics for the visit, Solana and his team had "zero" expectation of positive results. Tehran was miffed at Solana's decision to turn down the offer of a meeting with President Ahmedinejad. As a result, Cooper said the Iranian MFA had already scaled back the delegation's meetings schedule. Meetings with Majles Foreign Affairs Committee and Ali Larijani, Velayati, and the Supreme Leader's foreign policy advisor were now canceled by the Iranian hosts. Meetings with FM Mottaki and NSA Jalili were still on. In any case, Solana's main objective would be to disseminate as widely as possible an upbeat, forward-looking message on the enhanced package out, with a view toward stimulating debate among Iran's policy elite. Solana planned to circulate the P5 1 letter in both English and Farsi as well as an overview of the benefits of the enhanced package geared toward helping to transform Iran' into a modern, high tech, energy producing country. Schulte suggested that Solana not only saturate Iranian media, but also work with BBC Farsi, VOA, Radio Farda. China and Russia Problems -------------- ¶3. (C/NF) Cooper underscored that certain EU member states were more anxious to obtain Chinese cooperation on sanctions than Russian cooperation. In Cooper's view, Chinese oil deals were on a different level of magnitude than European deals (Swiss, Austrian) on gas. Cooper said he was planning to "make a major pitch" to the Chinese Ambassador to Brussels on its own strategic interest in helping to push the Iranians harder to suspend and negotiate. Schulte noted that he would be in Beijing on June 16 where he would make a similar push. (Note: Cooper shares USEU's assessment that the newly arrived Chinese Ambassador is well connected in Beijing, having served in previous assignments in the Office of the BRUSSELS 00000955 002.2 OF 002 Prime Minister, and MFA Policy Planning.) As for the Russians, Gazprom's intentions were a concern, as well as the possibility of an Iran-Russia gas cartel. Russia would continue to oppose tough sanctions against Iran because it did not want to endanger profits related to conventional arms sales and nuclear reactor construction contracts. Cooper further assessed that, given their own understanding of Iran's current technical problems, the Russians did not take seriously the Iranian nuclear program. In Cooper's view, Russia ceased being serious about sanctions after the release of the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate on Iran. It wanted to be "part of the game, but not see it actually progress." IAEA Dynamics -------------- ¶4. (C/NF) Schulte and Cooper agreed that the May 2008 IAEA technical experts report on Iran was the toughest to date. Cooper was pleased to see the first reference to a "military dimension" to the covert program, including through the linkage of actions such as testing, procurement, and research. Schulte noted that El-Baradei's own political report was weaker and even contradicted the experts. This disparity gave the Iranians an excuse to call for verification of experts' evidentiary documents. Cooper agreed that there was strong collateral proof of Iran's activities; no less than ten EU member states shared information with IAEA inspectors, including procurement data from several East European EU member states. SCR 1803: Waiting for the French? -------------- ¶5. (C) Cooper lamented that the EU was "nowhere" on 1803 implementation debate given the gap between those who supported a "robust" approach and those who supported a narrow one. He hoped that the non-results of the Solana trip to Tehran would help alter the climate for EU debate in favor of a robust approach on UNSCR 1803 during the French Presidency, perhaps as early as July. In response to Amb. Schulte's question, Cooper also expected the incoming French Presidency would be able to obtain Commission financial support for the IAEA nuclear fuel bank initiative in the next six months. Syria: IAEA Inspections Needed -------------- ¶6. (C) On Syria, Amb. Schulte shared U.S. views on the suspected Syrian nuclear site, including the implications for North Korea, and asked for EU support on next steps on the subsequent IAEA investigation. He stressed the importance of a concerted EU call for IAEA inspectors to be granted full access to the main site as well as other related sites. Cooper noted that the United States had garnered support from the international community for its approach. Many in the G-77 mistrusted Syria, despite their "rubbish" collective statements. Cooper was also interested in determining whether Tehran knew of Syria's nuclear activities before the Israeli attack on the site, since the case could be used to illustrate to Iranians that such illicit nuclear programs only served to decrease national security and regional stability. ¶7. (U) Ambassador Schulte did not have the opportunity to clear this cable before transmission. CHASE .